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NOTES
Antitrust Law--State Action Immunity and State "Neutrality" in
Regulated and Compelled Activities
In Parker v. Brown the United States Supreme Court held that
there was nothing "in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
to suggest that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature."1  The state action exemp-
tion2 recognized in Parker faced one of its rare Supreme Court tests
in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' This review was particularly timely
in light of several recent analyses of the Parker doctrine, 4 the apparent
confusion among lower federal courts about the scope of the exemp-
tion,5 and the absence of a. definitive statement setting the parameters
of the doctrine in its most recent pre-Detroit Edison test.' While De-
troit Edison did not overrule Parker, it did eliminate an exemption
1. 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). Parker dealt with the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1970). Specific attention was paid to §§ 1 & 2, which provide:
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce *among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . . Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by
sections 1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor ....
2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
2. For a summary of the range of additional exemptions, see P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 102-20 (2d ed. 1974).
3. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). The Parker doctrine was also at issue in Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), and Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See text accompanying notes 27-41 infra.
4. See, e.g., Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regula-
tion, 39 A.B.A. ANTrRUST L.J. 950 (1970); Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1976); Posner, The
Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974); Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an Antitrust
Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 61 (1974);
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71 (197.4); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust:
Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. Rv. 328 (1975).
5. Compare Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), and Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of
America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966), with Washington Gas Light Co.
v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Verkuil,
supra note 4, at 331 n.17.
6. See text accompanying notes 36-41 infra.
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based solely on state action in areas in which state policy is defined
by the Court to be neutral-areas in which the Detroit Edison Court
recognized an exemption.based essentially on economic criteria.7
At issue in Detroit Edison was the practice of the Detroit Edison
Company8 of supplying light bulbs to its customers in exchange for
their burned-out bulbs. The company supplied, at no extra charge, ap-
proximately fifty percent of the bulbs of the kinds most frequently used
by its residential customers.9 The program purported to increase the
consumption of electricity. Antitrust action was brought by the owner
of a drug store who alleged that the light bulb exchange program had
damaged his business. 10 The defense offered by Detroit Edison was
that its activity fell within the Parker v. Brown state action exemption:
the company argued that the program had been approved by the
Michigan Public Service Commission" and it was powerless to discon-
tinue the service without further approval. In other words, the pro-
gram had become compulsory and therefore was within the realm of
state action.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on
Parker v. Brown grounds.'2  The decision was affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals,' 8 and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari. 4 The Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the holding of
the lower court and found that a Parker v. Brown exemption was not
7. The Court was severely divided. While the holding was supported by a clear
six to three majority, it is difficult to ascertain a majority rationale. See text accom-
panying notes 51-63 infra.
8. The Detroit Edison Company is the sole supplier of electricity in southeastern
Michigan. Its marketing area includes about five million people. 96 S. Ct. at 3113.
9. The cost of the light bulbs was included (in an accounting to the Michigan
Public Service Commission) as an expense of Detroit Edison. Since utility rates were
calculated on an average cost basis, the bulbs were obviously not free. However, no
profit was recorded as arising directly from the exchange program. 96 S. Ct. at 3113-14.
10. Plaintiff originally asserted that the program violated § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
96 S. Ct. at 3112-13 n.3.
11. The Commission is vested with complete power to regulate all utilities in Michi-
igan including "rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules and conditions of service .
MicH. STAT..ANN. § 22.13(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
12. 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The district court relied heavily on
the language in Parker to the effect that a price fixing agreement among California
raisin growers was not in violation of federal antitrust laws as long as it "'derived
its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not
intended to become effective without that command."' Id. at 1111 (quoting 317 U.S.
at 350).
13. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975) (mem.).
14. 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
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applicable.15 The case was remanded for determination of whether the
program, stripped of its state action immunity, was in fact a Sherman
Act violation.' While this holding was supported by a clear majority
of the Court, the six Justices favoring reversal were split in such a man-
ner as to make it difficult to discern a common rationale. 17 The im-
plications of the holding, the split within the Court, and the problems
that are almost certain to be faced by lower courts in their attempts
to apply Detroit Edison are best understood in the context of Parker
v. Brown and its subsequent interpretations.
The dispute in Parker was the result of actions taken pursuant to
the California Agricultural Prorate Act of 1933.18 The Act established
procedures within which price stabilization programs for agricultural
commodities could be instituted.' These programs utilized price
floors and production controls and involved the withholding of excess
output from market. One such program, initiated for regulation of rai-
sin production, was challenged by Brown, a California producer, who
sought to enjoin Parker, the State Director of Agriculture, from enfor-
cing it.20 In a unanimous decision the Court declared the Sherman Act
to be inapplicable. It did not evaluate the program in light of the Sher-
man Act but made, in essence, a jurisdictional decision. In writing for
the Court, Justice Stone indicated that once the program was estab-
15. 96 S. Ct. at 3123.
16. Id. at 3121 n.38, 3123.
17. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion for himself and Justices Brennan,
Marshall and White. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun wrote separate con-
curring opinions. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Powell
and Rehnquist joined.
18. 317 U.S. at 344.
19. The Act created the Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, which, upon
the petition of ten producers of a particular commodity (in this case raisins), would
hold public hearings and determine whether the establishment of a prorate marketing
plan for the commodity in a specified zone would "prevent agricultural waste and
preserve agricultural wealth." Id. at 346. When it was determined that a program
was advisable, the Commission was authorized to select a committee to formulate the
specifics of the plan. Upon consent of 65% of the zone's producers who jointly owned
at least 51% of the acreage devoted to the regulated crop, the plan would bzcome
effective. The program was enforced by fines levied against any producer who sold
or any handler who received "without proper authority" a commodity for which a
program was in effect. Id. at 347.
20. The case originated as a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute author-
izing the price fixing program. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 .(S.D. Cal. 1941).
Upon appeal from the district court the United States Supreme Court thought it appropri-
ate that the Sherman Act inquiry be made. Justice Stewart indicated that this inquiry
was probably in response to an interim decision, Georgia v. Evans, 310 U.S. 159 (1942),
which held that a state is a "person"f within the meaning of § 7 of the Sherman
Act and reflected the concern of the Court with the relationship of states to federal
antitrust legislation. 96 S. Ct. at 3115.
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lished as being a product of state legislation, the Sherman Act would
not have preemptive effect.21 The fundamental consideration of the
Court is clear from its statement that "in a dual system of government
in which . . . the states are sovereign ... aft unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress. '2  The Court, however, refused to permit
states to give immunity "to those who violate the Sherman Act by au-
thorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful. 28
Thus, the Court distinguished actions that "derived [their] authority
and efficacy from the legislative command of the state"24 from actions
of a predominately private nature. In light of the Detroit Edison plur-
ality opinion that Parker is distinguishable from Detroit Edison on the
basis of defendant's status as a state official, 25 it is essential to note that
the Parker Court did not indicate whether it would have ruled differ-
ently had defendant not been a state official.26
In the post-Parker era the United States Supreme Court has only
twice decided cases in which some clarification of the state action ex-
emption doctrine was required. 7 In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.28 the Court considered the 1937 Miller-Tydings amend-
ment to the Sherman Act,29 which exempted from the Act "con-
tracts or. agreements prescribing minimum prices for . . . resale"
when such contracts are lawful under local law.80 The fact that Loui-
siana statutes permitted resale price maintenance agreements exemp-
ted such agreements from the Act;31 additionally, Louisiana law in-
21. 317 U.S. at 350. It should be noted that the exemption of "state action"
from antitrust legislation does not foreclose the possibility of obtaining the sought-
after relief on a procedural due process basis. See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 330,
354-56.
22. 317 U.S. at 351. Parker was not the first case to recognize this policy with
regard to the Sherman Act. See Olsen v. Smith, 195.U.S. 332 (1904); Lowenstein
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895). These cases are cited and discussed by Hand-
ler, supra note 4, at 8, 9.
23. 317 U.S. at 351.
24. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
25. See text accompanying note 51 infra.
26. At least two commentators have interpreted the Parker decision as allowing
for state action exemptions even when defendant is not a state official. See Handler,
supra note 4, at 8-9; Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust
Laws: Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 46 ILL. L. REv. 349,
366 (1951).
27. See note 3 supra.
28. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
29. Ch. 690, tit. VIII, § 1, 50 Stat. 693 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
30. Id.
31. Now LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:392 (West 1965).
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cluded a "nonsigner" proviso 32 that bound retailers who were not party
to a price maintenance agreement to the same resale terms as contrac-
ting retailers. Calvert Distillers brought suit to enjoin Schwegmann
Brothers, a nonsigning retailing chain, from selling at prices below the
agreed-upon minimum. Schwegmann Brothers contended that the
nonsigner proviso was beyond the scope of the Miller-Tydings amend-
ment. A divided Court agreed that the amendment was not so expan-
sive as to permit enforcement of the nonsigner clause. 8  The Court
further held that Calvert Distillers was not acting within an area af-
forded Parker v. Brown protection. The Court reasoned that although
nonsigner compliance was compelled by the state and therefore argu-
ably protected by Parker v. Brown, the original price fixing agreement
between Calvert and the signing retailers was voluntary. 4 Thus,
Louisiana laws permitted but did not compel the original agreement;
neither did they compel the effect of the nonsigner provision. While
there has been disagreement about whether Schwegmann modified or
simply clarified Parker,33 the holding is clearly to the effect that the
Parker exemption calls for state compulsion or a high degree of state
participation.
The Parker v.. Brown doctrine was applied again by the Court in
1975 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar."' In Goldfarb a unanimous
Court found that enforcement by the Virginia State Bar of a minimum
fee schedule for lawyers established by the Fairfax County Bar Associ-
ation was in violation of the Sherman Act.17  Although the Virginia
legislature had authorized the Virginia Supreme Court to "regulate the
practice of law"38 and designated the State Bar to act as an administra-
tive agency of the court,39 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
32. The nonsigner clause read as follows:
Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any corn-
modity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant
to the provision of section 1 [§ 9809.1] of this act, whether the person so
advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such contract,
is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby.
341 U.S. at 387 n.2 (emphasis by the Court). It currently appears in substantially
the same form as LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:394 (West 1965).
33. 341 U.S. at 388-89.
34. 341 U.S. at 389. This analysis is taken from Simmons & Fornaciari, supra
note 4, at 66-67.
35. Compare Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 4, at 67, with Rahi, supra note
26, at 366.
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. Id. at 793.
38. Id. at 788.
39. VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974).
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this authorization was not sufficient for the price fixing activity to be
deemed "state action." Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
indicated that the "threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompeti-
tive activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant
to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign." 40 The fact that anticompetitive activity was "prompted" by
the state was not to be equated with compulsion by the state."' The
Court in Goldfarb did not consider the question of whether a Parker
exemption was only applicable in suits in which state officials are de-
fendants. Whether the Court simply preferred to make its decision on
other grounds or regarded the employment affiliation of defendant as
inapposite is not clear.
Lower federal court interpretations of Parker have not been uni-
form. In the context of Detroit Edison, it is most instructive to com-
pare the interpretation of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wash-
ington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 2 with that
employed by the Fifth Circuit in Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co."8
In both cases the practices of state regulated utilities were challenged
as violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4  In both cases defendants
claimed an exemption based on Parker v. Brown. In Washington Gas
Light plaintiff argued that no inference of state approval could be made
since there had been no investigation or affirmative approval by the rel-
evant regulatory commission;4 5 however, the Fourth Circuit indicated
its willingness to infer consent from silence and ruled that Parker was
applicable.46
40. 421 U.S. at 790 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 791.
42. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
43. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
44. At issue in Washington Gas Light were promotional practices of Virginia
Electric & Power Company (VEPCO). The company compensated builders through
the use of a rebate program for the costs of installing underground transmission lines.
The amount of the rebate was a function of the degree to which a home was "all
electric." 438 F.2d at 250. Rebate programs similar to those in Washington Gas
Light were also at issue in Gas Light Co. In addition plaintiff challenged a quantity
discount rate system and a plan allowing consumers to pay their bills in 12 equal
installments. 440 F.2d at 1137.
45. 438 F.2d at 252.
46. Id. In Washington Gas Light the court expressed concern that plaintiff did
not exhaust the remedies available through the state regulatory commission, indicating
that this consideration may have been a factor in the decision. This is noted in
Kinter & Kaufman, The State Action Antitrust Imtmunity Defense, 23 AM. U.L REV.
527, 532 (1974), and Verkuil, supra note 4, at 337-38. The Fifth Circuit has rejected
an exhaustion of state remedies requirement. See Woods Exploration & Producing
.Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
212 [Vol. 55
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In Gas Light Co. the Fifth Circuit rejected the "consent by- si-
lence" reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. While the court found enough
active state supervision in the form of full adversary hearings47 to find
Parker applicable, it drew limits, stating, "it is not necessary for us to
extend the Parker exclusion to the point of its extension in Washington
Gas Light and we do not do so."4 Of these two approaches it is clear
that the Fifth Circuit's stricter requirement of greater than general su-
pervision is more typical than the approach employed by the Fourth
Circuit in Washington .Gas Light.49 Of equal importance in view of
the likely repercussions of Detroit Edison is the uniform tendency of
the lower federal courts to avoid substantive economic analysis in mak-
ing a Parker v. Brown decision.50
404 U.S. 1047 (1972), cited in Kinter & Kaufman, supra, at 532 n.32. In addition,
the decision may be partially explained by the tendency of the courts to view state
regulated utilities in a more favorable light with respect to the Parker exemption than
private enterprises. According to Professor Verkuil, 'The rationale of that case
[Washington Gas Light] is firmly rooted in the public utility/public calling context."
Verkuil, supra note 4, at 353.
47. 440 F.2d at 1140.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc., v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974);
United States v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Mamell v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
See also Kinter & Kaufman, supra note 46, at 533. While the degree of supervision
has been the overriding issue in many lower court cases, the courts also have looked
to the legitimacy of the state purpose and evidence of legislative compulsion. See,
e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Build-
ers, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). These cases
are cited in Note, Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee Schedules:
Learned Professions and State-Action Immunity, 53 N.C.L. REv. 399, 406 nn.53-55
(1974).
50. See cases cited note 49 supra. As will be discussed, the Court's decision
in Detroit Edison may force the lower federal courts to make substantive economic
analyses. See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra. The decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), provides a good example of
the careful reasoning required to make a Parker v. Brown analysis without becoming
involved in economic policy. In Whitten both parties were involved in competitive
bidding for contracts to build swimming pools and supply swimming pool equipment
for public and quasi-public institutions. The bids were based on specifications that
were drafted by an architect employed by the buyers. Paddock Pools, Inc., had ex-
perienced a great deal of success in influencing the architect to adopt plans that were
particularly well suited to Paddock's prefabricated. filtering systems, thus placing Pad-
dock in an advantageous competitive position. Paddock contended that its practices
were afforded a Parker v. Brown state action exemption as a result of adoption of
its plans by the public body. In vacating the summary judgment for Paddock Pools
granted by the district court, the First Circuit indicated that Parker was applicable
only in cases in which "government determines that competition is not the summum
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Given the importance of the decision to grant a state action ex-
emption and the various standards employed by the lower federal
courts, the decision in Detroit Edison deserves careful examination as
a possible guidepost to future decisions. The plurality opinion, written
by Justice Stevens, viewed the light bulb exchange program as falling
outside of Parker v. Brown, and offered an alternative method of deter-
mining whether an activity is to be afforded an exemption. Justice
Stevens distinguished Detroit Edison by indicating that, unlike Parker,
defendant in the original suit was not a state official; hence, Parker was
not controlling. The plurality considered it an open question whether
Parker might have been decided differently if charges had been brought
against private parties implementing state programs rather than against
state officials."'
Justice Stevens offered for the plurality a two-step analysis for de-
termining whether an activity qualifies for a Sherman Act exemption.
First, the fairness of not applying a Parker exemption to activity com-
pelled by state law was examined.52 This inquiry was particularly rel-
evant in light of the possibility of treble damages. On this point Justice
Stevens did not distinguish a state regulated utility from a private busi-
ness (as in Schwegmann). The plurality reasoned that Detroit Edison,
by playing a dominant role in the decision to maintain the light bulb
exchange program, did not qualify for immunity under a "state action"
rationale. The plurality distinguished this case from others in which
the private party actually obeyed a state order or in which the state's
role was so dominant that it would be unfair to hold the private party
responsible. In short, while Detroit Edison was compelled to continue
the program, -it was not compelled to initiate the program. As a result
of this exercise of free choice in implementation of the program the
threat of treble damages was not regarded as unfair!"
The second step of the plurality's analysis concerned the appropri-
ateness of superimposing federal antitrust regulations on state utilities
regulations.5 4  The plurality rejected the contention that federal anti-
trust laws should not be applied in areas already regulated by state
bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form
of public regulation." Id. at 30. The existence of a bidding program was regarded
as clear evidence that there had been no decision to eliminate -competition. Id. at
31.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 3122.
52. Id. at 3117-19.
53. Id. at 3118-19.
54. Id. at 3117, 3119.
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agencies. Instead, the plurality declared that federal interests are not
to be "inevitably... subordinated to the State's."'55 Thereby, the plural-
ity exhibited a willingness to consider each activity of the public utility
on an individual basis.5 6 Finding no evidence that the Michigan legis-
lature or the regulatory commission desired to regulate actively the light
bulb market, the plurality regarded the state's policy as neutral. While
this neutrality was regarded as sufficient to preclude a "state action" ex-
emption, it was not considered necessary. -Thus,.once a firm has ven-
tured into a field in which it is not a natural monopoly, or when there
is no other economic basis for an antitrust exemption, the plurality has
indicated its willingness to deny a state action exemption, even if there
is state regulation.58  Acording to Justice Stevens, the "Court has con-
sistently refused to find that regulation gave rise to an implied exemp-
tion without first determining that exemption was necessary in order
to make the regulatory act work, 'and even then only to the minimum
extent necessary.' 59 The basis of this deblaration was the belief that
the relationship between federal laws and state regulation should par-
allel that found between federal laws and federal regulation."0
Two facets of Detroit Edison are particularly important for future
applications of Parker v. Brown. First, a majority of the Court defin-
itively rejected the notion that Parker applies solely to suits against
state officials."1 A second conclusion may be derived by joining the
plurality's willingness to make substantive economic analyses in almost
all areas of state activity62 with the Chief Justice's willingness to make
55. Id. at 3119.
56. Id. To support this willingness to inquire into the individual activities of
state-regulated utilities the plurality offered its interpretation of the "threshold inquiry"
language of Goldfarb. According to the pluality, the "threshold inquiry" of whether
anticompetitive activity is required by a state is not dispositive with respect to an
antitrust exemption. Instead, it is only the initial step. 96 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
57. Id. at 3114.
58. Id. at 3119-20.
59. Id. at 3120 (footnote omitted) Cquoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 391 (1973), which was quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch.,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
60. 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
61. Only the four members of the plurality were willing to narrow Parker to
this extent.
62. It must be recalled that the plurality recognized what it regarded as state
neutrality vis-4-vis the light bulb exchange program, but did not regard neutrality as
necessary to preclude Sherman Act exemption. It would instead apply a form of sub-
stantive economic analysis. It would allow exemptions in cases of natural monopoly
and, perhaps, in agricultural programs similar to the one in Parker. See text accom-
panying notes 54-59 supra. At this point the plurality really no longer spoke in terms
of a Parker v. Brown exemption. The Parker Court reasoned that there was no evi-
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the same type of analysis in areas he regards as neutral vis--vis state
policy.6 This "majority" indicated that approval of a program by a
dence that Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act to restrain "a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-51. There
was no economic analysis to be made. Parker was based on the nature of the federal
system, see text accompanying notes 21-24 supra, and simply stated that state legis-
lative command was not to be preempted by the Sherman Act; therefore, it is inappro-
priate to label an exemption based on an economic rationale as a Parker exemption.
63. Although the Chief Justice joined with the plurality in holding that the light
bulb exchange program was beyond Parker v. Brown protection, he disagreed with
that part of the plurality opinion that would narrow Parker to suits against state officials.
96 S. Ct. at 3123. The Chief Justice pointed out that the emphasis in Parker v.
Brown was not on individuals per se, but on activities. Accordiig'to the Chief Justice,
if the plurality's reading of Parker had been applied in Goldfarb, the decision in that
case could have been based on no more than finding that the Virginia Bar was a
voluntary 6rganization, not a state agency. Thus, the plurality approach was deemed
inconsistent with that employed just one year earlier in which the Court viewed the
degree of state supervision as decisive. Id.
The Chief Justice's concurrence with the holding of the plurality was based on
what he agreed was a state policy of neutrality with respect to the light bulb exchange
program. Id. at 3124. Whether he would go as far as the plurality in allowing federal
intrusion in cases of nonneutrality is not entirely clear. On one hand he expressed
general agreement with those parts of the plurality opinion that called for this more
intrusive analysis, yet when discussing the specifics of his rationale, he spoke only
in terms of "neutrality" or the need for an "independent regulatory purpose." Id.
It is essential to note that the "neutrality" in Detroit Edison is quite different from
that involved in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
Schwegmann took place in the context of a private business and involved individual
conduct that was permitted by Louisiana law. The state took no active role and the
individual found that taking advantage of a law that permitted certain conduct was
no assurance that the conduct would be exempt from the Sherman Act. In Detroit
Edison the conduct was by a state regulated utility that had to have the express approval
of the state regulatory agency.
Justice Blackmun also rejected the plurality's narrowing of Parker to suits against
state officials. Id. at 3128 n.5. His agreement with the holding of the court is based
on what he regarded as evidence of congressional intent for the Sherman Act to have
preemptive effect with respect to inconsisfent state laws. Citing congressional action
to exempt specific activities from the Sherman Act, Justice Blackmun concluded that
if a general state action exemption were desired Congress would have provided for
it. Id. at 3125-26.
The dissenting Justices, led by Justice Stewart, agreed with the Chief Justice that
the "state officials only" interpretation of Parker offered by the plurality was entirely
too narrow. Id. at 3129. They would have disposed of the case through a two-
step analysis. First, the actions of Detroit Edison in proposing what may have been
an anticompetitive program would not be. subject to the Sherman Act under Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), cited in
96 S. Ct. at 3133. In Noerr the Court held that the Sherman Act "does not pro-
hibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the
legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would
produce a restraint or a monopoly.". 365 U.S. at 136. Second, once the plan was
approved, and Detroit Edison was in effect required to continue it, the activities were
protected by Parker. 96 S. Ct. at 3133.
In supporting its own conclusion that all the activities of Detroit Edison were
beyond the Sherman Act, the dissent relied on the legislative history of the Act and
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state regulatory agency is not necessarily'to be regarded as sufficient
evidence of affirmative (or nonneutral) state policy deserving a Parker
exemption; therefore, it is clear that an approach like that employed
by the Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light would now be inappro-
priate.
Precisely what constitutes "nonneutrality" after Detroit Edison is
not clear; therefore, the lower federal courts are faced with continuing
problems of interpretation. First, is state policy neutral? Clearly, ap-
proval by state agencies is .not sufficient to find nonneutrality. Sec-
ondly, if state policy is neutral, does the activity have validity in terms
of the state's regulatory goals? This question, of course, opens the
door to economic analysis. In answering this question the courts will
have to determine whether a natural monopoly does exist or whether
there is some other economic basis foi anticompetitive activity. Market
analysis, the weighing of.competing economic interests and detailed ex-
amination of regional economic conditions may be required just to de-
termine whether the activity should be open to Sherman Act review.
Underlying.the reasoning of a majority of the Court is an apparent
desire to treat the relationship between federal legislation and state reg-
gulation in the same manner as the relationship between federal legis-
lation and federal regulation.64 In order to permit this analogous treat-
ment the majority either ignored Parker's role in balancing federal and
state interests or felt that the federalism justification for Parker must
be subordinated to the public interest in efficient allocation of economic
an analysis of the historical context of Parker v. Brown. The dissent cited language
from the legislative history of the Sherman Act indicating that the Act was not in-
tended "'to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to occupy
doubtful grounds."' Id. at 3137 (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890)). It then described the post-1890 period
as one of "retroactive" expansion of the jurisdictiodfal reach of the Sherman Act due
in large part to expanded interpretation of the commerce clause. Id. at 3138. Accord-
ing to the dissent, without this expanded interpretation of the commerce clause and
the parallel expansion of the Sherman Act, Parker v. Brown would not have arisen.
Once it did arise, though, the dissent viewed the decision as the "best possible" accom-
modation of the original Sherman Act intent and its post-1890 commerce clause expan-
sion. Id. at 3139.
64. The exact language of the plurality is: "Congress could hardly have intended
state regulatory agencies to have broader power than federal agencies to exempt private
conduct from the antitrust laws." 96 S. CL at 3120. As the dissent correctly notes,
the premise that state regulatory agencies could provide exemptions to federal legisla-
tion is itself invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 3135.
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resources.65 Either way, Parker was not carefully considered in the
majority's balance..
The decision in Detroit Edison is also clear evidence that the
Court stands firm in its willingness to provide a forum for review col-
lateral to that available through state and federal regulatory agencies.66
By lowering the Parker v. Brown barrier the Court seems to have in-
creased the role of the lower federal courts in this area. To the extent
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 7 is part of the process of bal-
ancing state and federal interests in a dual system of government, a
broad interpretation of Parker would seem to further this objective by
forcing plaintiffs to place primary reliance on remedies available through
state regulatory agencies.6 8 Here again the Court seemed to assign rela-
tively little importance to this facet of Parker.
One additional aspect of the Detroit Edison opinion must be un-
derscored: it is entirely conceivable that a utility could go through the
entire regulatory process and, after gaining state approval of its rates
and proposed programs, find that it is liable for treble damages in an
antitrust action. The decision in Detroit Edison would not permit this
result "if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the com-
mand of his state sovereign."6 9 However, the Court did not equate con-
tinuing practices that defendant proposed and have become compulsory
with obeying the initial command of the state. As a result, when for-
mulating proposals, state regulated utilities must be conscious of federal
antitrust legislation as well as state regulatory policies.
In Detroit Edison* the Court calls for economic justification for
Sherman Act exemptions in those areas of activity in which state policy
is deemed to be "neutral." Neutrality was found to exist even though
the program in question was that of a regulated utility and had been
approved by the state regulatory agency. The Court seemed to dis-
count the role Parker v. Brown has played in the delicate process of
balancing federal and state interests. If one views Parker's role in bal-
65. In the case of federal law/state regulation, this objective runs 'directly into
the constitutional issue of the allocation of power between federal and state interests.
See Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. '1164 n.8 (1975).
66. Accord, Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1978 (1976).
67. According to Professor Verkuil, "Primary jurisdiction directs a federal court
to dismiss or stay an antitrust action pending a resolution of the challenged conduct
by the appropriate administrative agency." Verkuil, supra note 4, at 348-49 (footnote
omitted).
68. See Handler, supra note 4, at 13-14; Verkuil, supra note 4, at 340-50.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 3117.
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ancing these interests as transcending the public interest in alocative
efficiency, the decision may represent injudicious tampering. On the
other hand, if one views the balancing process and the benefits of allo-
cative efficiency as concerns of comparable magnitude, then the net
benefit from the tradeoff may not be apparent for some time.
JEFFREY LYNCH HARRISON
Civil Procedure-Collateral Estoppel: The Fourth Circuit
Squeezes an Oversized Judgment Through a Narrow Issue
Collateral estoppel' is a procedural doctrine whereby essential
issues that have been decided in a prior action are treated as conclu-
sive in any subsequent proceeding, thus foreclosing a party from reliti-
gating the same issue.2 Among the policy objectives collateral estop-
pel furthers are safeguarding against inconsistent results and avoiding
needless litigation. The seductiveness of these ends, however, should
never obscure the necessity for careful analysis of whether the issue
asserted as collaterally estopped was both actually determined -and
substantially identical with the present one, lest a litigant be unfairly
denied his day in court. In Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft,2
the Fourth Circuit held that a seemingly ambiguous finding by a state
court in an action to recover on a promissory note that an affirmative
defense of duress based upon an alleged threat of a group boycott had
not been established was conclusive as to whether the threat was in
fact made in a subsequent affirmative antitrust action brought by the
defendant in a federal district court.
Azalea Drive-In Theatre, plaintiff in the federal action, leased
films from defendant distributors under agreements providing for pay-
ment of a percentage of the box office receipts. These agreements
also authorized periodic inspections to insure that the theatre was not
1. Also known as a species of res judicata or issue preclusion.
2. The Restatement of Judgments defines the rule as follows: "When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
3. 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976).
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underreporting its receipts. Such inspections were. performed by the
accountant for the distributors' law firm, who concluded that the the-
atre had misrepresented its receipts by as much as $240,000. The
parties managed to negotiate a settlement for $70,000, and Azalea
executed a promissory note for this purpose.4
When Azalea failed to make the first payment, the distributors
initiated a suit in a Virginia state court to recover on the note.'
Azalea set forth three affirmative defenses: (1) that the note was
given without consideration, (2) that it was given by their president
under duress, he having been threatened by the accountant with a
group boycott by the distributors unless he agreed to the settlement,
and (3) that the note was obtained in violation of federal antitrust
laws.' The state judge struck the third defense and an antitrust coun-
terclaim on the ground that the enforcement of the antitrust laws was
under exclusive federal jurisdiction. He then tried the case without
a jury, and received testimony from both sides on whether a group
boycott had in fact been threatened.7
In the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of lawhe framed
one of the questions of ultimate fact to be: "Was there sufficient and
convincing evidence of duress on the part of the plaintiffs to the detri-
ment of the defendants?"8  For all questions posed, including the
preceding, he gave only the general answer, "[a]s the trier of the
facts, the Court decides same in favor of the plaintiffs," and granted
judgment for plaintiffs.
Meanwhile, Azalea had filed a claim in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the distributors
charging a Clayton Act violation and the use of "monopolistic and
economic threat, coercion and duress" in obtaining the note.10 After
the state court rendered its judgment, the distributors amended their
answer to assert that Azalea was collaterally estopped from again liti-
gating the question of the alleged threat and attendant duress. The
district court, noting the lack of specific findings, ruled that the doc-
4. Id. at 714.
5. Id. The state trial court decision is unreported. The statement of facts con-
cerning that proceeding is taken from the summary by the Fourth Circuit.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 716 n.2.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 714; Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Sargoy, 394 F. Supp. 568 (1975)
(mem.).
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trine should not apply since it was possible that the- state judge found
that a threat was made without finding that it constituted duress."1
Azalea then prevailed in the jury trial.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, through Chief Judge Hayns-
worth, reversed on the ground that the core factual dispute, namely
whether, or not a threat of group boycott had been made, was the
same in each suit. 12  Believing that the state judge in deciding the
facts for the distributors must have found that no threat had been
made, the court concluded that under established principles collateral
estoppel should have been invoked. The court also rejected Azalea's
claim that application of collateral estoppel in the federal suit would
compromise its seventh amendment right to a jury trial since no such
right had been available in the former suit on the note by determining
that the policies underlying collateral estoppel are not overborne sim-
ply because the form of the fact finding process in the first forum
is unlike that of the second."3
Judge Butzner vigorously dissented on three separate grounds.
He based the first on an analysis of the difference between the state
claim of duress and the federal claim of an antitrust violation: to
prove duress Azalea had to establish not only that the accountant
threatened a group boycott, but also that such a threat was unlawful
under state law and "was sufficient to overcome the will of a person
-of ordinary firmness,"'14 while .to make out a per se antitrust violation
only a threat of a group boycott need be proven. Since the ground
of decision was unclear on the record, the judge could have found
that no threat had been made, or, alternatively, that the threat had
been made but that it was not unlawful or that it fell short of over-
coming the will of Azalea's president. Thus collateral estoppel
should not apply for the reason that the dispositive matter litigated
and determined might have been only one of several possibilities, and
it had not been clearly shown to be only the existence or not of the
threat. A second factor that he asserted to weigh against collateral
estoppel was the fact that Azalea had to prove by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence the duress defense while the antitrust claim en-
tailed only the ordinary civil burden of proof -of a preponderance of
11. 540 F.2d at 714; 394 F. Supp. at 575.
12. 540 F.2d at 714.
13. Id. at 715.
14. Id. at 716 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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the evidence. 5 Lastly, Judge Butzner asserted that the application
of collateral estoppel would be a compromise of Azalea's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial on the antitrust claim.' 6
Prior cases illustrate those situations in which the invocation of
collateral estoppel is deemed. inappropriate. Russell v. Place,'7 cited
by the dissent,' 8 refused to allow collateral estoppel to foreclose a
party who had been found guilty of infringement of a patent from con-
testing the validity of that patent in a subsequent suit when the patent
consisted of two claims and it could not be discerned on which claim
the first judgment had been rendered. The rule stated in its holding
has never been questioned:
[I]t must appear, either upon the face of the record or be shown
by extrinsic evidence, that the precise question was raised and de-
termined in the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this
head in the record,-as, for example, if it appears that several
distinct matters may have been litigated, upon one or more of
which the judgment may have passed, without indicating which of
them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was ren-
dered,-the whole subject-matter of the action will be at large, and
open to a new contention, unless this uncertainty be removed by
extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and deter-
mined.'9
Thus, reasoning by speculative inference from an ambiguous record
is not permitted to show that the issues are the same. There must
be demonstrable- evidence from which such a conclusion, and no
other, necessarily follows.
Closely.related to this concept is the mirror situation in which
the first judgment rests on alternative grounds, either of which by it-
self would justify the result, and the determination of each or all of
them is evident from the record. Under these circumstances, unlike
the Russell situation, what issues were actually decided is known. Al-
though this knowledge might seem to vitiate the argument against col-
lateral estoppel based on uncertainty, the recent trend is to deny pre-
clusion in this situation also. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, contrary to- the first Restatement,20 takes the
view that neither of two alternative determinations by itself should be
15. Id. at 717.
16. Id. at 718.
17. 94 U.S. 606 (1876).
18. 540 F.2d at 715.
19. 94 U.S. at 608.
20. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment n (1942). "Where the judg-
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conclusive in a subsequent suit.21  The recent case of Halpern v.
Schwartz22 refused to give collateral estoppel effect in an action for
objections to discharge of a party who had been adjudicated bankrupt
on three separate grounds, any one of which would have been con-
clusive standing alone, when only one of the grounds required a find-
ing of actual intent to defraud, which was the issue in the second suit.
After surveying the authorities and concluding that they were not
overwhelmingly compelling either way on this close question, the
court offered the rationale that, "if the court in the prior case were
sure as to one of the alternative grounds and this ground by itself was
sufficient to support the judgment, then it may not feel as constrained
to give rigorous consideration to the alternative grounds," implying
that in such a situation the "full and fair consideration" generally re-
quired of the issue in the first instance may be lacking.24
Another limiting factor in regard to collateral estoppel is a change
in the burden of proof. Usually this circumstance arises when the
first action is criminal in nature and the second civil; an acquittal in
the former under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard will not
preclude relitigation of the issues in the latter under the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard.2" In Helvering v. Mitchell26 a defend-
ant who had been acquitted on a criminal tax evasion charge was held
not to be immune from a civil suit to collect a deficiency based on
ment is based upon the matters litigated as alternative grounds, the judgment is deter-
minative on both grounds, although either alone would have been sufficient to support
the judgment." Id. See. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1942), for support of the first Restatement position.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment i (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973). "If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of
two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the
result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone." Id.
22. 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 105.
24. But cf. Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1926).
The defendant's position comes to this: That a finding is not res judicata, if
the court could have reached the same result by other reasoning. . . . But
the principle has never been carried so far' as to discredit findings which are
collateral only if the cause had been disposed of upon other principles than
those which the court had a mind to apply. On the contrary, if a court decides
a case on two grounds, each is a good estoppel.
Id. at 724. Judge Learned Hand's last sentence could be taken as standing for the
contrary view, but the case may be distinguished in that the alternative ground asserted
by the defendant was only a hypothetical one, and not included in the first court's
findings. See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 107 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970).
25. A conviction, however, may serve as an estoppel, since satisfaction of the
higher burden of proof must necessarily logically include satisfaction of the lower one.
26. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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the same set of alleged facts. The court stated that "[tihe difference
in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was 'merely
... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all
reasonable doubt of the accused.' "217 This principle has also been
applied further down the burden of proof spectrum when an admin-
istrative proceeding follows a civil suit.28
A corollary to this precept is that a party who loses on a claim
in which one element to be proven is some specific intent or other
subjective state on the part of his adversary will not be estop'ped from
litigating a different claim based on the same act, but in which intent
is immaterial. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United
States, 9 a case also illustrating the criminal-civil dichotomy,3° the
Government was not estopped from pressing a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding for imported merchandise not included in a declaration and
entry under the tariff laws even though defendant had been acquitted
on criminal charges stemming from the same importation. The court
reasoned that for a criminal conviction the Government had to prove
a willful intent to defraud as well as the act of unlawful importation.
An acquittal could have entailed a finding that the act was done but
that the intent was lacking. Since in a forfeiture action the Government
had only to prove that the property was imported without a declar-
ation, the criminal acquittal could not be accepted as a conclusive
27. Id. at 397 (quoting Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302 (1914)). See also
Harper v. Blasi, 112 Colo. 518, "151 P.2d 760 (1944), noting that the same testimony
might be insufficient to support a guilty verdict against a criminal defendant but never-
theless suffice to discharge the lower burden of proof necessary for a verdict against
a civil defendant. Id. at 521-22, 151 P.2d at 761. But see Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886), in which the Government was estopped from litigating
a civil action for seizure of untaxed liquor after it had failed to obtain a conviction
in a criminal trial for attempt to defraud the United States of the tax on it.
28. In Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1968), a longshoreman
first sued a shipowner for negligence in connection with injuries sustained aboard ship.
The shipowner impleaded the employer, and it was determined that the longshoreman
had in fact sustained no injury when he fell. The court held that collateral estoppel
should not apply on the question of injury when the longshoreman subsequently sought
compensation from his employer under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act because a lesser quantum of proof is necessary to establish a claim
in that proceeding and the administrative policy is to resolve all doubtful fact questions
in favor of the injured employee. Strictly speaking, the court did not base its holding
solely on the difference in burden of proof, but also because the nature of evidence
and procedural rules are in general more "free-wheeling" in administrative proceedings.
Id. at 188.
29. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
30. Id. at 235.
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finding that this act was not done.3 1 A slight modulation on this
theme is when the intent must still be proven in the second suit, but
the burden of proof is less. The proposed Restatement, which sup-
ports the general rule of excepting collateral estoppel in the case of
a changed burden of proof,8 2 provides a hypothetical illustration:
A brings an action against B to recover on a promissory note.
B defends on the ground that he was induced by A's friend to give
this and other notes in the series, but fails to establish fraud by
clear and convincing evidence as required by law. After judgment
for A, the law is changed to provide that in such cases fraud need
be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. In an action
by A on'another note in the series, B is not precluded from assert-
ing the defense of fraud.83
Thus, the requirement of proof of intent in the first suit not only aborts
an estoppel in the second suit when .by a qualitative change in the
burden of proof intent is not an essential element, but also when by
a quantitive change intent is still an essential element, but the neces-
sary quantum of proof is less.
The underlying justification for denying collateral estoppel when
the burden of proof changes is that the policy of preventing inconsist-
ent results is inoperative in such a case."4 Differing results under dif-
fering burdens of proof are neither contrary to logic nor repugnant
to considerations of fairness; indeed, considerations of procedural in-
tegrity may occasionally compel a different result in such a case.
31. Id. at 234-35. The concern in this analysis with the ambiguity of the first
determination also echoes the rule of Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876). See text
accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
provides:
Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion.
(d) The party against whom preclusion is sought had. a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action
than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or
the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action
33. Id. § 68.1, Comment on Clause (d), Illustration 11.
34. But cf. Harding v. Carr, 79 RI. 32, 83 A.2d 79 (1951). In this action
for injuries sustained in an auto accident, plaintiff was estopped from asserting that
the driver of defendant's car had his permission, when in an earlier suit against defend-
ant's insurer plaintiff failed to show such permission. Collateral estoppel was applied
over a dissent, even though in the second action the burden would have shifted entirely
to the owner to rebut the presumption of permission. The court stated: "The prin-
ciple of estoppel as here involved is based on the adjudication of an identical and
ultimate issue and not on the question of which party may legally have the burden
of proving or disproving such issue." Id. at 43, 83 A.2d at 84.
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Another situation in which collateral estoppel may be denied,
which entails consideration of policies extrinsic to the general policies
of collateral estoppel, and concerning which there is less agreement,
is when a right to jury trial attaches to the second suit but not the
first. In Rachal v. Hill3 5 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court's. ruling in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover"--that the seventh amendment right to jury trial requires
that legal issues must be tried first before a jury when both legal and
equitable issues are to be tried in the same suit-also mandates that
the right to jtry trial may not be lost by operation of collateral estoppel
to issues in an entirely separate suit.s 7  Thus, Rachal, who had been
issued an injunction in connection with a manipulative stock scheme
in an action initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, was
not estopped from litigating the issue of the scheme when stock-
holders subsequently pressed forward a derivative suit against him
averring the same scheme.88
The Rachal decision has been generally disapproved. Only one
case appears to have followed it.3 9 The Restatement, probably in
response, has taken the contrary position.40  Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc.,41 though distinguishing Rachal on the facts in that the
estoppel in Crane was mutual, questioned in dictum the correctness
35. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
37. 435 F.2d at 64.
In light of the great respect afforded in Beacon Theatres . . . and its
progeny, for a litigant's right to have legal claims tried first before a jury
in an action where legal and equitable claims are joined, it would be anom-
alous to hold that the appellants have lost their right to a trial by jury on
the issue of whether they are liable to respond in damages for violations
of the security laws because of a prior adverse determination by the district
court of the same issue in an action in which their present adversary was
not a party and which arose in a different context from the present action.
Id.
38. The court seemed to narrow its holding by emphasizing that the asserted
estoppel was non-mutual, i.e., the party seeking to assert it was not an adversary in
the first suit. See note 37 supra. It is fair to read Rachal as signifying that when
the estoppel is mutual, then the jury trial issue should not abort it. The distinction
seems rather cabalistic; perhaps the court thought that the right to jury trial somehow
renews itself at the appearance of new adversaries.
39. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This
holding appears even broader than Rachal, since a right to jury trial was present in
the first suit, but was waived.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973). "The determination of an issue by a judge in a proceeding conducted without
a jury is conclusive in a subsequent action whether or not there would have been
a right to a jury in that subsequent action if collateral estoppel did not apply." Id.
41. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
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of the Rachal holding.4 2  In addition, two cases whose factual pat-
terns seemed to be appropriate for a Rachal analysis did not even refer
to the issue.43 One article has attacked the Rachal holding as a leap of
faith from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the seventh amendment
that does unwarranted violence to the policies of collateral estoppel.4 ,
One consideration not directly raised in the Azalea opinion is tlat
the policies underpinning the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts of the administration of the antitrust laws mandate,
under the rule announced by Learned Hand in Lyons v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,45 that determination of antitrust issues decided in state
court proceedings not be binding on the federal courts. In Lyons de-
fendant in a state court breach of contract action lost on a defense
alleging antitrust violations in the marketing of lamps. Defendant
then sued in federal court, averring the same antitrust violations.
Although acknowledging that the state court determination would or-
dinarily be treated as an estoppel, 4" the court nevertheless stated:
[T]he grant to the district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over the
action for treble damages should be taken to imply an immunity
of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere; at least on
occasions, like those at bar, where the putative estoppel includes
the whole nexus of facts that make up the wrong.47
The policy reason offered for this distinction was that the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction evidenced a congressional intent that the antitrust
laws be uniformly administered, 48 even though it may be permissible
42. Id. at 343 n.15.
43. Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081
(5th Cir. 1969); and Paramount Transp. Sys. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), both allowed collateral estoppel on the
issue of liability in damage actions under the National Labor Relations Act after the
unions had been found guilty of secondary boycotts under the Act by the National
Labor Relations Board in actions for injunctions. The Fifth Circuit in Rachal did
not bother to distinguish its own decision in Painters. The Ninth Circuit was prob-
ably not yet aware of Rachal when it handed down Paramount.
44. Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment.
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HAgv. L REv. 442 (1971). The authors stress the waste of
judicial resources incurred by retrying complex issues in arguing that neither the sev-
enth amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court nor considerations of fairness
should produce such a result. Id. at 458.
45. 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
46. Id. at 188.
47. Id. at 189; cf. Scott, supra note 20, at 18-19 (litigants should not be precluded
from retrying issues in a court having jurisdiction over the matter when such issues
were incidentally decided by a court that would not have had jurisdiction to decide.
such issues in an action brought expressly to determine them, even though the judgment
in the initial suit is still valid).
48. 222 F.2d at 189.
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for state courts incidentally to decide antitrust issues when they arise
in a defense to a contract action.49 One commentator has also cited
the seventh amendment right to jury trial, setting the burden of proof,
and the choice of forum as important legislative considerations in the
federal administration of antitrust law. 50
A cursory reading of Lyons might imply that collateral estoppel
by a state court judgment is never appropriate in a federal antitrust
action. In distinguishing the situation in Lyons from that in Becher
v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc.,51 however, Hand seemed to concede
that prior state court determinations of pure fact, as opposed to those
of law or mixed fact and law, may be conclusive. After quoting from
Becher that "'[e]stablishing a fact and giving a specific effect to it
by judgment are quite distinct,' "52 he made the somewhat cryptic ob-
49. Id. at 190. Of course, the Azalea case may be distinguished in that the
trial judge refused to entertain the antitrust defense, citing the federal courts' exclusive
jurisdiction in the area. Although counterclaims and affirmative treble damages suits
based on the federal antitrust laws cannot be heard in state courts, such courts may nev-
ertheless, in their discretion, entertain defenses based on them. As the court stated
in Lyons v. Westinghouse: "We think that the state court had undoubted jurisdiction,
notwithstanding § 15 of Title 15, U.S.C.A., to decide the merits of the first defence
. .222 F.2d at 187. Such defenses are appropriate only when the alleged anti-
trust violations "inhere" in the contract itself and the contract is intrinsically illegal.
Id. at 187-88. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755
(1947). Nevertheless, state courts are not bound to entertain such defenses in any
case, since, "[o]bviously, state law governs in general the rights and duties of
sellers and purchasers of goods ...... Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1958).
It appears that if in the instant case the note would not have been obtained but for
a threat of group boycott, a per se antitrust violation, see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 & n.5 (1959), then it could plausibly be argued
that the illegality "inhered" in the note itself. Nevertheless, the decision by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court on appeal in Azalea Drive-In Theatre,. Inc. v. Sargoy, 215 Va.
714, 720, 214 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1975), that "[tihe alleged federal antitrust violation
was collateral to the main issue in plaintiffs motion for judgment, and it was not
a viable defense in this action" rendered the matter moot. Cf. Medusa Corp. v. Gordon,
496 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1974) (violation of antitrust laws held not to be a valid
defense under Michigan law).
50. Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior
State-Court Deterniinations, 53 VA. L. Rav. 1360, 1365, 1383 n.85 (1967).
51. 279 U.S. 388 (1928). Becher involved a machinist's contract to construct
a machine, whereby he agreed to keep information entrusted to him secret and not
to make use of it himself. He breached this trust by obtaining a patent for the inven-
tion on his own, and his employer obtained from a New York court a decree holding
the machinist a trustee ex maleficio of the invention and commanding him to assign
the patent to the employer. When the machinist turned around and sued the employer
for infringement of the patent, the Supreme Court held that he was estopped from
asserting the claim by the state decree. One ground of distinction from Lyons could
have been that the court ruled that the suit was not one arising under the patent
laws at all. The court stated that the cause of action was based on either breach
of contract or wrongful disregard of confidential relations, both of which are independ-
ent of the patent law. Id. at 391.
52. 222 F.2d at 188 (quoting 279 U.S. at 391).
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servation that this proposition suggests that "the distinction [is] be-
tween the finding of one of the constituent facts that together make
up a claim and the entire congeries of such facts, taken as a unit;
an estoppel is good as to the first but not as to the second." 53 The
upshot of this statement seems to be that state court determinations
of discrete, concrete facts, separable from the major premise of a
legal theory based on antitrust law, may properly be invoked for es-
toppel, since such determinations are made -independently of an issue
of law under exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the federal court may
still exercise its prerogative to apply the federal law to the established
facts in order to rule on the merits of the claim as a whole.54
If the majority decision in Azalea is deemed to have impliedly
rejected the countervailing arguments presented by the dissent, then
the decision may retard the developing law of collateral estoppel as
well as undermine already firmly established principles. The state-
ment that "the factual dispute in the federal court was exactly the
same as the factual dispute in the state court"55 is misleading. Certainly
whether a threat of group boycott was made was a threshold question
in both. But stating the obvious does not develop the analysis far
enough; it must also be conclusively shown that the factual question
was actually decided in the former. In view of the ambiguity of the
trial judge's findings, the conclusion that "[w]hen the state trial judge
stated that he found the facts in the plaintiffs favor, he must have
found that no threat had been made,"56 simply does not necessarily
follow from the premise that the factual dispute was the same.
The state judge's findings are only a bit more enlightening than
a general verdict.57 His finding for plaintiffs on the stated issue-"Was
there sufficient and convincing evidence of duress on the part of the
53. Id. The distinction may be. made more lucidly by the Becher opinion itself:
That decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the Courts of
the United States does not give sacrosanctity to facts that may be conclusive
upon the question in issue. A fact is not prevented from being proved in
any case in which it is material, by the suggestion that if it is true an impor-
tant patent is void-and . . .we can see n6 ground for giving less effect
to proof of such a fact than any other.
279 U.S. at 391-92.
54. See Note, supra note 50, at 1384, pointing out that limiting collateral estoppel
effect to factual determinations safeguards against contravention of any substantial fed-
eral interest.
55. 540 F.2d at 714.
56. Id.
57. General verdicts, with their lack of specific findings, are a great impediment
to the application of collateral estoppel. This could be remedied by a more widespread
use of special verdicts and interrogatories.
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plaintiffs to the 'detriment of the defendants?'" 8-though framed as a
single issue, must be viewed as a multiple finding. Admittedly, it could
mean that no threat was made, but it could also mean that the threat was
not unlawful under state law,59 that the threat was insufficient to over-
come the will of a person of ordinary firmness,60 that defendants' proof
was not sufficiently clear and convincing on the elements of the defense,0'
or some combination of these variables. If the finding is viewed as in-
tending only one or several of these possible conclusions, then it should
come squarely within the rule of Russell v. Place that collateral estoppel
effect should not be given to ambiguous findings. 62 Even if it is viewed
as implying all of them, including that no threat was made, the rule of
Halpern v. Schwartz, that a putative estoppel based on any of alternative
sufficient determinations should not be allowed,63 still should preclude
any estoppel. The requirement that Azalea prove not only that a threat
was made, but also that such threat was sufficient to overcome its vice-
president's will, makes the situation analogous to that of One Lot Emer-
ald Cut Stones, in which it was held that if a subjective element is essen-
tial to the first claim, but not the second, no estoppel will attach.64 Aside
from any ambiguity in the findings, the difference in burden of proof
58. 540 F.2d at 716 n.2.
59. This finding was explicitly made by the Virginia Supreme Court on appeal,
215 Va. at 721, 214 S.E.2d at 136. See note 49 supra.
60. This term of art is generally considered to be an essential element of duress.
See United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414 (1872). "Unlawful duress
is a good defense to a contract if it includes such degree of constraint or danger,
either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, as is sufficient in severity or
apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Id.
at 432. The judge might well have concluded that to threaten a boycott is simply
a good business tactic, which an ordinary businessman should be able to take in stride.
61. Duress usually requires the higher burden of "clear and convincing" evidence,
rather than the ordinary civil burden of a "preponderance" of the evidence. Virginia
state law appears to adhere to this requirement. "One who seeks to cancel a contract
for fraud and duress must carry the burden of proof and furnish clear and full proof
of such fraud and duress." Scott v. Scott, 142 Va. 31, 39, 128 S.E. 599, 601 (1925)
(per curiam) (quoting the trial court). The judge's use of the word "convincing"
indicates that this was the standard he was applying.
62. See Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608 (1876).
63. 426 F.2d at 105.
64. 409 U.S. at 234. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones is distinguishable from Azalea
in that in the former the party against whom the estoppel was asserted had failed
to establish fraudulent intent on the part of its adversary, whereas in the latter Azalea
had failed to establish that its own will had been overcome. Nevertheless, it should
make no difference which party is looking into whose head; an element of proof in
addition to the establishment of the objective act is required either way. To establish
the antitrust claim, Azalea had only to show that a threat of a group boycott had
been made, such a threat being a per se antitrust violation. See, e.g., Kor's Inc.
v, Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) and cases cited id. at 212 n.$.
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alone dictates that estoppel is inappropriate, according to Helvering v.
Mitchell and the other cases discussed above.65
One consideration briefly addressed and summarily dismissed by
the Azalea opinion is that of collateral estoppel compromising the right
to jury trial under the antitrust claim. The court stated that "the rules
foreclosing relitigation of factual issues between the same parties serve
such important policies that relitigation should not be allowed though
the fact finding processes in the first tribunal were unlike those which
otherwise would be available in the second."66 Although this declara-
tion could be taken as direct disapproval of the ill-conceived rule of
Rachal v. Hill,67 it persuasiveness is diluted by the omission of any
citation to that case, by the fact that the estoppel in Azalea, being mu-
tual, is thus readily distinguishable, and by the failure to weigh the "im-
portant policies" of collateral estoppel against those of the right to jury
trial in any sort of analytical discussion.
While Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.68 is not directly ap-
posite by virtue of the state court's refusal to hear the antitrust defense,
the inference remains strong that if it had ruled on the merits of the
defense and simply found against Azalea without clearly indicating that
a threat of group boycott had not been made, a Lyons analysis would
have dictated that the federal court not be bound.6 9 Thus it seems
anomalous that the federal court should be bound by a judgment based
on a different major premise (duress), when it would not have been
bound by a judgment based on the same major premise (antitrust).
Except for the jury trial issue, any one of the above considerations
standing alone should have mandated that collateral estoppel be re-
fused in the instant case. All are corollaries of the fundamental axiom
that the issue in the first suit must be substantially identical to the issue
in the second, and, taken together, weigh so heavily against the Azalea
opinion that it must be said that the case was wrongly decided. 70 The
65. 303 U.S. at 397; see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
66. 540 F.2d at 715.
67. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text supra.
69. This is not to say that if such a specific factual finding were made, the
federal court should disregard it. Such a finding would be collateral estoppel. in re
the existence of the threat, and since the merits of the. antitrust claim depend on
this fact, it would require that the claim be dismissed. This would be an example
of collateral estoppel by a "constituent" fact, as opposed to "congeries" of fact repre-
sented by a general finding on the claim. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text
supra.
70. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is flexible in its allowance of extrinsic
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glaring defect in the court's analysis is that it treats the state finding
as one of a singular factual issue, rather than as an issue of fact so en-
tangled with an overlay of legal issues that it is impossible to extract
with confidence the one factual finding relevant to the second suit.
The state court issue was decided as one of mixed fact and law; the
federal court issue wai one of fact alone. Therefore the issues were
not the same in both suits. The issues being different, no estoppel
should have attached.7'
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Civil Procedure-Kidd v. Early: Summary Judgment on Testi-
monial Evidence in North Carolina
In Cutts v. Casey' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that any
testimonial evidence submitted in support of a motion for a directed
verdict created an issue of credibility to be presented to the jury. This.
holding gave rise to dire predictions 2 that the North Carolina summary
judgment procedure would be crippled. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has narrowed the scope of Cutts by setting guidelines
for determining when an issue of credibility actually arises.
In Kidd v. Early' the court granted summary judgment4 for the
evidence to show whaj was decided in the first suit. The holding in the instant case
thus could possibly have been redeemed if the court had examined the trial record
and, say, found the level of evidence against a threat having been made so overwhelm-
ing as to support a partial directed verdict in an antitrust trial. With such a demonstra-
tion, the ambiguity of the judge's findings could justifiably have been disregarded.
71. The instant case should at least remind us that the "lesson" preached by
Professor Vestal has not been thoroughly learned: "One of the lessons which must
be learned is that great exactness must be used in determining the issues decided in
Suit I and to be decided -in Suit .. . . In the years ahead, it will be necessary
to use more finesse in the area." Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature
of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 192 (1965). The basic value of Azalea
is to point out that refinement of collateral estoppel technique is needed to insure
that the "fit" between issues is a close one.
1. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
2. Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, 50 N.C.L. REv. 729 (1972); Note, Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended
to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L. Rv. 940 (1976).
3. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976).
4. Pursuant to N.C.R. Crv. P. 56. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were enacted in 1970. Rule 56 enables a court to grant final judgment for a
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party bearing the burden of proof at trial who supported his motion
with depositions and affidavits, while the non-moving party failed to
produce any evidence to support his opposition to the motion. For the
first time in North Carolinh, the court held that testimonial evidence
does not automatically trigger an issue of credibility which must go to
the jury, but may be afforded credibility as a matter of law if it is dis-
interested, unimpeached and uncontradicted.
The parties stipulated that on August 4, 1972, plaintiffs, Dr. Claude
Kidd, Thomas H. Collins and David P. Dillard,5 purchased a thirty-day
renewable option to purchase farm land in Guilford County, North Caro-
lina from defendant, C.F. Early. The option agreement failed to spec-
ify any time or method of payment.
On September 28, 1972, plaintiffs executed a written offer to pur-
chase and delivered it to defendant, who refused to accept their terms
for payment." The next day plantiffs mailed a letter to defendant exer-
cising the option,7 and delivered a check for $119,000 to their attorney
to hold until the deed was delivered.8  Defendant found these terms
unacceptable and refused to convey the property.
After further negotiations, the parties continued to disagree on the
method of payment and the purchasers filed suit seeking specific per-
formance of the option contract. After the pleadings were filed, both
parties moved for summary judgment under rule 56. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the vendor, and the purchasers ap-
party before trial when there remains no genuine issue of material fact. The court
applies the law to the undisputed facts and grants summary judgment for the party
entitled to it as a matter of law.
5. Plaintiff Kidd originally purchased the option with Howard M. Coble, who
later sold his interest to Kidd. Later, Kidd assigned one-third of his interest to Col-
lins and one-third of his interest to Dillard. 289 N.C. at 347, 222 S.E.2d at 396.
6. Defendant Early learned* from talking with his CPA that he would gain a
substantial tax advantage if he were paid in installments rather than in cash on delivery
of the deed. Id. at 348-49, 222 S.E.2d at 397.
7. The letter read in part:
The option granted by you on September 1, 1972, for the purchase of
200 acres more or less of the C. F. Early farm . . . is hereby exercised by
delivery of a check to your joint order in the sum of $119,000 to my at-
torneys . . . to be held in trust for you and given over to you upon the
occurrence of the following conditions:
(1) The furnishing of a new survey by you of the land being sold as
provided in the option agreement;
(2) Delivery by you of a good and marketable warranty deed in fee
simple absolute, free of all encumbrances, to the property covered by the
option agreement.
Id. at 349-50, 222 S.E.2d at 397-98.
8. At the time the check was delivered, the balance in the account from which
the check was drawn was only $17,173. Id. at 350, 222 S.E.2d at 398.
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pealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed by finding
that there was a genuine issue of material fact that required a jury trial.
The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the purchasers
and remanded the case for jury trial.9
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that the
undisputed facts established every essential element except the pur-
chasers' willingness and ability to perform the contract at the time they
.exercised the option."0 To meet their burden of proof on this remain-
Ing issue, the purchasers submitted their own affidavits, loan applica-
tions and financial statements" showing that their net worth was be-
tween $261,000 and $364,494 at the time the option was exercised.
They also submitted the affidavit of the president of the Federal Land
Bank Association of Winston-Salem that stated that he was prepared
to issue a firm commitment loan of $100,000 to the purchasers using
the farmland as security. The vendor made no response to these mat-
erials.,
Since the vendor failed to present any evidence in opposition
to the purchaser's evidence in support of the motion, the court de-
termined that rule 56(e) would allow summary judgment if the pur-
chasers met their burden of production and succeeded on their own
evidence.' 2 The court held that any credibility problems were minimal
and that only latent doubts existed about the accuracy of the pur-
9. Kidd v. Early, 23 N.C. App. 129, 135, 208 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1974).
10. Defendant asserted three defenses to the motion for summary judgment, based
upon the uncontested facts of the case: (1) the description of the property was in-
sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds; (2) the option was void because the parties
had failed to agree upon an essential term-the method of payment; and (3) plaintiffs
failed to tender payment within the option period. The North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected all three affirmative defenses and denied defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment since he was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under N.C.R. Civ.
P. 56(c). 289 N.C. at 364-65, 222 S.E.2d at 407.
11. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e) states that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, the opposing party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
The court may also consider oral testimony at a summary judgment proceeding
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 43 (e).
12. 289 N.C. at 365-66, 222 S.E.2d at 407.
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chasers' proof. As a result, the purchasers were held to have met
their burden of production on the remaining factual issue and were
granted summary judgment. 13
Summary judgment 14 is a means of looking beyond the pleadings
to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 15 Both
parties may move for summary judgment 16 regardless of which party
carries the burden of proof at trial,17 but the burden is upon the moving
party to establish the lack of any triable issue of fact.' 8 The evidence
presented to meet this burden may not be sufficient even if the op-
posing party fails to present any materials in opposition to the motion;'9
any doubt about the existence of a material issue of fact is resolved
against the moving party.20 Once the moving party meets the initial
13. Id. at 372, 222 S.E.2d at 411. Quoting from Professor Louis' article, the
court stated that the standard for determining the sufficiency of the moving party's
evidence is as follows:
(1) Mhe [movant's] supporting evidence is self-contradictory or circumstan-
tially suspicious or the credibility of a witness is inherently suspect either
because he is interested in th& outcome of the case and the facts are pecu-
liarly within his own knowledge or because he has testified as to matters of
opinion involving a substantial margin for. honest error, (2) there are sig-
nificant gaps in the movant's evidence or it is circumstantial and reasonably
allows inferences inconsistent with the existence of an essential element, or
(3) although all the evidentiary or historical facts are established, reasonable
minds may still differ over their application to some principle such as the
prudent man standard for negligence cases.
289 N.C. at 366-67, 222 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Louis, supra note 2, at 738-39).
Only one standard was not met: the affidavits were presented by interested parties
and the facts were peculiarly within their own knowledge.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282
N.C. 44, 191 S.E.2d 683 (1972).
16. See, e.g., McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972). N.C.R.
Cxv. P. 56(a) & (b) state that either the "claimant" or the "defending party" may
move for summary judgment.
17. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282
N.C. 44, 191 S.E.2d 683 (1972). There is a greater reluctance, however, to grant
summary judgment for the party bearing the burden of proof at trial. See Louis, Fed-
eral Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 748, 755
n.42 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974);
Pridgen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 1.77 S.E.2d 425 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Lineberger v. Colonial Life & Accid. Ins. Co., 12 N.C. App." 135,
182 S.E.2d 643 (1971); Robinson v. McMahon, 11 N.C. App. 275, 181 S.E.2d 147
(1971). See also N.C.R. C-v. P. 56(e), set forth in note 11 supra. The North Caro-
lina courts have interpreted the meaning of the rule to be that even if the non-moving
party fails to present any evidence, the moving party's materials may not be enough
to entitle the moving party to summary judgment.
20. Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); see Millsaps v. Wilkes Contracting Co., 14 N.C. App. 321, 188 S.E.2d 663
(1972). "ITihe Court in considering the motion carefully scrutinizes the papers of
the moving party and, on the whole, regards those of the opposing party with in-
dulgence." 289 N.C. at 29, 209 S.E.2d at 798.
236 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
burden by showing a lack of any triable issue of fact,21 the opposing
party must come forward with some evidence tending to show a triable
issue of fact or explain his failure to do so under rule 56(f).22
The North Carolina courts view the summary judgment procedure
as a drastic remedy to be granted with caution.23 The procedure does
not entitle the court to decide an issue of fact, but merely to determine
whether an issue of fact exists. 24  The procedure is not designed to
constitute a trial by affidavits in which the court weighs the sufficiency
of evidence or weighs the credibility of testimony, 25 since these are tra-
ditionally the province of the jury.
Although the North Carolina courts agree that all issues of credi-
bility must be presented to the jury, the courts have not applied a uni-
form evidentiary standard for determining when an issle of credibility
arises. In Cutts26 the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that all
21. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e), set forth in note 11 supra.
22. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(f) states in full:
When Affidavits are Unavailable.-Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
The courts have excused the failure to present materials when the evidence was
within the moving party's own knowledge and not available to the non-moving party.
Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970).
23. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 52, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); W. SHuFORD, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcMcn AND
PRocEDURE § 56-3, at 467-68 (1975). Shuford also suggests that numerous North
Carolina practitioners are taking advantage of the new rule, and that more summary
judgment motions have been appealed than any other procedure made available by
the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
24. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975); Zimmerman v.
Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); Houck v. Overcash, 282
N.C. 623, 193 S.E.2d 905 (1973). The courts should not decide which affidavits
are true when there is a conflict in the evidence presented.
25. Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970); see Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 12 N.C. App. 54, 182 S.E.2d 627 (1971).
26. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971). Although Cutts v. Casey is a directed
verdict case, the standards for directing a verdict and granting summary judgment are
essentially the same. See Millsaps v. Wilkes Contracting Co., 14 N.C. App. 321,
188 S.E.2d 663, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 623, 190 S.E.2d 466 (1972); Coakley v. Ford
Motor Co., 11 N.C. App. 636, 182 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d
244 (1971). In Cutts v. Casey both parties claimed title to the same piece of property.
Each party presented a survey showing that he owned the land in question, relying
partly upon testimonial evidence to establish his claim. The North Carolina Supreme
Court stated: "The established policy of this State-declared in both the constitution
and the statutes-is that the credibility of testimony is for the jury, not the court,
and that a genuine issue of fact must be tried by the jury unless this right is waived."
278 N.C. at 421, 10 S.E.2d at 314.
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testimonial evidence creates a credibility issue that must be resolved
by a jury. In reinstating a jury verdict after the trial judge granted
a judgment n.o.v., the court stated that testimonial evidence could
never support a directed verdict:2" to do so would violate the opposing
party's right to jury trial, which is guaranteed by the North Carolina
Constitution.28 The Cutts rationale is based on the premise that "the
right to determine the credibility of witnesses lies at the core of the
jury's factfinding function." 9  Since affidavits are not subject to cross-
examination, and since no one can observe the behavior of the affiant
making his statement, affidavits are generally considered to be "the
least satisfactory form of evidentiary materials."30 Depositions are also
regarded with skepticism, even though the witness was cross-examined,
since the court is unable to observe the demeanor of the witness. 3
The observation of the demeanor of a witness is necessary, because the
witness can be either lying intentionally or mistaken about the facts.3 2
The Cutts rationale was applied to a motion for summary judgment
in Shearin v. National Indemnity Co.33 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that an uncontradicted eyewitness' statement raised an
issue of credibility, which the jury must resolve. The court, however,
27. 278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314.
28. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 was relied upon by the court in its opinion. It
reads: "In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by
jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred
and inviolable."
29. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MiNN. L. Rav. 903, 928 (1971).
30. 6 (pt. 2) MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15[4], at 514 (2d ed. 1975).
31. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 929.40.
32. Id. The validity of these checks on credibility does not go unquestioned.
To reach conclusions solely on the basis of demeanor is a very weak foundation for
a judgment, especially since it may be that juries form less accurate decisions when
they base them on the observation of witnesses. The demeanor of a witness can
be misleading because many factors combine to make the witness behave the way
he does on a witness stand. For example, the witness may appear nervous either
because he is lying or because he feels uncomfortable speaking in front of a large
group of people; or his nervousness may be merely a mannerism. The jury is just
as likely to distort the truth since they too are witnesses. Since the jury must rely
upon demeanor evidence alone if the testimony goes uncontradicted and unimpeached
by the non-moving party, the accuracy of the appraisal is highly suspect. And if
the non-moving party fails to present opposing evidence at the summary judgment
level, it is unlikely that he will obtain the necessary evidence by the time the trial
begins. Therefore if the court determines that the evidence is so strong that the jury
cannot disbelieve the testimony merely on the basis of demeanor, then the court should
be able to assign credibility as a matter of law and avoid a long unnecessary trial.
33. 27 N.C. App. 88, 218 S.E.2d 207 (1975); accord, Lowe's of Greensboro,
Inc. v. Curry, 29 N.C. App. 229, 223 S.E.2d 909 (1976); Van Poole v. Messer, 19
N.C. App. 70, 198 S.E.2d 106 (1973); Wyche v. Alexander, 15 N.C. App. 130, 189
S.E.2d 608, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 764, 191 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
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stated that but for the Cutts opinion, summary judgment would have
been appropriate.14
Other cases deny summary judgment for the moving party when
the testimonial evidence is presented by an interested party and the
facts were within his own knowledge. In three cases, the witness was
held to be interested because of an economic relationship with the mov-
ing party. In Lee v. Shor3" and Shook Builders Supply Co. v. Eastern
Associates, Inc.36 the affiants were either the directors or the president
of the company that was moving for summary judgment. As a result
of this relationship, the parties were interested, and "[The affiant's]
credibility itself may be such an issue of fact as will take the case to
trial. T37 In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Werner Industries Inc.38 the
sole eyewitness to the accident over which the dispute arose was an
employee of the moving party. The court denied summary judgment
on this basis, and on the basis that conflicting inferences arose from
the evidence presented.
Other cases, however, have completely ignored the Cutts require-
ment that all testimonial evidence be presented to the jury. In Brooks
v. Smith39 and Bogle v. Duke Power Co.40 defendants used testimonial
evidence to meet the burden of production to establish their affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence on motions for summary judgment.
In both cases the evidence was deemed sufficient since the affiants
were disinterested and plaintiff failed to contradict or impeach the tes-
timony.
The court in Kidd rejected the Cutts rule that all testimonial evi-
dence must be.presented to the jury even though it may be extremely
credible. In explaining the different results reached under Kidd and
Cutts the court stressed the factual differences between the two cases,
rather than basing the distinction upon the differences between a di-.
rected verdict and a motion for summary judgment. 41 In Cutts the
34. 27 N.C. App. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210. The court, in deciding whether
summary judgment would be appropriate for the party bearing the burden of proof
at trial who used testimonial evidence to meet his burden of production, stated that
"on authority of Cutts v. Casey, ... we conclude the answer is No." 27 N.C. App.
at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
35. 10 N.C. App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970).
36. 24 N.C. App. 533, 211 S.E.2d 472 (1975).
37. Id. at 537, 211 S.E.2d at 475.
38. 286 N.C. 89, 209 S.E.2d 734 (1974).
39. 27 N.C. App. 223, 218 S.E.2d 489 (1975).
40. 27 N.C. App. 318, 219 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 296, 222 S.E.2d
695 (1976).
41. 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E.2d at 410. For a discussion of the differences
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court noted that the facts presented by testimonial evidence were vigor-
ously attacked by the opposing party. The credibility issue arose not
because the evidence was testimonial, but because the testimonial evi-
dence was challenged. In making the distinction, the court indicated
that Cutts was never meant to stand for the proposition that all testi-
monial evidence must go to the jury. Instead, Cutts is to be read as
saying that if testimonial evidence is contradicted, then a credibility is-
sue arises for the jury to consider.42
Therefore, Kidd and Cutts fall squarely within the federal inter-
pretation of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4" The
federal courts may assign credibility as a matter of law when the evi-
dence is not contradicted or impeached.4" Even if the witness is inter-
ested in the outcome of the case, if the facts necessary to oppose the
between directed verdict and summary judgment, see Note, Civil Procedure-Cutts -v.
Casey Extended to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 940, 948 n.45 (1976).
42. Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. at 423, 180 S.E.2d at 319 (Huskins, J., concurring
in result); see'Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902);
2 A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1488.20 (Phillips Supp.
1970); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILmE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2714 (1973);
Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HAnv. L. REV. 669, 690-
91 (1918).
It is clear that the summary judgment procedure itself does not deprive a party
of his constitutional right to jury trial, but it is arguable that testimonial evidence
does always create an issue of fact for the jury since it is always possible for the
witness to lie. Some federal courts applied this evidentiary standard. See Colby v.
Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
However, this test has not been followed even within the Second Circuit. See Dyer
v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2726, at 523 (1973). Prior to Kidd, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals considered itself to be bound to that standard as a result of Cutts.
See Note, Civil Procedure--Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L.
REV. 940, 942 (1976). But see cases cited notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text
supra. According to Robert Doge, one of the original members of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
In reality, the rule does not interfere in the slightest degree with the right to
trial by jury, because the court can not, of course, enter a summary judgment
if there is any issue of fact to be tried, and if the court erroneously orders a
summary judgment, the right of appeal will protect the party.
The judge is not to weigh affidavits, is not to determine which affidavit is
right and which is wrong. He is simply to see whether upon the affidavits
there is a real issue of facts between the parties.
ABA PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTrrTrrE (ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE)
AT WASHINGTON, D.C., October 6-8, at 176 (1938).
43. For an analysis of the federal rule see Louis, Federal Summary Judgment
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J 745 (1971).
44. The fact that a witness is interested in the outcome of the case is sufficient
to create a credibility problem for the jury to resolve. Sonnentheil v. Christian Moer-
lein Brewing, Inc., 172 U.S. 401 (1899). Some federal courts, however, limit this
rule to cases in which the facts are peculiarly within the moving party's own knowledge,
see Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962), or when conflicting inferences arise from
the evidence presented, United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1970).
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motion are readily available to the non-moving party through discovery,
then credibility should be assigned as a matter of law if the non-moving
party presents no opposing evidence. It is assumed that the opponent
obtained, or could have obtained, the information necessary to contra-
dict the witness. If he failed to utilize discovery, then he loses because
he was too lazy to establish his case; if he utilizes the discovery pro-
cedure and finds nothing to support his opposition to the claim, then
there is no reason to question the veracity of the moving party's witness.
It would be a waste of time to require a full jury trial when the op-
posing party cannot, or will not, present any evidence to raise doubts
about the credibility of the witness in the mere hope45 that someihing
will turn up at trial.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Kidd, however, went be-
yond the federal standard by determining whether a credibility issue
actually arose from the facts presented. The court held that the testi-
monial evidence was presented by an interested party.; the court found
some of the facts peculiarly within the knowledge of that party and thus
not discoverable by the vendor. Under a strict construction of the
"interested party" rule this evidence would have been enough to create
a credibility problem that would have required a determination by the
jury. The court rejected strict application of the rule, stating that
"it is quite clear that it would be futile to attempt to state a general
rule which would determine whether a 'genuine issue *of fact' exists in
a particular case ' 40 and granted summary judgment for plaintiff because
only latent doubts about the credibility of his evidence existed.
The result reached by the court on the facts of Kidd is both prac-
tically and logically correct. The bank president's affidavit did not
create a credibility problem because the bank president had no reason
to lie about his willingness to grant a loan. The circumstances were
not suspicious since the bank was using the land as security and would
only grant the loan if the title were good. Even if it could be argued
45. Riieri V. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The federal courts
clearly reject the idea that the non-moving party can go to trial on the mere hope
that some evidence will turn up, or the jury will disbelieve the testimony presented.
Compare Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (holding that since motive was a crucial
issue, there was more than a mere hope that additional evidence would result from
a full jury trial) with Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding
that a non-moving party cannot force a trial on the vague supposition that by cross-
examining a disinterested party he might be able to produce additional evidence).
46. 289 N.C. at 368, 222 S.E.2d at 409; see 6 (pt. 1) MooRE's FEDMAL PRACTtcE
56.15[1.-O, at 401 (2d ed. 1975).
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that there was an economic relationship between the parties, it would
have been too attenuated to cast doubts upon the witness' veracity with-
out some specific facts to show a closer relationship.
Plaintiff's affidavits, however, were presented by an interested
party and so should be viewed with more skepticism. In this case, how-
ever, it would have been a simple matter for defendant to use the dis-
covery procedure to get a look at the bank books, check the credit rat-
ing of plaintiffs and appraise the value of plantiffs' personal property.
The court is willing, under these circumstances, to shift the burden
of producing evidence to the non-moving party in the interests, of ju-
dicial expediency. By enabling the moving party to meet his initial
burden of proof with testimonial evidence when the opposing party has
access to the evidence, the court can make certain that the opposing
party has some specific evidence to get to the jury. If he fails to pro-
vide these facts, then summary judgment should be granted for the.
moving party.
Some of the testimony presented by the moving parties was used
to establish a subjective fact-their willingness to pay the purchase
price. Since it is impossible to discover the innehnost thoughts and
feelings of an opposing party, the only way to attack his statement of
events is to impeach his credibility. Such a situation of impossibility
provides sufficient excuse under rule 56(f) for failing to present op-
posing materials. As a result, a jury question is normally created and
summary judgment becomes inappropriate. 0
Nevertheless, the court in Kidd was willing to grant summary
judgment for the purchasers, probably because in the entire four years
of the dispute, the purchasers never gave any indication that they did
not want to perform the contract. Indeed, it is undisputed that the pur-
chasers suggested several methods of payment in order to find some
terms that the vendor would accept, and on several occasions voiced
their desire to purchase the land. The purchasers also exercised the
option, which bound them to the contract if defendant sought to enforce
it. On the basis of these manifestations, the purchasers' testimony
achieved credibility in the absence of a showing by defendants of some
specific facts demonstrating the purchasers' intent to renege on the
agreement.
As a result of the Kidd opinion, North Carolina attorneys who are
facediwith a motion for summary judgment by the party who bears the
burden of proof at trial must make some effort to gather specific facts
to contradict or impeach the witness before the hearing on the motion.
1977]
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If the attorney cannot get the necessary information because of witness
hostility or because the moving party has sole control over the infor-
mation, then he must move for a protective order under rule 56(f).
Otherwise, he runs the risk that the testimonial evidence will be afforded
credibility as a matter of law and that summary judgment will be granted
for. the moving party.
In Kidd v. Early the North Carolina Supreme Court set out a flex-
ible standard for determining the sufficiency of testimonial evidence on
a motion for summary judgment. With the help of this standard, the
courts can now determine with greater accuracy whether testimonial
evidence has created an issue of fact that must be presented to the jury.
This promotes judicial expediency by weeding out cases that contain no
factual disputes at the summary judgment level, without jeopardizing
the parties' right to a jury trial.
REBECCA WEIANT
Consitutional Law-Property and Liberty Interests in Public
Employment
The proposition that a government cannot unreasonably restrict
the exercise of constitutional rights by its employees has become a basic
tenet of constitutional law.1 However, in the absence of a specific stat-
ute or regulation to the contrary, a government's authority to dismiss
its employees for purely arbitrary reasons, or for no reason at all, has
remained essentially unchallenged. 2 Except for situations in which the
government appears motivated by a desire to stifle constitutional privi-
leges, the maximum protection afforded a public employee against dis-
charge has been some form of hearing at which he can appeal the de-
cision. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in the companion
1. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
2. The United States Supreme Court noted in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) that "(t]he Court has consistently recognized that . . . the interest
of a government employee in retaining his job can be summarily denied. It has become
a settled principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be
revoked at the will of the appointing officer." Id. at 896.
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cases of Board of Regents v. Roth' and Perry v. Sinderman,4 held that
not all employees are entitled to such protection. The discharged em-
ployee must show that the loss of his job will deprive him of "liberty"
or "property" before he qualifies for the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments' guarantees of due process.5
In determining whether a public employee who is threatened with
dismissal has a right to due process, the Supreme Court's standard of
inquiry, as set out in Roth and Perry and reaffirmed in the recent case
of Bishop v. Wood,6 is whether the employee has acquired either a lib-
erty or property interest in his employment. Under this test, there are
two classes of public employees-those with a sufficient interest in their
jobs to warrant some due process protection and those whose claims
are inadequate to merit any constitutional consideration. Only after an
employee overcomes the threshold barrier of demonstrating a "legiti-
mate interest in employment" is he entitled to any protection at all, and
then the form of his due process protection may be far short of a formal
adversary proceeding. The required degree of protection will be de-
cided by the court in each case by balancing the employee's interests
against those of the government.1 Although the majority in Bishop uti-
lized the Roth-Perry test in adjudicating the plaintiff-employee's claim
to a due process pretermination hearing, the result reached in that
case may indicate a significant reduction in the scope of judicial review
of government personnel decisions.
In Bishop, officer Carl Bishop, after serving for almost three years
on the Marion, North Carolina police force, was dismissed in 1972 by
the city manager of Marion upon the recommendation of the chief of
police. A city ordinance specified four possible grounds for the dis-
missal of a "permanent employee," such as Bishop, and further pro-
vided that upon request, any dismissed employee could obtain written
notice of the date of and reasons for his discharge.8 The ordinance
3. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
5. "[INor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or. property, without
due process of law.... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
7. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570.
8. The Personnel Ordinance of the city of Marion provides:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over
a period of time shall be notified in What way his work is deficient and
what he must do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employeefails to perform work up to the standard of the classification held, or con-
tinues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may
be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given
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made no provision for any type of pretermination hearing at which an
employee might contest the sufficiency of the alleged cause for his ter-
mination, and accordingly, Bishop received no such hearing.
Relying on 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Bishop brought suit against the
city manager, chief of police, and city of Marion seeking reinstatement,
and back pay. In his complaint, he contended that as a "permanent
employee" he had a constitutional right to a due process pretermination
hearing. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Bishop had failed to demonstrate a sufficient
liberty or property interest in his job to invoke due process protection."0
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,1 and certio-
rai was granted. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Stevens, upheld
Bishop's dismissal and affirmed the district court's view that under the
Marion ordinance and North Carolina law, Bishop "'held his position
at the will and pleasure of the city.' ",12 A clear understanding of how
the Court disposed of Bishop's claim to property and liberty interests
in his job can best be obtained by separate consideration of those issues.
PROPERTY
According to Roth, a discharged employee must have "a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement" to continued employment before he has
been deprived of "property" under the fourteenth amendment. 18 Such
a claim of entitlement cannot be based upon the employee's mere sub-
jective expectations, but must be founded upon "existing rules or un-
derstandings"' 4 with his employer (the state), as set forth in a statute,
ordinance, or contractual provision establishing a definite duration for
written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date and reasons
for his discharge if he shall request such a notice.
96 S. Ct. at 2077 n.5 (quoting art. II, § 6 of the Ordinance).
The ordinance also provided that all city employees would be considered "proba-
tionary" employees when first hired, but c6uld attain the status of a "permanent" em-
ployee after six months' satisfactory employment. See 96 S. Ct. at 2082 n.5 (dissent-
ing opinion).
9. Justice Stevens' majority opinion points out that the city was not a proper
defendant, not being a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. 96 S. Ct. at 2077
n.1. For a more complete analysis of this issue, see Note, Federal Jurisdiction-The
Status of Public Officials as "Persons" Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 54 N.C.L. REv.
1062 (1976).
10. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
11. 498 F.2d 1341 (1973).
12. 96 S. Ct. at 2078 (quoting 377 F. Supp. at 504). The decision was five
to four, with Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun authoring dissenting opinions.
Justice Marshall concurred with the Brennan and White dissents.
13. 408 U.S. at 577.
14. Id.
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the employment or granting of tenure by some other method. The
Court'5 further noted that the Constitution did not create property in-
terests but only extended protection to already existing interests whose
"dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."' 6 Thus, the approach
adopted by the Court in Roth requires an initial examination of "an
independent source such as state law"' 7 to characterize the nature of
the relationship that exists between the government employer and em-
ployee. This relationship, as defined by state law, is then examined
under federal law to determine whether it constitutes a protected property
interest. 18
Perry established that an employee who has no written statutory
or contractual entitlement to tenure can still claim due process protec-
tion by demonstrating the existence of an implied contract or an infor-
mal, but widely understood rule of the work-place "that certain employ-
ees shall have the equivalent to tenure."' 9  With the addition of this
"constructive tenure" concept, the Roth-Perry standard for determining
when an employee has a property interest in his job was left sufficiently
nebulous to allow the lower federal courts considerable latitude in ap-
plying it. As a result, the large number of suits initiated by public em-
ployees claiming a right to a pretermination hearing have received in-
consistent treatment.20
15. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The vote was five to
three, with Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissenting and Justice Powell taking
no part in the case.
16. 408 U.S. at 577.
17. Id.
18. Plaintiff in Roth was a teacher at Wisconsin State University whose one-
year employment contract was not renewed. The Court ruled that the Wisconsin stat-
utes regarding tenure of state university professors and the specific terms of plaintiff's
appointment created and controlled any interest Roth might have in his job. Id. at
576-78. Since neither the statute nor the contract could support a claim of entitlement
to reemployment, the Court concluded that he had no constitutionally protected property
interest in being rehired and therefore could not demand a due process hearing review-
ing the decision not to renew his contract. Id. at 578.
19. Perry involved a state college professor who received neither notice, explana-
tion nor a hearing upon his release after the conclusion of the last of four one-year
contracts with the university. The college system in which Perry was employed had
no official or statutory tenure system for its professors. Perry claimed, however, that
the college had a de facto tenure program (the existence of which was itimated in
the school's faculty guide), and that he had tenure under that program. Although
the Court did not immediately grant him a due process hearing on these grounds,
it remanded the case to the district court to give Perry an opportunity to prove that
the school's policies were as he alleged. If he .could successfully demonstrate a prop-
erty interest upon remand, then he was to receive a hearing at which he could chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the reasons for his release. 408 U.S. at 602-03.
20. In some cases this inconsistency has been manifested by the varying results
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The uncertainty generated by the Supreme Court in its formula-
tion of the pliable Roth-Perry property interest test was by no means
dissipated in its next pronouncement regarding a dismissed public em-
ployee's rights to due process. In Arnett v. Kennedy,2' five Justices
wrote opinions that displayed widespread disagreement.22  Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, seemingly abandoned the second
criterion in the bifurcated Roth-Perry approach, which initially deter-
mines whether an employee has a sufficient liberty or property interest
to merit due process, and then ascertains what level of due process the
Federal Constitution requires in the given situation.28 He concluded
that even when a government has accorded its employees a property
interest in their jobs, it is not bound by federal notions of due process
but still retains the right to set up any type of procedure it desires,'
no matter how minimal, to safeguard that interest.24  Under Justice
Rehnquist's view, since an employee's entitlement to his job arises un-
der a statute, it may be conditioned by a statutory limitation upon pro-
cedural due process protection.
Six of the Justices in Arnett rejected the plurality approach and
adhered largely to the Roth-Perry view. Justice Whitenoted:
The fact that the origins of the property right are with the State
makes no difference for the nature of the. procedures required.
While the State may define what is and what is not property,
once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due
achieved under this test within a single court. For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals (which affirmed the district court opinion in Bishop) has vacillated signif-
icantly. It strictly construed an employment contract in Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1
(1973), and a statute in Brown v. Hirst, 443 F.2d 899 (1971), to deny public employ-
ees access to a due process hearing, but liberally found a property interest even in
the absence of statutory tenure in Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (1975). Moreover,
in Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (1972), the Fourth Circuit found that under the
Roth-Perry test, "continuous employment over a significant period of time-such as
appellant's 29 years-can amount to the equivalent of tenure." Id. at 181. Only
two years later, however, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina refused to follow Fraley and held that a teacher with 19 years'
service did not have tenure and that "longevity of employment" alone does not establish
the existence of a property interest. Cannady v. Person County Bd. of Educ., 375
F. Supp. 689 (1974).
21. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
22. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the plurality. Id. Justice Powell filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 164. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at
171. Justices Douglas and Marshall filed separate dissents. Id. at 203 (Douglas);
id. at 206 (Marshall).
23. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
24. 416 U.S. at 152.
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process, and as I understaid it six members of the Court are in
agreement on this fundamental proposition.2 5
A number of other issues were also under consideration in Aniett,26 and
the Court reached such diverse results that Justice Stevens' remark in
Bishop that "Arnett sheds no light on the problem presented by this
case"27 is understandable. It is also evasive, however, since six of the
Justices specifically agreed that a statute s guaranteeing continued em-
ployment absent cause for discharge creates a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to the job and affords the employee the right to a due process
hearing.29
Given the facts of Bishop, a reasonable application of the Roth-
Perry standard could easily have justified a finding that Bishop had a
legitimate property interest in his job. Under the Marion personnel
ordinance, not only was he classified as a "permanent employee," but
his removal was conditioned upon the presence of certain enumerated
causes.30 In light of the Arnett case, this "for cause" qualification of
the ordinance certainly could provide a strong basis for concluding that
a property right was present.31 Although Justice Stevens, in writing
for the majority, conceded that the Marion ordinance could be read as
creating a property interest in employment,3 2 he declined to do so,
but relied instead upon the district court's interpretation.
The district court's analysis of Bishop's claim to a property right
was less than exhaustive. First, it noted that Bishop had no written
contract that conferred tenure and that the city personnel resolution
made no express guarantee of tenure or continued employment. The
court then ended its review of the case's circumstances and turned to
state law for guidance in interpreting the ordinance. Citing Still v.
Lance, 3 the court found that in North Carolina, a contract for em-
25. Id. at 185.
26. The Court also considered whether the applicable personnel statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague, and addressed several questions relating to the nature and timing
of the employee's evidentiary due process hearing.
27. 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.8.
28. The statute involved in Arnett provided that a permanent employee could
not be removed other than for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice." 416 U.S. at 151-52.
29. See opinion of Justice White, id. at 181, and opinion of Justice Powell, id..
at 166.
30. See note 8 supra.
31. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
33. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971). In a short, but well reasoned dissent,
Justice Blackinun questioned the applicability of this case to the facts of Bishop. 96
S. Ct. at 2085.
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ployment with no provision regarding duration or date of termination
is terminable at the will of either party and gives an employee no legiti-
mate expectation of continued employment.34 Thus, the district court
ignored Bishop's argument that the ordinance created a property right
by providing for dismissal upon cause, and held that since there was
no express statutory or contractual grant of tenure, he held his job "at
the will and pleasure of the city." 5
• By upholding the district court's "tenable" reading of the ordin-
ance even though admitting that its own independent examination of'
the ordinance "might have justified a different conclusion,"' 0 the ma-
jority in Bishop appears to have significantly narrowed the scope of fed-
eral court review of public employee dismissals. Although the Roth-
Perry test contemplates reference to state law as an aid in defining the
nature of the employment relationship in a given context, it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court in those cases intended to foreclose further ex-
amination of the facts and their logical implications.17  Indeed, Roth
and Perry allow the court to determine whether the employment re-
lation, as defined by state law, does or does not create a property
right.8
By discarding the Roth rationale as a justification for an active role
for federal courts in defining property interests in public employment,
the majority in Bishop has opted for a more restrained approach.
Bishop emphasizes that the federal court's primary duty is to look to
the intent of the legislature that created the job from which an em-
ployee has been removed in order to determine if a property interest
has been created. When the statutes are unclear on this issue, Bishop
34. 377 F. Supp. at 504.
35. Id.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
37. At least several lower courts have not felt compelled to do so. See Vance
v. Chester County d. of School Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 824 n.1 (4th Cir. 1974);
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 1973); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d
176 (5th Cir. 1973). See also note 20 supra.
38. Justice Brennan's dissent argues that Perry and Roth require court review
of such circumstances as the common practices of the employer and expectations of
the employee that are based on those practices or upon his probable understanding
of the local ordinance. He contends that "at least before a state law is definitively
construed as not securing a 'property' interest, the relevant inquiry is whether it was
objectively reasonable for the employee to believe he could rely on continued employ.
ment." 96 S. Ct. at 2082 (emphasis added).
Justice Brennan's view, that a unilateral expectancy of continued employment cre-
ates a property right when objective circumstances justify that expectation, was rejected
by the majority and characterized by Justice Stevens as a "remarkably innovative sugges-
tion that' we develop a federal common law of property rights .... " 96 S. Ct.
at 2080 n.14.
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suggests that the court defer to state cases for clarification rather than
indulge in its own interpretations. Obviously, such an approach will
minimize independent examination of the facts in search of a construc-
tive property interest as was found in Perry. Thus, Bishop's contention
that his understanding of the city ordinance and of his "permanent"
status induced a reasonable belief that he enjoyed tenure was given no
weight by the court in the absence of specific allegations that such be-
lief was widely held among Marion policemen or fostered by his em-
ployer.
If the method of deferring to state law employed by Bishop
is utilized in the future, it would be difficult for the courts to recognize
a property right to employment in many cases even when an ordinance
is not worded ambiguously. The common law of almost every state
coincides with Still v. Lance in construing contracts of employment that
mention no period of duration to be terminable at the will of either
party.39 Moreover, since few state legislatures or city councils were
aware at the time they created a job that an employee's rights to due
process could depend upon their intent, most statutes and ordinances
are probably unclear on this issue.40
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White accused the majority of
adopting Justice Rehnquist's Arnett position, previously rejected by a
majority of the Court.41 White read the majority opinion as holding
that when the state creates an entitlement to employment, it also has
the power to establish any procedure it desires to effect that entitle-
ment, even if such procedure does not meet minimum standards of due
process. This interpretation appears somewhat strained. The majority
held that Bishop never acquired a property interest and thus had no
occasion to determine whether Marion's procedure was adequate for
safeguarding such an interest. 2 However, by holding that the ultimate
authority to define "property" for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
39. E.g., Land v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 231, 203 S.E.2d 316 (1973);
Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974); see Annot, 161
A.L.R. 706, 707 (1946).
40. Note, The Due Process-Rights of Public Employees, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 310,
348 (1975).
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2083; see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. Justice White
based his accusation upon language used by both Justice Stevens and the district court
to the effect that Bishop's rights were not abrogated since the procedure established
in the ordinance-i.e., sending written notice of the date of dismissal, etc.-was fol-
lowed. 96 S. Ct. at 2083.
42. What Bishop does appear to conclude is that if an ordinance provides for
any type of dismissal procedure, even if it does not confer a property right, then
the government-employer must still comply with the procedure. See 96 S. Ct. at 2077-
79.
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ment resides with the states, the majority clearly intimates that govern-
ment employers may now avoid any due process limitation upon their
powers to fire.their employees merely by deciding that the jobs do not
constitute "property. 43
LIBERTY
Board of Regents v. Roth44 also developed the Supreme Court's
standard for determining when an interest in "liberty" has been im-
paired to the extent that due process protection is mandated. Accord-
ing to Roth, a public employee is entitled to a due process hearing
if the dismissal imposes a. social stigma upon him or is carried out in
a manner that may deprive him of future employment. That this two-
pronged test has proved as difficult to apply with exactness as the Roth-
Perry deprivation of property standard is evidenced by the widely di-
vergent results reached in the lower courts. 5
For discharge to amount to a social stigma, the employer must
make charges against the employee "that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community."46 Although Roth did not
provide a definite indication of what degree of stigma requires a hear-
ing affording the employee a chance to clear his name,47 it did clearly
require that some potentially damaging reason for dismissal be given.
This requirement seemingly furnishes employers with an incentive
for not notifying the employee of the reasons for his dismissal, since
in the Court's view there can be no social stigma when there are no
allegations made.4 8  In applying this "social stigma" test to the facts
of Bishop, Justice Stevens found that Bishop could not claim that his
good name was stigmatized since there was no public disclosure of the
reasons for his dismissal.4 9
43. See dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, id. at 2082 n.4.
44. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
45. For a survey of cases representing this disparity, see Note, supra note 40,
at 330-35.
46. 408 U.S. at 573. The Court indicated that allegations of dishonest or immoral
conduct would constitute such charges. Id.
47. The Court gave no more precise statement of what would constitute social
stigma then a quotation from Wisconsin v. Constantineau: "'Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."' 408 U.S. at
573 (quoting 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
48.- But see Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973), in which the court
noted that "silence will often work greater damage to the dismissed person's reputation
than the worst of reasons." Id. at 680.
49. The alleged reasons for Bishop's dismissal-insubordination, causing low
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The second type of situation in which dismissal can violate an em-
ployee's right to liberty as described by Roth occurs when the termina-
tion "imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."50  To
meet this standard, a dismissed employee's proof must go beyond a
mere showing that he is "somewhat less attractive to other employers" 51
as a result of being fired. The majority 6pinion in Bishop omitted any
discussion of this "harm to future employment" test and focused ex-
clusively upon the question of disclosure to the general public. Justice
Brennan's dissent pointed out this omission and argued that disclosure
of the damaging reasons for Bishop's dismissal, 2 would probably be
made to future employers. Consequently, he reasoned that Bishop was
thus entitled to a hearing at which he could challenge the merits of
the accusations against him.
The effectiveness of Justice Brennan's incisive argument may
have been diluted by the apparent lack of proof at the trial level that
other police departments routinely request the reasons for a potential
employee's prior dismissal or that the city of Marion would disclose
those reasons. 53 Clearly, such proof would have provided Bishop a
strong basis for arguing deprivation of liberty under the "harm to future
employment" test. If the omission of that test means that the Supreme
Court has dropped the second tier from the Roth liberty test sub sil-
entio, then the implications for public .employees may be grave indeed.
Obviously, substantial damage to future employment opportunities can
occur if stigmatizing reasons for dismissal are disclosed to potential em-
ployers.54 Although many states have enacted legislation that protects
the privacy of state .and local government employee personnel re-
morale and poor attendance at training classes-were privately communicated to him
by the city manager. Even though these reasons did eventually become public as
the result of Bishop's lawsuit, the Court held that the disclosure must precede the
filing of the claim. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
50. 408 U.S. at 573.
51. Id. at 574 n.13.
52. See note 49 supra for a list of those reasons, the gravity of which prompted
Justice Brennan to remark: "It is difficult to imagine a greater 'badge of infamy'
that could be imposed on one following petitioner's calling; in a provision [sic] in
which prospective employees are invariably investigated, petitioner's job prospects will
be severely constricted by governmental action in this case." 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
53. Justice Brennan based his speculations on "common sense." 96 S. Ct. at
2081 n.2.
54. Roth held that such a disclosure was a deprivation of liberty and emphasized
the seriousness of the consequences by quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath: "'To be deprived not only of present government employment but of future
opportunity for it certainly is no small injury."' 408 U.$. at 574 (quoting 341 U.S.
123, 185 (1951)).
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cords,"' such statutes often contain exceptions that permit inspections
of these records by other governmental units."" Moreover, some states
still classify personnel files as "public documents," and thus place no
restrictions upon the number of people who can discover the reasons
for an employee's discharge.57
As a final argument petitioner Bishop alleged that he was dis-
missed on the grounds of false accusations. He submitted affidavits
of fellow officers specifically refuting the charges made by the chief
of police; the Supreme Court, in considering defendant's motion for
summary judgment, had to accept the statements contained therein as
true. Nonetheless, the majority concluded that even if he were fired
for false or erroneous reasons, Bishop had no claim to judicial relief
since the false statements were never released to the public. In ex-
plaining this holding, Justice Stevens revealed a fear that appears to
underlie the majority's philosophy in Bishop-that federal courts may
be inundated by an ever-increasing tide of lawsuits by discharged
public employees. As to Bishop's argument regarding the falsity of the
reasons for his dismissal, Justice Stevens observed: "A contrary evalu-,
ation of his contention would enable every discharged employee to as-
sert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former supervisor
made a mistake."' 58 Justice Stevens acknowledged that public em-
ployers will always make "incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions,"
but that "the federal court is not the appropriate forum" for granting
relief to the victims of such decisions5 9
55. E.g., N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160A-168 (Cum. Supp. 1975); see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 5-199 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
56. For instance, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168(c)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1975) pro-
vides:
An official of an agency of the State or federal government, or any
political subdivision of the State, may inspect any portion of a personnel
file when such inspection is deemed by the official having custody of such
records to be inspected to be necessary and essential to the pursuance of
a proper function of the inspecting agency ....
Thus, if an employee who was dismissed by one city applied for employment in another
city, the first city could find that it is "necessary ... to the pursuance of a proper
function" of the personnel office of the second city to allow inspection of the employ-
ee's file. See id.
57. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.01, .012 (Harrison 1975 & Cune. Supp,
1975). Florida's Attorney General has interpreted the Florida Public Records Act
to require that personnel files of public employees be maintained as public records,
open to inspection by all. Op. Arr'y GEN. FLA. 073-212, 073-51 (1973). See gen-
erally Note, Privacy of Information in Florida Public Employee Personnel Files, 27
U. FLA. L. REV. 481 (1975).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
59. Id.
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CONCLUSION
To effectuate its desire to reduce federal court involvement in
public employee personnel cases, the Supreme Court in Bishop estab-
lished that state law is the final arbiter of a public employee's status.
Bishop did not completely abandon the principles of Roth and.Perry,
but attempted to streamline the courts' application of those principles
by deferring to state law as a substitute for independent federal court
analysis of a plaintiff's "property interest" in his employment. Further-
more, it narrowed the scope of an employee's loss of "liberty" to situa-
tions where potentially damning reasons for dismissal are made pub-
lic.60 Although Bishop plainly reaffirms the settled principle that.
absent special circumstances, a public employee's general interest in
keeping his job is not sufficient to entitle him to due process of law,
government employers, by avoiding public disclosure of "stigmatizing"
reasons for dismissal, and by wording their personnel ordinances unam-
biguously either to guarantee or to deny employees a property right
to their jobs, can determine the legal rights of their employees. Hope-
fully, in making these choices, government employers will be motivated
by principles of fairness and good personnel management rather than
merely a desire to comply with the now minimal Supreme Court re-
quirements.
Removal of judicial checks upon the government's power to dis-
miss its employees could lead to abuses; and if employees have only
a limited right to question the grounds for a dismissml, employee fear
of being disciplined arbitrarily may inhibit their activities in areas of
their lives where the government has no right to be. Although the
Court still recognizes its duty to prevent dismissals of public employees
that are based on the employer's desire "to curtail or to penalize the
exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights," ' . its decis-
ion in Bishop could indirectly result in such curtailments by creating
a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of the freedoms of speech, reli-
gion, or association.
BENTFORD E. MARTIN.
60. The notion that free grants of tenure to public employees could reduce effi-
ciency and promote elitism may have been an underlying consideration in the Court's
approach, although its primary motive apparently was to insure that federal courts
do not become "super-legislatures" with power over state and local personnel policies.
61. 96 S. Ct. at 2080.
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Constitutional Law-Prison Disciplinary Proceedings and the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Any determination of the rights retained by prison inmates is
complex because of the conflict between the interest in maintaining the
basic fair treatment assured all individuals by constitutionally guaran-
teed freedoms and protections and the competing interest of the state
in allowing prison officials sufficient discretion to administer a .safe
and effective prison system.' Prison disciplinary proceedings, in which
officials can impose removal of good time credits,2 punitive segregation'
or other lesser punishments4 for infractions of prison regulations, bring
this problem into still sharper focus. The prisoner is in danger of a
substantial loss of liberty in a procedure in which he is unprotected by
the rights guaranteed to a defendant outside prison walls. Prison autho-
rities, on the other hand, confront an individual suspected of rejecting
their regulations and controls and therefore posing a serious threat to
order and security within the institution.
In a 1974 case, Wolff v. McDonnell,5 the United States Supreme
Court examined prison disciplinary hearings for the first time and' held
that the due process rights of inmates are limited to those that pose little
or no threat to the prison administration or the state's interest." In
Baxter v. Palmigiano7 the Court was presented with the issue whether the
1. Discretion is necessary primarily to allow prison officials to act quickly to pre-
serve control and to provide effective rehabilitation, security and a safe environment for
prison employees as well as inmates. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63
(1974).
2. Good time credits are granted in many prison systems for time served in prison
without disciplinary sanctions, and reduce the length of sentence remaining to be served.
Notte, Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings-
The Supreme Court Responds, 53 N.C.L. REv. 793, 793-94 (1975). See generally
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
3. Punitive segregation or solitary confinement generally consists of restriction to
a cell either full time or for most of each day, without opportunities for recreation or
exercise and sometimes with a reduced diet -and reduced access to reading matter.
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 50 (1967).
4. The lesser punishment most commonly used is loss of privileges for a given
period of time. Id. See also Proposed Regulations Governing Procedures at the Adult
Correctional Institutions, Rhode Island, reprinted in Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp.
857, 874 app. (D.R.I. 1970).
5. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
6. See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
7. 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination" forbids the taking
of a negative inference from the silence of a prisoner at a disciplinary
hearing to which the privilege against self-incrimination applies.9
lit holding that such an inference is permissible,'0 the Court decreased
the protection provided by -the fifth amendment in the prison context,
and in so doing took a further step in the process of limiting the rights
of imprisoned individuals.
In Baxter the Court jointly considered two United States Court of
Appeals cases challenging the constitutionality of prison disciplinary
proceedings under 42 U.S.C. section 1983." The first, Clutchette v.
Procunier,'2 was an action brought by inmates of the California penal
institution at San Quentin. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California found that the disciplinary proceedings
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because
they denied counsel to prisoners. Because of this denial the prisoners
were forced to give up their constitutional privilege against self-incrim-
ination in order to present a defense that could otherwise have been
presented for them by a lawyer while they remained silent.' 3  In its
final consideration of the case,' 4 -the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that -an inmate faced with any form of disci-
pline was entitled to notice of claimed violations, an opportunity to be
heard and present witnesses, a hearing before a detached and neutral
body, and a decision based on evidence introduced at the hearing.' 5
The court also held that prison officials could, in their discretion, refuse
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V in pertinent part provides: "[Nior shall [any person]
be compelled in any &riminal case to be a witness against himself ... 
9. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.
10. Id. at 1558-59. Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority, with Justices
Brennan and Marshall concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens did
not take part in the decision.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
12. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
13. Id. at 777-78.
14. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally held that the minimum
due process requirements for parole and probation revocations applied to disciplinary
proceedings as well. 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974). After the Supreme Court decision
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), rehearing was granted and the court of
appeals' final decision was reported at 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1975).
15. 510 F.2d at 614, aff'g in part 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
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to provide an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, but
written reasons for that denial were to be given to the prisoner or the
denial would act as "prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion."'0
Finally, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Miranda v.
Arizona7 secured a prisoner's right to counsel in a disciplinary proceed-
ing for activity violating state criminal laws as well as prison regula-
tions.' 8
In the second case, Nicolas A. Palmigiano, an inmate of the
Rhode Island Correction Institution, faced a disciplinary hearing for in-
citing a disturbance within the prison.' 9 Prior to the hearing Palmigiano
was informed that he might be prosecuted for a violation of Rhode Island
criminal law, and -that he could consult with his attorney but that the
attorney could not be present during the hearing itself. He was also
advisedithat he had a right to remain silent 'but that his silence would be
held against him in the proceeding. Following the disciplinary hearing
at which he remained silent, Palmigiano was placed in solitary confine-
ment for thirty days and had his classification status downgraded. Pal-
migiano sued, claiming the proceeding violated his rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.2"
The United States District Court denied relief.2 The original decision
of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,2" a reversal of the district
court, was vacated by the Supreme Court in view of its decision in
Wolff.28 On remand, the First Circuit reaffirmed its initial holding, 4
finding that Palmigiano's fourteenth amendment due process rights were
violated by the disciplinary procedure.2 5 Furthermore it held that the
protections required by Miranda and Mathis v. United States0 to safe-
guard the privilege against self-incrimination in a custodial interrogation,
16. 510 F.2d at 616.
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. 510 F.2d at 616.
19. Palmigiano, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with
urging other prisoners not to return to their cells for lock-up in the evening in order
to register protest for the failure of the prison administration to provide medical assist-
ance for a fellovi prisoner who was violently ill. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280,
1281 (lst Cir. 1973).
20. 96 S.'Ct. at 1555.
21. Id. The district court decision is unreported.
22. Palnigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
23. 418 U.S. 908 (1974).
24. 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
25. Id. at 537.
26. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying note 69 infra.
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including the presence of counsel, should have been provided to Palmi-
giano in light of the possibilities of future criminal 'prosecution.2 7
The Supreme Court reversed in both cases,28 stating that Wolffs
limitation of the right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings encom-
passed all such hearings, regardless of .the possibility of future criminal
prosecutions, and that neither Miranda nor Mathis was applicable since
disciplinary proceedings are "not part of a criminal prosecution. ' 29 The
Court further held that the practice of informing a prisoner of his rig ht
to remain silent but stating also that his silence would be used against
him is invalid neither per se nor as applied in a civil proceeding of this
sort."°  The Court first reasoned that the fifth amendment does not
apply to prevent the taking of adverse inferences from silence in civil
actions, although it does forbid such an inference in a criminal case."
The Court then rejected the argument that Baxter fit within a group of
civil cases32 in which an inference of guilt taken from defendants' fifth
amendment silence in the'face of official questions had been invalidated,
differentiating between those civil cases and the instant case on the
ground that Palmigiano's silence alone did not automatically subject him
to discipline.3 3 Finally, the Court reiterated that "[m]utual accommo-
dation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution that are of general application" is necessary, and that
this -accommodation will limit the standard of rights necessary to con-
stitute due process in all prison disciplinary hearings.34
The Supreme Court first utilized the "mutual accommodation" bal-
ancing process in the area of prison-related discipline in Morrissey v.
27. 510 F.2d at 536-37.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 1560-61.
29. Id. at 1556, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1558-59.
31. Id. at 1557-58.
32. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968); Sanitation Men v. Sanitatioh Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See text accompanying notes 55-59 infra.
33. 96 S. Ct. at 1556-57. The majority opinion also'reexamined the due process
issue presented in Wolff in this changed context and reaffirmed the denial of cross-ex-
amination and confrontation to prisoners, refusing to require prison officials to provide
written explanation of their discretionary decisions to forbid such actions. Id. at 1559.
Further, the Court held unanimously that any holding regarding minimum due process
standards when inmates are threatened with loss of privileges rather than the more seri-
ous forms of discipline would be premature on these facts. Id. at 1560. The Court
also held that the district court inappropriately treated Clutchette v. Procunier.as a class
action within the contemplation of rules 23(c)(1) and 23(c)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure without certifying it as such and identifying the class. Id. at 1554
n.1.
34. Id. at 1559, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
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Brewer." The Court found in that case that due process applies to
parole revocation hearings. After weighing and balancing governmental
interests in efficient, inexpensive proceedings, as well as in the parolee's
rehabilitation,36 with the parolee's private interest, the parolee's due
process rights were found to include: (1) preliminary and final hearings
before neutral and detached bodies, (2) written notice of alleged viola-
tions, (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documents, (4) the opportunity to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, and (5) a written statement of the evidentiary basis and
reasons for revocation.37  Gagnon v. Scarpelli8 applied similar due
process requirements to probation revocation actions.39
In Wolff v. McDonnell"° the Court declined to extend the full range
of Gagnon-Morrissey due process requirements to disciplinary proced-
ures for acts occurring within the prison that could lead to confinement
in disciplinary cells and deprivation of good-time credits. 41 In view of
the state's strong interest in maintaining order within the prison and in
the rehabilitation of prisoners4 2 the process of mutual accommodation
in such instances creates less stringent due process requirements: (1)
notice of the charges in sufficient time to prepare a defense, (2) oppor-
tunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence if it will not be
hazardous to the safety or correctional goals of the prison, and (3) a
written statement of findings of fact and reasons for the imposition of
discipline.4 3  The right of confrontation and cross-examination and the
35. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
36. The government interest in rehabilitation can be used not only to cut down
on the absolute right to counsel in order to make disciplinary hearings more adversary
and less corrective, but also to support a great many other due process rights on the
grounds that unfair treatment will have a negative effect on a parolee's attitudes and
greatly decrease his chances of successful rehabilitation. 408 U.S. at 484. See also
U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 830 (1969).
37. 408 U.S. at 489.
38. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
39. Gagnon also added a requirement of counsel when the state authorities found
a trained advocate would be necessary to present fairly the probationer's side of the case.
Right to counsel is presumed in a number of situations. Id. at 783-91.
40. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
41. Id. at 563-72.
42. In Baxter the state goal of rehabilitation was used by the Court solely as a
rationale for cutting back the due process requirements. The arguments of note 36
supra seem to have been abandoned on the ground that rehabilitation is best promoted
by a rapid, non-adversary hearing, even though the prisoner's belief in the fairness of
the proceeding may be decreased.
43. 418 U.S. at 564-67. For criticism of this view see Millemann, Prison Disci-
plinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process, 31 MD. L. Rv. 27, 42 (1971).
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right to-counsel were found not to be required by due process on the
grounds that these rights would produce delay, put an adversary cast
on the proceeding that would reduce its rehabilitative value, and limit
the discretion of the prison administration in such a way as to compro-
mise the security of the institution."
Although the rights of prisoners have only been considered by the
Supreme Court in the recent past,48 the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination has a long history of protection by the federal
courts.46  According to its language, the fifth amendment applies only
to criminal trials. One of its primary purposes is to protect against
inquisitorial abuses of widespread government interrogation and investi-
gation.48 If the criminal limitation were strictly applied, however, the
fifth amendment would be robbed of its effectiveness since incriminatory
answers could be demanded in non-criminal "investigatory" procedures
and then utilized in a criminal trial with the very effect that the amend-
ment is designed to avoid. 49  Theoretically, the privilege against self-
incrimination should protect any person who is being coerced by gov-
ernmental authorities to testify to matters that might tend to incriminate
him. 50 The protection extends not only to questions whose answers are
incriminating per se, but to those whose answers would contain informa-
tion that could either constitute a "link in the chain" of evidence that
might incriminate defendant or give the authorities information that
could reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of such evidence.'
44. 418 U.S. at 567-70.
45. The federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to respond to inmate com-
plaints and interfere with prison administration. See generally Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Con-
victs, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Develop-
ing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
46. See, e.g., Arndstein v. McCarthy; 254 U.S. 71 (1920); Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
47. See note 8 supra for the relevant text. The fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
48. Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. CHm. L. REv. 472, 484 (1957). The privilege originated in England as a response
to the procedures of the Star Chamber, which not only demanded that defendants give
testimony that would lead to their convictions, but which tortured those who refused to
speak under oath. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFm AMENDMENT TODAY 2-4 (1955).
49. Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52
VA. L. REv. 322, 323 (1966).
50. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See also Ratner, supra note
48, at 493.
51. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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The protection does not extend to prevent a defendant who remains
silent from being damaged by the presence of unrefuted evidence tending
to show his guilt. The natural inference arising out of the presence of
such evidence 52 creates a dilemma for the defendant who must choose
between presenting a defense and exercising his self-incrimination privi-
lege. However, the inference taken from unrefuted evidence has gener-
ally been considered to be insufficiently coercive to create a threat to the
fifth amendment privilege. Commentators have suggested that the in-
ference is constitutionally acceptable because it arises out of the strength
of the evidence presented and not out of defendant's exercise of his con-
stitutional right.53
The fifth amendment does not forbid self-incrimination altogether.
Rather, it forbids any governmental action that would coerce a citizen
to incriminate himself involuntarily.5 4 The Supreme Court has recently
invalidated two types of behavior that impermissibly threatened the free
use of the fifth amendment privilege. In Griffin v. California" the
Court held it to be unconstitutionally coercive to advise juries that they
can draw an unfavorable inference from defendant's silence at his crim-
inal trial. Such an inference would not only be a coercive penalty
making the "assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly,' "60 but
would effectively negate the application of the privilege as a protection
both for the innocent who fear that ambiguous answers to selected ques-
tions or their nervous appearance on the witness stand would tend to
incriminate them and for the guilty who want to leave the full burden of
52. Some states allow comment on the use of the privilege in civil litigation. See,
e.g., Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, "45 So. 641 (1908), cited, with approval in
Hinton & Sons v. Strahan, 266 Ala. 307, 96 So. 2d 426 (1957). The majority do not
permit comment, but do allow the jury to draw an inference from a party's silence. See,
e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953).
53. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 48, at 476; Comment, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75, 79.
54. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court stated its policy as
follows:
rIllegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing ...by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more. in sound than in substance.
It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Id. at 635. This statement was quoted with approval in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
515 (1967).
55. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
56. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967), citing Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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proving their criminal activity on the state.57  Any inference taken from
silence amounts to an assumption that those who avail themselves of
the privilege are either guilty or are perjurors who are using the privilege
to block investigations and protect others although they have no personal
fear of incrimination.5"
The second form of coercion was discussed in a group of civil cases,
two of which were Garrity v. New Jersey59 and Lefkowitz v. Turley."0
These cases concerned economically oriented civil sanctions that were
automatically imposed on those claiming the privilege against self-in-
crimination before a government investigation. 6 " Such penalties were
not actual inferences of guilt taken at the hearings where defendants'
testimony was desired, but rather cousins to such inferences-assump-
tions that any person who could not testify freely and fully was guilty of
something and therefore an unsuitable employee who should be removed
from his or her job. The Supreme Court held that these collateral
inferences were coercive in their non-rebuttable, automatic nature, and
that the privilege may not be "condition[ed] by the exaction of a price. 62
Arguably the common factor in these cases is that the government acted
in all of them both as interrogator and imposer of penalties.6" Protec-
tion against such a use of governmental power harks back to the fifth
amendment's original purpose of protection from government inquisition
57. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956), modified,
351 U.S. 944 (1956) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 557.
59. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
60. 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The other cases in the group are: Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
61. In Slochower, a statute required termination of employment of any city em-
ployee who did not answer questions related to official conduct. Garrity involved police
who were forced to answer questions or lose their jobs. Spevack involved an attempt
at automatic disbarment of a lawyer who claimed the privilege. In Gardner, discharge
of policemen was threatened if they failed to sign waivers of immunity before appearing
before a grand jury. Finally, the New York contracts in issue in Lefkowitz required
contractors to waive immunity and answer questions concerning state contracts or lose
the right to contract with the state for five years.
62. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). This line of cases had two
related holdings: first, that such coerced testimony could not be used at a subsequent
criminal trial, and second, that it was not permissible to penalize someone for remaining
silent despite coercion to talk. Compare id. at 497-98, with Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).
63. Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968
U. ILL. L.F. 75; cf. Comment, Constitutionality of Administrative or Statutory Sanctions
Upon the Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 36 FoRD. L. Rv. 593
(1968).
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and abuse of governmental power to punish those who failed to coop-
erate. 64
The fifth amendment right was extended to situations of custodial
interrogation by the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona."
Because of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation,
Miranda required that the individual subject to such questioning be
first informed of his right to remain silent and the fact that any statement
made can be used against him in a criminal trial.m To ensure that
defendant is aware of his fifth amendment right and is not coerced intb
giving up his opportunity to exercise it, he was granted the right to
consult a lawyer and to have him present at any time during question-
ing.67  Mathis v. United States"" applied the Miranda procedures to
custodial interrogation when the reason, for custody was unrelated to
the investigation taking place and when the investigation itself was rou-
tine rather than accusatory. 69 Failure to give Miranda warnings pro-
duces the immediate result of barring any self-incriminating evidence
from use at a future criminal trial unless the government can prove a
voluntary waiver of fifth amendment rights.70
In Baxter the Supreme Court looked for the first time at the rela-
tionship between the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and prison disciplinary hearings. In reconsidering the due process issue
of confrontation and cross-examination, the Court rejected the argument
that the accommodation reached in Wolff 71 should be modified because
.64. Ratner, supra note 48, at 484-87.
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. Id. at 467-69.
67. Id. at 469.
68. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. Id. at 4-5. Mathis was in prison serving a state sentence when subjected to
a routine federal tax.investigation. Although he was incarcerated on a different charge,
aid it was possible that no criminal charges would arise out of the investigation, the
Court found that the protective rights of Miranda applied and that any information
given in that investigation was barred from future prosecution. Id. at 5.
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). The theory behind this action
is that the coercive nature of the situation itself endangers the fifth amendment privi-
lege. Barring the use of coercively obtained evidence is only a partial solution in view
of the intention of Miranda to protect the fifth amendment privilege. It is arguable that
exclusion of tainted evidence is insufficient and that any jurisdiction failing to utilize
the Miranda procedures or their equivalent to protect the fifth amendment could be di-
rected to extend immunity to those who had been coerced into incriminating themselves.
The idea of deliberate defiance of Miranda on the assumption that the evidence would
be inadmissible at a crminal trial but might be of other value presents an entirely differ-
ent set of problems. See generally Turner & Daniel; Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma
of Prison Disciplline and Intramural Crime, 21 ButrALo L. REn'. 759, 770-71 (1972).
71. For a discussion of Wolff, see text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
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an inmate's interest is weightier when he is faced with possible criminal
prosecution. The Court found instead that the interest of the state
still outbalanced individual interests, and that prison officials must be
left with full discretion in these areas.7 2
Although recognizing that the fifth amendment privilege was
applicable to the Baxter interrogation despite its civil nature because of
the possibility .f future criminal proceedings,73 the Court found that the
disciplinary proceeding was neither criminal in itself nor as a stage of a
pending criminal prosecution. The type of coercive inference forbidden
from criminal trials by the strict holding of Griffinwas therefore correctly
found to be inapplicable in this circumstance.
74
In addition, Justice White, writing for the majority, saw Baxter
and the Garrity-Lefkowitz line of decisions as analytically separable.75
In those cases the refusal to testify alone resulted in a governmental
sanction. In Baxter, by contrast, silence was assumed to have a conno-
tation but would not result in discipline in the absence of other evi-
dence.78 Justice Brennan, in the dissenting portion of his opinion,
asserted that Baxter demonstrates the same use of an impermissible
government sanction as a penalty for the use of the fifth amendment
found in the earlier cases. 77
Neither of these arguments is lacking in logic. Baxter is indeed
a very different type of case from Garrity, and is not only distinguishable
but should be distinguished on the grounds mentioned by White. There
is a difference between a statute or contract that invalidly provides a set
penalty for constitutionally protected action and an administrative hear-
ing, similar in many ways to a trial, in which some inference taken from
an inmate's silence will become part of the evidence that might result in
disciplinary action. This difference prevents Garrity and the cases
following it from serving as adequate precedent for a decision striking
down the Baxter procedures.
The analysis of Justice Brennan, although it erroneously attempts
to tie Baxter into this group, shows a deeper insight into the problem
72. 96 S. Ct. at 1559-60.
73. Both the majority opinion and the dissent agree that the fifth amendment ap-
plied to Palmigiano. Compare 96 S. Ct. at 1557 (majority opinion), with 96 S. Ct. at
1561 (dissenting opinion).
74. 96 S. Ct. at 1557. For a discussion of the philosophy behind the Griffin hold-
ing, see text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
75. 96 S. Ct. at 1557.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1562-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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presented. The question before the Court was not whether the situation
presented in Baxter involves the Garrity-Lekowitz type of coercion, 78 but
rather whether the procedure used there was impermissibly coercive in
itself. The majority made no comment on the relationship of the facts
of Baxter to the philosophy espoused in Griffin,70 which forbade any
action that will make the exercise of the fifth amendment "costly." Nor
did the Court recognize the apparent inequity of considering constitu-
tionally protected silence to be an inference of guilt when it was intend-
ed to benefit the innocent.
Moreover, the Court failed to distinguish between an inference of
guilt arising. out of the silence itself-an inference that would be in
apparent conflict with the history of the fifth amendment privilege and
with its purpose and philosophy as expressed in Griffin-and an infer-
ence arisihg out of unrefuted evidence.80  If the inference was taken
from defendant's silence,. the majority did not adequately explain its
approval. The assumption was made that the fifth amendment permits
the taking of an inference against a party in a civil action who refuses to
testify,8 1 although the Supreme Court had never previously approved
this practice. No recognition was given to the idea that such inferences
are permissible only because they are taken from unrefuted evidence,
which is not protected by the fifth amendment, and not from the silence
itself."' -Furthermore, the knowledge that Rhode Island disciplinary
decisions "must be based on substantial evidence manifested in the
record of the disciplinary proceeding" s3 did not settle the question since
it is unclear whether silence was or was not evidence manifested in the
record. If the Baxter inference was an inference solely from the weight
of the unrefuted evidence and therefore permissible, the facts of the case
demand an investigation both of the sufficiency of the other evidence
to support the decision of the disciplinary board 4 and of the coercive
78. For a discussion of the coercion involved in those cases, see text accompanying
notes 59-64 supra.
79. 380 U.S. at 614.
80. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
81. 96 S. Ct. at 1558.
82. See Comment, Penalizing the Civil Litigant Who Invokes the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 24 V. FLA. L. REv. 541, 549 (1972); Comment, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 75, 79 (1968). Cf.
Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv.
322, 340-41 (1966).
83. 96 S. Ct. at 1557, quoting Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 873 (D.R.I.
1970).
84. The disciplinary board's decision was based on reports of prison officials and
Palmigiano's silence. The majority speaks as if the silence did carry some independent
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and misleading nature of the statement that Palmigiano's silence "would
be held against him."- The Court's decision was apparently made
without consideration of any of these problems.
The application of Miranda and Mathis6 to prison disciplinary
proceedings was summarily dismissed in the Court's consideration of
the availability of counsel. The assurance of counsel was not consid-
ered a fifth amendment protection at all, although both the First and
Ninth Circuits had based their decisions on the theory and rule of
Miranda and Mathis.8 7 As the courts of appeals found, the situation in
Baxter approximated that found inherently coercive in Mathis. In both
cases officials questioned a man in prison whose custody was based on
a charge other than that involved in the questioning. In both cases
the questions were part of an investigation that could conceivably lead
to criminal charges, but no criminal charges had yet been brought in
either, and there was a possibility in each that no prosecution would ever
begin. In Mathis, the Court found that the possibility that criminal
prosecutions might result was sufficient to require full Miranda protec-
tions, including the presence of counsel to guard against erosion of the
fifth amendment privilege.8 8  In Baxter, on the other hand, the Court
held that the interrogations were not part of a criminal proceeding. 89
This analysis is insufficient to distinguish Baxter from Mathis, which
applied full Miranda protections to a custodial interrogation although
the investigation was a routine one unrelated to the reason for defend-
ants imprisonment. Further, it ignores the fact that the essence of Mathis
and Miranda was the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, not the assurance of the right to counsel under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments. 90
The Court had previously held that custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive and produces a clear threat to the fifth amendment
weight, although they assume that it would be insufficient in itself for a decision to dis-
cipline. See 96 S. Ct. at 1559 n.4, 1564-65 n.6.
85. Id. at 1555. Some indication of the Court's inattention to the power of this
phrase is that the decision initially described the pronouncement as being that the in-
mate's silence would be held against him, and later said that Palmigiano was told that
his silence could be held against him-a considerably weaker, less intimidating, less
coercive warning. Compare id. at 1555 with id. at 1556.
86. See text accompanying notes 65-70 supra for a discussion of these cases.
87. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.
88. 391 U.S. at 4-5.
89. 96 S. Ct. at 1556.
90. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 458-66 (1966).
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privilege any time an individual faces the possibility of self-incrimination
at future criminal proceedings. Baxter was a case of custodial interro-"
gation, and the consensus of the Court was that the fifth amendment
applied. 1 It therefore defies logic to decide that the Miranda rights,
set up as protections against threats to the privilege ahd affirmed in a
similar situation in Mathis, do not apply in Baxter. When the Court
eliminated the requirement of counsel in Wolff, it did so through the ise
of a balancing test appropriate to limit the reach of the sixth amendment
through the due process clause. In Baxter the Court erroneously
extended the sixth amendment/due process balancing test to a situation
where -the presence of counsel was required as a protection for the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Utilization of a valid
limitation of the due process clause to remove any portion of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination tarnishes the respected position of broad
construction and expansive application it has occupied throughout its
history.
The privilege against self-incrimination has always been liberally
construed because a strict construction limits its effectivness. 2 In its
treatment of prison disciplinary hearings, the Supreme Court cut sharply
into the philosophic underpinnings of the privilege by yielding to the
assumption that a party claiming that privilege is guilty or is committing
perjury. 93 Baxter affects a small class of people, but for those prisoners
the Court has taken action that could reduce the privilege to "a hollow
mockery."' 4 Moreover, the area in which the Court has chosen to limit
severely both the absolute application and the effectiveness of the fifth
amendment is one in which the privilege is probably the most necessary:
Innocent men are more likely to plead the privilege in secret pro-
ceedings, where they testify without advice of counsel and without
opportunity for cross-examination, than in open court proceedings,
where cross-examination and judicially supervised procedures pro-
vide safeguards for the establishing of the whole, as against the
possibility of merely partial, truth.95
The Court held in Wolff that prisoners faced with disciplinary hearings
were denied the instrumentalities of confrontation, cross-examination,
and counsel necessary to present a defense. After Baxter, an inmate is
91. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
92. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 515 (1967), quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
93. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1956).
94. Id. at 557.
95. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1957).
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forced to speak and risk incriminating himself both at the disciplinary
hearing and possibly in future criminal proceedings 6 or to keep silent
and accept the burden of giving up his defense while preseriting an
admission of his guilt to the disciplinry board.9 7 The combined effect
of the two decisions is to place the prisoner in a procedural vise from
which there is no foreseeable release.
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976-An Over-
view of the New Law
As the American consumer credit industry has grown, lawmakers
repeatedly have turned to legislation and regulation in an effort to con-
trol abuse and discourage the development of unfair credit policies.'
Part of this effort is represented by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments of 1976,2 passed in March, 1976, only five months after
the original legislation became effective.' The most ambitious and
controversial amendments expand the existing ban on discriminatory
credit-granting procedures, impose new disclosure requirements on
lending institutions and increase the statutory limits on creditor liability.
Creditors insist that these amendments and the corresponding regu-
96. In light of the Court's view that Miranda is completely inapplicable to this sit-
uation, it is unclear whether the absence of protection for the fifth amendment privilege
would cause self-incriminatory testimony given at a disciplinary procedure to be ex-
cluded from a later criminal trial.
97. 328 F. Supp. at 778.
1. Legislation in this area includes the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 1730f, 1831b, 2601-2617 (Supp. V 1975), and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1601-1691f (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976, Supp.
Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The latter encompasses
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1"601-1667e (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976,
Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976), the Fair Credit
Billing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1666-1666j (West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1691-1691f
(West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691-1691f
(West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976)) (amending Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as amendments].
3. The original Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (Supp.
V 1975), became effective Oct. 28, 1975. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 707, 88 Stat. 1525
(1974).
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lations will create a new maze of paperwork and increase the threat
of capricious lawsuits, thus making credit more expensive and less avail-
able to those in need, while driving the smaller creditor from the
market. Consumer advocates see the legislation as a way to extend
credit to worthy persons struggling in an economic system that makes
credit a necessity of life. It is too early to determine the precise im-
pact of the amendments on either consumers or the credit industry as a
whole. It is possible, however, to outline those key provisions that are
most likely to bring about change in current credit-granting procedures.
An evaluation of those provisions must consider not only the policy issues
behind congressional action but also any potentially counterproductive
results of the new law.
Despite the massive and complex credit legislation Congress has
passed since 1968 there has been little protection for the consumer who
is denied credit on grounds not logically related to the evaluation of
a good credit risk. Testimony at congressional hearings in 1973 re-
vealed unsurprising patterns of inherently discriminat6ry credit-grant-
ing procedures, particularly with regard to women and the elderly.4
Some of the criticized procedures were clearly offensive;" others, though
neutral in motive, were discriminatory in effectA Congress responded to
the hearings, and to extensive lobbying pressure from women's groups,
by passing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (the Act).7 The
Act barred discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status but omit-
ted several significant protection and enforcement provisions consid-
ered crucial by consumer advocates."
4. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Comm. Hearings]; Hear-
ings on H.R. 14856 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
5. There have been reports that when a married couple applied for a home
loan, some loan officials discounted the wife's income unless the wife had had
a hysterectomy. Joint Comm. Hearings, supra note 4, at 192 (setting forth the practice
of Veterans Administration loan officials as an example).
6. It was also common practice to discount a mortgage applicant's part-time
income as unreliable; this has had an adverse effect on women who make up a great
percentage of the part-time work force. Comment, Equal Credit: Promise or Reality?,
11 IHAv. C.R.-C.L L. Rnv. 186, 196-97 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1975). An overview of the law is provided
in Note, Consumer Protection: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 OLaA. L. Rnv.
577 (1975). The impact of the 1974 Act and accompanying regulations on lenders
is discussed in Mortimer, A Creditor's Preliminary Look at Regulation B, 93 BANKINO
LJ. 417 (1976). The impact of the Act on low-income persons is discussed in Baker
& Taubman, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: The Effect of the Regulations on the
Poor, 9 CLEARNGHOUSE REV. 543 (1975).
8. For instance, in noting the Federal Reserve Board's failure to include a re-
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The ensuing attempt by the Federal Reserve Board (the Board)
to promulgate regulations implementing the 1974 Act produced hard-
fought debate of the kind that might well have preceded the drafting
of the bill itself.' The regulations as. finally promulgated were a dis-
appointment to many consumer advocates who had hoped the Board
might take the broadest possible view of the legislation by requiring
more affirmative activity on the part of creditors. In addition to their
displeasure with- the regulations, some congressmen and consumer
groups were still committed to expanding the legislation's coverage to
protect other groups historically denied credit for irrelevant reasons.' 0
To incorporate these needs into the existing legislative framework,
Congress in 1975 instituted a new round of hearings," which culmi-
nated in the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments
of 1976.
Once again, the Federal Reserve Board must implement this legis-
lation; proposed rules are currently in print 2 and hearings are being
held to solicit public and industry reaction. 3 The expanded scope of
the Act along with new procedural and enforcement devices provided
by the amendments unfortunately has created new ambiguities. In
an effort to address these ambiguities the Board has proposed detailed
rules that may create traps even for the creditor who in good faith at-
tempts to comply with the law. 4 Such a maze of complex rules also
quirement for explanation of denial of credit by the creditor, Representative Patterson
said, "These regulations ... almost make it impossible for the system designed by
the Congress to be used at all." 121 CONG. REc. E5351 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975).
9. Proposed rules were published in April, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,183 (1975), but
were not satisfactory to creditors so a revised version was published a few months
later, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,030 (1975). Women's groups and consumer advocates found
these rules too weak and urged that further .changes be made. The final regulations,
40 Fed. Reg. 49,298 (1975)-published one week before the deadline set by the legis-
lation-represent an attempt at compromise.
10. A bill introduced by Senator Biden also would have prohibited discrimination
on the basis of "political affiliation," and would have given the Board authority to
establish "such other classifications" as were found appropriate. S. 1927, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 701, reprinted in Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer
Leasing Act-1975: Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961 and H.R. 5616 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
11. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10.
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,877 (1976).
13. Id. at 29,870.
14. For instance, in an effort to protect married women from being unfairly penal-
ized in a credit scoring scheme because they do not have phone listings, the proposed
rules stipulate that a creditor "shall not take into account the existence of a telephone
listing in the name of the applicant" but may consider "the existence of a telephone
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makes it difficult to identify consumer rights and remedies under the
law. In order to construe the amendments and the rules in the face
of this potential confusion it is important to identify the policy consid-
erations underlying the legislation: Therefore, a review of the amend-
ments' most significant provisions must focus upon their intended im-
pact and attempt to identify potential pitfalls facing consumers and
creditors.
THE "STATEMENT OF REASONS" CLAUSE
Potentially the most significant provision of the 1976 amendments
is the "statement of reasons" clause. 5 As approved, this provision
states that creditors are obligated to provide 'any rejected credit appli-
cant who so requests with "specific reasons" explaining the denial. In
contrast, the original Senate bill, which received the support of many
consumer advocates, would have required that such reasons be given
automatically to the rejected applicant at the time he or she was in-
formed of the adverse action.' 6
Although resigned to some degree of additional regulation, cred-
itors fought at least to limit the proposed legislative provisions; the
modified "statement of reasons" clause represents one of their victories.
However, examination of the motives behind the opposition to this sec-
tion indicate that the "victory" may be less important than it seemed.
Creditors have cited increased cost as the main reason for their
objections to the clause,17 but in light of other legislative requirements
in the residence of an applicant .... " 41 Fed. Reg. 29,881 (1976) (proposed rule
§ 202.6(b) (3)).
15. (2) Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be
entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor. A cred-
itor satisfies this obligation by-
(A) providing statements of reasons in writing as a matter of course
to applicants against whom adverse action is taken; or(B) giving written notification of adverse action which discloses(i) the applicant's right to a statement of. reasons ....
(3) A statement of reasons meets the requirements of this section onlyif it contains the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (2), (3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
16. "A creditor shall promptly furnish each applicant who 1has applied for credit
and to whom credit is denied or terminated a clear and meaningful statement in writing
of the reasons for the denial or termination." S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(d),
reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 148.
17. Sears, Roebuck and Co. prepared data indicating that each letter of rejection
could cost over $5.00 to prepare, and that multiplied by the new account rejections
in 1974, the cost of sending such letters would be over $8 million. 1975 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 402. This assumes that each letter would be individually drafted
and typed.
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this reason may not be valid. For example, creditors are required to
inform rejected applicants in writing of adverse action taken on any ap-
plications.' 8 Thus, if an applicant requests an explanation of the credit
denial the lendor is required to write a second time, providing the state-
ment of reasons. This statement may take the form of a prepared
checklist 0 on which the creditor would check appropriate explanatory
phrases. By automatically including this statement with the first letter,
the lender saves the time, effort and expense of preparing a second
response.
The advantages of such a checklist may convince creditors to go
beyond the minimal response required by the legislation; indeed some
creditors already are employing this system.20 Direct and honest com-
munication with a potential customer is likely to produce public good
will, which is particularly important to a service industry whose com-
munity reputation is a critical business consideration. 1 An individual
applicant may respond favorably to a clear explanation of his or her
failure to qualify for credit and may be encouraged to reapply after
meeting the appropriate requirements.
The automatic statement also decreases the likelihood that an ap-
plicant will deny having received a response to his or her request for
a written explanation of the adverse action. Thus it seems possible
that from a business standpoitit, creditors may be convinced to go be-
yond the requirements of the law, despite their prior vigorous opposi-
tion to the "statement of reasons" section. The advantages of incurring
the additional expense involved may be more convincing if substantial
judgments are awarded against lenders who violate this provision of the
law.
18. A creditor must give the applicant a written statement of the reasons for
the rejection or notify the applicant in writing of his or her right to have such a
statement. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (2), (3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976),
quoted in note 15 supra.
19. The Board's proposed rules include a sample checklist which, if properly com-
pleted by the creditor, establishes compliance with the "specific reasons" requirement.
41 Fed. Reg. 29,882 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.9(b) (2)).
20. Representatives of National BankAmericard testified at congressional hearings
that in the interest of public relations, member banks are encouraged to employ al-
ternative form letters and inform the rejected applicant of why he or she was not
awarded credit. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 367. Informal inquiry by the author
reveals that North Carolina Wachovia banks offering MasterCharge are instructed to
include a checklist explanation when informing a customer that his or her MasterCharge
application is not being accepted.
21. "[Flor the most part there is no national market for consumer credit. Con-
sumers seldom shop for credit outside their town or city .... ." NATIONAL CoMMIs-
SION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNrrED STATES 11 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
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Although it is difficult to predict, it seems unlikely that large num-
bers of credit applicants will request the written explanation to which
they are entitled. 2 In light of this fact, it would seem that the goal
of establishing a more critical and informed class of consumers would
have been better achieved by requiring automatic disclosure of the rea-,
sons for rejection. Nevertheless, the "specific reasons" clause estab-
lishes the principle that a credit applicant is entitled to know why a
lending institution did not find him to be an acceptable credit risk. Rec-
ognition of this principle is, in itself, an important development, even
if the legislation's precise language does not go far enough toward en-
couraging the growth of an informed class of credit consumers.2"
CLASSIFICATION OF BORROWERS
Less concrete protection for the credit -consumer is found in the
statute's specification of particulair categories of people against whom
creditors cannot discriminate. 24  Although the categories of race, 25
color, religion and national origin are potentially important, the inclu-
sion of a prohibition on age discrimination has proved to be the most
controversial. Here again, industry representatives achieved their ob-
jectives by convincing legislators that if the category of age were added
as a protected classification, it should not be barred from use as a factor
22. While not definitive, an informal questionnaire mailed to selected member
banks by National BankAmericard indicated that 10-15% of rejected applicants contact
the bank for further information when invited to do so; for those banks that did
not invite inquiry only 1% inquired. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 375-82..
23. By including the "statement of reasons" provision Congress also expressed
a desire to provide a victim of credit discrimination with potential courtroom evidence.
Although a creditor is not going to explain the applicant's rejection in terms of dis-
criminatory motives, a rejection statement based on clearly inappropriate reasons will
make better legal ammunition than no statement at all. See SENATE REP. No. 94-
589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 635, 642.
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) reads as
follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any
applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or mari-
tal status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program;.or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised'any right under
this chapter.
25. A 1975 pilot survey confirmed the existence of racial discrimination by show-
ing that black applicants for mortgage loans are turned down almost twice as frequently
as white applicants of similar economic circumstances. COMPTROLLER OF TIM CUR-
RENCY, ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS FAir HousING PRACTICE PILOT PROJECr,
1975, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 481-526.
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in credit scoring schemes. In effect, the amendments ban only the ar-
bitrary use of age when making credit decisions.16  For instance, the
young person having difficulty obtaining a loan because he or she lacks
a credit rating may find this legislation of little help; creditors still will
be able to deny credit on that ground.27 The new law would appear
to prohibit some of the discriminatory practices cited in the legislative
record,2 though creditors can inquire about age in relation to other
"valid" credit factors such as credit history and employment record. If
the amendments do result in credit extension to some elderly persons
presently denied credit in an arbitrary manner, creditors should not
foresee economic loss. Studies suggest29 and common sense reinforces
the notion that persons over sixty-five often are better able to assess their
ability to repay loans, have better credit histories and are in general
more conservative about assuming debts.
The prohibition of age discrimination was particularly intended to
protect the elderly; however, the effects -of expanding the law's cov-
erage to additional groups (the terms "race," "color," "religion," "na-
tional origin" and "age' are new) may well go beyond protection of
each individual classification. Because the persons now protected from
discriminatory credit-granting practices include those Americans histor-
ically denied equal opportunity in many social and economic spheres,
the language suggests that Congress would favor broad and inclusive
judicial construction of the equal credit opportunity legislation. °
26. The amendments prohibit discrimination on the basis of age but provide that
the creditor may make inquiries concerning age to determine "probable continuance
of income levels [or] credit history." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b) (2) (West Supp. Pamphlet
No. .2, pt. 1 1976). Age may be considered in an "empirically derived credit system"
if such a systeni does not operate so that the age of an elderly applicant is given
a "negative factor or value." Id. §§ 1691(b) (2), (3). These quoted terms are defined
by the Board in the proposed rules at 41 Fed. Reg. 29,872 (1976) (proposed rules
§ 202.2(o) & (u)). At least one commentator has suggested that the legislation will
"preclude age as a meaningful component of a credit scoring system" because whenever
one age bracket is given favorable treatment the result is to "discriminate" against
other age groups. Comment, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 28 BAYLOR L. Ry. 633, 641 (1976).
27. If a rejected applicant could establish that basing credit denials on lack of
credit rating results in disproportionate rejection of persons under age 26, it seems
likely that a creditor would be able to justify his position by showing that lack of
credit rating has a "manifest relationship to creditworthiness," as this phrase is used
in the Board's proposed rules. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,879, 29,880 n.7 (1976) (proposed
rule § 202.1(x), .6(a)). For another proposed rule on this issue, see note 42 infra.
28. Apparently many creditors, particularly banks offering credit chiecking ac-
counts, automatically terminate credit extension when the customer reaches age 65.
1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 78-92.
29. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 438.
30. On the other hand, a specific test as opposed to a more general prohibition
of "discrimination based on immaterial grounds" leaves unprotected specific .groups of.
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CMIL LIABILITY
Broad construction and successful consumer litigation will not
alone deter those creditors who are determined to continue violating
the letter and the spirit of the law. In those cases, it seems that only
severe financial penalties will provide an effective deterrent; the amend-
ments' liability provisions represent an effort to create such a deterrent.
In addition to actual damages, costs and attorneys' fees, an individual
may recover up to $10,000 in punitive damages; for class actions, puni-
tive damages are limited to $500,000. or one percent of the creditor's
net worth, whichever is less.31 It should be noted that these terms rep-
resent a considerable concession to the industry. The originally pro-
posed limits-$50,000 or one percent of net worth, whichever was
greater 52 -were rejected, presumably because committee members did
not favor multi-million dollar recoveries of punitive damages. 8
persons such as the physically handicapped. The committee rejected a provision in
the Senate bill that would have allowed the Board to add new classifications, presumably
on the ground that such a grant of authority would permit an executive body to exer-
cise powers reserved to the legislature. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)(b)
(1975), reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 147.
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) reads in
part as follows:
(a) Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed
under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant in an amount
equal to the sum of any actual damages sustained by such applicant acting
either in an individual capacity or as a representative of a class.(b) Any creditor . . . who fails to comply . . . shall be liable to the
aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an amount not greater than$10,000 . . . except that in the case of a class action the total recovery
under this subsection shall not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum
of the net worth of the creditor...
(d) In the case of any successful action . . . the costs of the action,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall
be added to any damages awarded ....
32. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(b) (1975), reprinted in 1975 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 150.
33. The proposed and adopted provisions produce vastly different results, as an
example will illustrate. Assume a successful class action is brought against Sears,
Roebuck Acceptance Corporation (net worth approximately $707,000,000). Under the
provisions as proposed, liability could be as high as $7,070,000. As adopted, the legis-
lation would limit liability to $500,000. Actual damages, costs and fees must be added
to these figures.
The results are also significantly different in relation to a small creditor, whose
net worth is, for instance, $50,000. Under the section as proposed, he could lose
his entire business in a successful class action suit.' As the law now stands, liability
for punitive damages could not exceed $500 in his case. These larger awards could
be limited if the class did not include enough members, since no individual can recover
more than $10,000. (Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corporation net worth figures for
1974 appear in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 281.)
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The compromise $500,000 figure (increased from $100,000 in the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act3 4) was designed to provide incentive for
class actions while discouraging the frivolous litigation some feared
would occur if recovery were limited only by the one percent ceiling.
While this may discourage class actions when the class includes more
than fifty persons,35 commentators have pointed out that class actions
may not be the appropriate remedy for so personal and subjective an
act as discrimination. 6
Only a class action, however, can result in the tremendous finan-
cial sanctions that would deter a creditor from repeatedly violating the
law. Individual actions, which are limited to a $10,000 recovery,3 7 pro-
vide a remedy for the applicant but at small relative cost to the creditor.
It is the threat of larger losses that, in theory, creates the motivation
to comply. This motivation is inevitably weakened by limiting the
scope of the class action. The conflict over the liability provisions re-
flects a broader controversy surrounding the class action device itself. 88
While imperfect, and vulnerable to attorney abuse, the class action re-
mains the most significant private tool available for challenging a dis-
criminatory credit practice that violates numerous persons' rights under
the law but does not result in actual damages.89
However, creditors were quick-and correct-to point out that
the amendments do not limit recovery of punitive damages to situations
of intentional or knowing violation of the law.40 The committee report
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976).
35. In theory, this is because an individual could not recover the maximum in-
dividual award of $10,000 if the maximum class action award had to be split into
more than 50 shares.
36. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 627; Note, Consumer Protection: The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 577 (1975). On the other hand,
the class action would seem the perfect way to attack a policy that arbitrarily puts
a blanket end to credit checking accounts when customers reach the age of 65. See
note, 28 supra.
37. See note 31 supra.
38. Discussion of the class action as a consumer tool is found in Fetterly, The
Application of the Class Action to Consumer Litigation, 24 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 4
(1973); Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions
and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974).
39. In addition to private civil actions, the amendments authorize the Attorney
General to bring civil suits "whenever he has reason to believe that one or more
creditors are engaged in a pattern or practice in violation (of the law]." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1691e(h) (West Supp. Pamphlet No..2, pt. 1 1976).
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) provides
that
[i]n determining the amount of [punitive] damages in any action, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the cred-
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suggests that liability should be determined by applying the now famous
"effects test," which grew out of employment discrimination cases."
This would shift to the creditor-defendant the burden of proving that
credit practices that result in rejection of disproportionate numbers of
persons, in protected classes are material to making sound credit de-
cisions. Translating these courtroom burdens of proof into business
procedures designed to avoid litigation suggests the employment of a
scheme of affirmative review.by creditors. Such a scheme would re-
quire a review of application procedures to determine if disproportion-
ate numbers of persons in protected classifications were being rejected
as poor credit risks.42 If this were occurring, the creditor would have
to determine if the application qualifications responsible for this result
were necessary to assess credit risks validly. Even if such qualifications
were materially related to assessing credit risks, a broad application of
the "effects test" would seem to require that the creditor make some
effort to devise other qualifications that would further the desired eval-
uation process without producing the accompanying discriminatory ef-
fect.
Whether creditors seek to avoid litigation by instituting such an
affirmative review system will depend on how aggressively consumers
pursue their rights (particularly in the form of class actions) and also
on how broadly courts apply the "effects test" as outlined in race dis-
crimination and employment cases. By suggesting that the courts ex-
amine impact in addition to intent, it would seem that Congress has
expressed support for procedural devices that will spread the costs of
itor, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected,
and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
The proposed rules indicate that an "inadvertent error" is not a violation of the
"statement of reasons" requirement, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,883 (1976) (proposed rule §
202.9(e), but "inadvertent error" is narrowly defined. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,883 (1976)
(proposed rule § 202.10(c)).
41. In determining the existence of [unlawful] discrimination . . . courts
or agencies are free to look at the effects of a creditor's motives or conduct
in individual transactions. Thus judicial constructions of anti-discrimination
legislation in the employment field in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) are intended to serve as guides in the application of this act
SENATE REP. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CoNe.
& AD. Nnws 635, 638.
42. The proposed rule specifically proscribes in several instances . . the
use of insufficiently refined general information which is accordingly not caus-
ally related to a determination of creditworthiness where the effect of using
such information would be to discriminate against an applicant on a prohibited
basis, even though the creditor may have no intent to discriminate.
41 Fed. Reg. 29,880 n.7 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.6(b)).
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correcting social problems among businesses and industries that have
profited from the advantages of the American market.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The "effects test," however, has been developed and expanded
on a case by case basis over time.43 It is the prospect of having to
employ legal counsel to interpret the test's requirements that prompts
creditors to complain of overregulation and unwarranted government
intrusion. Even if actual costs of disclosure and application-form revi-
sion are kept to a minimum, there is still an expressed fear that the ad-
ditional regulation and its accompanying legal complexities could force
the small lender out of the credit business.44 In an effort to address
this concern Congress included a provision exempting the very small
creditor from the "statement of reasons" requirement. 45  Nonetheless,
many creditors have seemed overwhelmed by the complexity of the
new law, the increasing need for legal advice in order to comply with
its provisions and the potential for litigation.46 Even the most clearly
worded regulations may not dispel this fear, given the complex nature
of the credit industry.47  At worst this development could mean a re-
duction in the number of middle-level creditors as they relinquish their
share of the market to the giants of the industry. For instance, a busi-
nessman who extends credit as part of a small retail operation may opt
for a major credit card arrangement to avoid potential litigation.
A reduction in the number of small creditors would work against
consumer interests, if only because there would be fewer alternative
43. See Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), in which the court found that particular employment
requirements were not sufficiently job-related to justify their discriminatory effects. But
see Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 533 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the
court ruled that although the state bar examination resulted in disproportionate rejection
of black applicants, the test as administered was a legitimate evaluation of job-related
skills.
44. See note 46 infra.
45. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (5) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) exempts
from the "statement of reasons" requirement those creditors "who did not act on more
than one hundred and fifty applications during the calendar year preceding the calendar
year in which the adverse action is taken."
46. This concern was expressed by a small retailer from Massachusetts; that state
has enacted credit legislation similar to the federal law. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§ 4(3B), (4), (10), (12), (14), (15) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). The retailer said
that in his town in one month alone "11 independent retailers went from their own
charge into Bank charges because they felt they couldn't comply with the Massachusetts
regulations." 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 387.
47. NCCF RnPoRT, supra note 21, at 207.
1977] 277
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
lending schemes available. It seems likely that a nationwide credit and
finance company would establish less flexible policies than a local mer-
chant familiar with his market and more willing to extend credit to a
local resident. With fewer existing systems of assessing credit charges,
the consumer is less able to fit payment plans to his or her individual
needs.17  And fewer creditors means, at least in theory, less competi-
tion to keep down the price of money.48
Whether a reduction in the number of small creditors will be an
inevitable result of increased industry regulation is difficult to predict,
because it depends on small lenders' perception of the law as much
as on the law itself. However, this legislation is only a small part of
the overall problems faced by small businesses today. It is unlikely
that repeal of the amendments would help a small businessman as
much as would clear regulations setting forth for the well-intentioned
creditor a plan or policy that would establish compliance with the law.40
Ultimately, some degree of complexity will be inevitable and must be
accepted as part of an increasingly interdependent and technologically
sophisticated society. Although the legislators were made aware of the
small businessman's problems, the committee report accompanying the
amendments leads to the conclusion that Congress' overwhelming pri-
ority was to halt the policies that have made it virtually impossible for
some American credit consumers to participate in the existing Ameri-
can economic framework. 50
In order to predict how successful the amendments will be in
achieving this congressional goal it is important to recognize the limita-
tions of the legislation. The amendments represent an attempt. to re-
48. Less competition would mean the possibility of collective price setting, less
service for high-risk customers and prevention of entry into the market by potential
competitors. Id. at 209-11.
49. For instance, use of the Board's proposed checklist of credit criteria consti-
tutes compliance with the "statement of reasons" requirement. See note 19 supra.
If extended too far, however, this device could be used to shift the risk of noncompli-
ance to the Board; it is therefore important that the Board make clear, as it has
in its proposed rules, that Board members will not have "authority to approve particular
creditors' forms in any manner." 41 Fed. Reg. 29,878 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.1
(c) (5)).
50. Senator Jesse Helms did not share the view that federal legislation is the
best way to achieve the stated goals:
These amendments are just one more nail in the coffin of the right of the
individual to have local matters determined by the State legislatures. ...
Not only has the Congress been encroaching on [the] right[s] of the
States . . .it has also usurped much of the vital decisionmaking power for-
mally exercised by business and consumers in a free market.
12Z CONG. REC. S1021 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976).
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dress grievances that are inextricably wound with much larger social,
political and economic problems. While outlawing certain discrimina-
tory credit-granting practices, the amendments do not challenge the
catch-22 of the underlying economic system. Credit is often denied
because the applicant does not have a credit history; for many this vici-
ous circle cannot be broken. Persons with low incomes are often un-
able to obtain loans though they may be perfectly capable of slowly
repaying a small loan. And because credit has become so integral a
part of the American economic system 5' the individual defined as a
"bad" credit risk all too frequently turns to the thriving underworld of
loan sharks and extortionists.
And yet if credit is going to remain an important tool for improv-
ing the standard of living, as well as for aiding the individual through
temporary periods of financial difficulty, it is imperative that such a tool
be universally available. If the amendments result in efforts on the
part of lending institutions to reassess established credit scoring schemes,
as well as in greater consumer imderstanding of creditors' lending cri-
teria, they should be called a success.5 2
DONNA HELEN TRiPTOW
Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Do Private Citizens
Have a Right To Bring Action To Abate Water Pollution Under
Federal Common Law?
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of .1972'
set, a goal of ending all pollutant discharges into navigable waters by
1985.2 This lofty goal will be difficult to obtain8 even with congres-
51. "Between . . . 1950 and 1971 consumer credit outstanding rose from $21.5
billion to $137.2 billion, an increase of over five times . . . ." NCCF REPoRT, supra
note 21, at 5.
52. The legislation, however, does not address the problems created by an ever-
increasing national, corporate and individual debt. This increased debt is one manifes-
tation of the "rising expectations" politicians have taught us to fear, but we are contin-
ually urged to "relax" and "charge it."
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376"(Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 1251(a) (1).
3. McThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L Rnv. 195, 208 (1973).
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sionally mandated state and federal cooperation.4 In Committee for
the Consideration of the Jones Fall Sewage System v. Train," the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals turned down an opportunity to become
involved in pollution control by further judical expansion of "special-
ized federal common law." The court held that private citizens have
no federal common law right to enjoin intrastate water pollution that
is not enjoinable under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.1
The Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage
System complained that the city of Baltimore was discharging sewage
into Jones Falls Stream. Plaintiffs first sought injunctive relief under
the federal water pollution statutes,8 but it soon appeared that they had
no cause of action under the statutes because the city had submitted
an application for a discharge permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k),
which provides that discharges will not be a statutory violation during
the pendency of a proper application. The authorizing agency found
that the city was meeting the statutory standards and a permit was is-
sued during the pendency of the litigation. The issuance of the permit
prevented any relief under the federal statute, so plaintiffs amended
their complaint to allege a federal common law right of action for
an injunction ° against additional connections to the sewer system that
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V 1975).
5. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
6. For a discussion of the development of "specialized federal common law"
since the ban on "generalized federal common law" in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L R .383 (1964).
7. 539 F.2d at 1007.
8. Id.
9. (Supp. V 1975). This section states in part:
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to that section shall be deemed
compliance [with all statutory standards, except those imposed] for a toxic
pollutant injurious to human health. Until December 31, 1974, in any case
where a permit for discharge has been applied for pursuant to this section,
but final administrative disposition of such application has not been made,
such discharge shall not be a violation of [statutory standards], unless the
Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition
of such application has not been made because of the failure of the applicant
to furnish information reasonably required or requested in order to process
the application.
10. Injunctions for abatement of pollution have been granted on federal common
law grounds. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). Illinois involved a state seeking an injunction against
a city of another state to abate water pollution. The Court felt that the national
interest in pollution control and the interstate nature of the parties made it inappropri-
ate to subject either party to the laws and processes of a foreign state, and conse-
quently applied federal common law to permit the injunctive relief. 406 U.S. at 101-
08.
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was discharging pollutants into the stream."
In the district court defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or if
jurisdiction was found, that the district court should elect not to exercise
it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' 2 Defendants based their
allegation of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on two premises: (1)
that private citizens could not invoke federal common law to abate
intrastate pollution of navigable waters, and (2) that the 1972 amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempted the federal
common law.' 3 The district court held that only governmental units
could invoke the federal common law cause of action to abate pollution
of navigable waters,' 4 and thus found it unnecessary to consider whether
the 1972 amendments preempted the federal common law.15
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision and concluded that the amended complaint stated no claim
upon which relief could be granted.' 6 In reaching its decision the court
of appeals indicated four reasons for not recognizing a body of federal
common law conferring rights upon private citizens to enjoin pollution
of intrastate waters not enjoinable under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972. The court first relied upon the Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 7 ban on general federal common law.18 The
11. 539 F.2d at 1008.
12. Committee v. Train, 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (D. Md. 1974). The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is often invoked when an administrative agency has been created
to deal with problems that arise in a particular area, such as pollution control. The
court will invoke that doctrine to deny jurisdiction to a plaintiff when it feels that
the administrative agency is the proper body to decide the particular claim, or that
plaintiff should exhaust any possible administrative remedies before the court grants
jurisdiction. For a good discussion of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in environ-
mental litigation, see Hoffman, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Misconceived:
End To Common Law Environmental Protection?, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Ruv. 491 (1974).
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Committee v. Train discussed
or relied upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in its decision.
13. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion); 375 F. Supp. at 1153-55.
14. 375 F. Supp. at 1153-54. The district court felt that the federal common
law respecting waters should be limited to governmental entities because it developed
in disputes between states and the rationale of preventing subjection of one state to
the laws and courts of another did not apply to disputes between citizens. Id.
15. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion); 375 F. Supp. at 1155.
16. 539 F.2d at 1010.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Justice Brandeis concluded that there was "no federal
general common law." Id. at 78. Brandeis' decision was based upon considerations
of the allocation of power in a federal system. Friendly, fupra note 6, at 394-95;
Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1975).
18. 539 F.2d at 1008. Until the Erie decision federal courts were often develop-
ing generalized federal common law to settle disputes, and this practice spread to sub-
stantive areas where no congressional action had been taken. Erie stopped the advance-
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court of appeals acknowledged that a body of "new federal common
law""8 respecting waters has developed,"0 but it distinguished the Com-
mittee v. Train case from earlier cases2 that had recognized a federal
common law right to abate water pollution. As a second reason for
denial of plaintiff's requested relief, the court recognized a distinction
between governmental entity plaintiffs22 in the earlier cases and private
citizen plaintiffs in Committee v. Train.2 3 The court's third ground for
not applying the federal common law respecting waters was that Com-
mittee v. Train involved an intrastate stream rather than interstate
waters.24 The fourth reason given by the court of appeals was that the
1972 act of Congress preempted 25 any federal common law that would
proscribe conduct permitted under the Act.20
An understanding of the development of federal common law
since the Erie decision is necessary to analyze properly the, basis for
the court of appeals' decision in Committee v. Train. On the same day
that Erie banned federal common law, the Supreme Court in Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 27 began to develop "spec-
ment of federal common law into areas of state rather than federal concern, but soon
after Erie the federal courts began to develop specialized federal common law in areas
of federal concern. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-14. See generally Friendly,
supra note 6.
19. Friendly, supra note 6.
20. 539 F.2d at 1008-09; see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas
v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
21. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110
(D. Vt.) ajf'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Scott
v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
22. See cases cited note 21 supra.
23. 539 F.2d at 1009.
24. Id. at 1009-10.
25. Id. For a summary of the statutory provision legitimatizing discharges pur-
suant to a permit, see note 9 supra.
26. 539 F.2d at 1009. In a dissenting opinion Judge Butzner stated that there
is a federal interest in ending pollution in Jones Falls Stream because of its effect
on the Chesapeake Bay and because it is within the broad definition of navigable
waters that Congress and the courts have determined to be under federal control. Id.
at 1011-13. Butzner argued that the 1972 amendments are further evidence of a na-
tional interest in allowing plaintiffs relief in that the amendments provide private citi-
zens with the right to bring suits to enforce effluent standards and preserve any common
law cause of action. Id. Butzner recognized the specific statement in Illinois v. Mil-
waukee that federal common law applied to "navigable waters" rather than just inter-
state waters, and that Illinois was not limited to suits brought by states. Id. at 1013.
The dissenting opinion emphasized the fact that it would be inconsistent to allow state
courts to fill federal interstices. Id. at 1014. After concluding that plaintiffs had
standing because of their particular injuries, Judge Butzner said that any preemption
question should be decided only upon a consideration of the merits.- Id. at 1014-
16.
27. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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ialized federal common law."' 28  In resolving a controversy concerning
interstate waters, the Court in Hinderlider concluded that federal
courts should fashion federal common law when the interstate nature
of a dispute makes it inappropriate that the law of either state should
govern.2 9
In Illinois v. Milwaukee0 the Supreme Court relied partially on
federal common law respecting disputes among the states, developed
in Hinderlider and subsequent cases, 3' to recognize a federal common
law cause of action to abate pollution of navigable waters.3 2  The
state of Illinois sought an injunction to abate pollution of Lake Michi-
gan by the city of Milwaukee.33 The Court felt the interstate nature
of the dispute and the national interest in pollution control merited
relief under the federal common law.3 4  The basic rationale behind
the generation of federal common law to govern interstate disputes
was said to be the necessity for avoiding subjection of one state's rights
to an adjudication in the forum of another state or under the laws of
another state.3 5
Many other areas of specialized federal common law have devel-
oped 6 since Hinderlider. Much of the federal common law has de-
veloped in response to a broad exception contained in Erie itself:
28. Friendly, supra note 6, at 405.
29. 304 U.S. at 110.
30. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974); Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965). See generally Monaghan, supra note 17, at 14.
32. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441
F.2d 236, 239-40 (10th Cir. 1971).
33. 406 U.S. at 93-94.
34. Id. at 105-08.
35. See id. at 104-05; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Monaghan, supra note 17, at 14.
36. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 381-403 (1970)
(maritime law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964)
(foreign relations); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)
(overriding national interest).
A simple classification of the areas in which federal common law has developed is
not easy to obtain. . In Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 H~Av. L REv. 1512,
1519-26 (1969), one commentator has listed three categories of federal common law.
The first category contains those cases that developed federal common law from the
concept of national sovereignty, such as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). A second category includes those cases that developed federal com-
mon law because Congress has expressly or impliedly authorized the courts to develop
law in an area. Examples of express authorization to the cQurts to develop law in
an area are the Rules Enabling Acts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1970). The third
category includes those cases that have created federal common law to formulate reme-
dies for the breach of duties imposed by federal laws. An example of a court-cre-
ated remedy for a breach of a duty imposed by federal legislation is the creation
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"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by the
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. ' 37 The most significant expansion of specialized federal common
law has been in matters governed by acts of Congress .3  Federal courts
used specialized federal common law to fulfill legislative intent and
fill federal statutory interstices.39
In Committee v. Train the Fourth Circuit observed that Erie had
banned general federal common law and stated that tho facts pre-
sented did" not justify the application of specialized common law that
had developed since Erie.40 In particular, the court examined and
rejected the line of cases that had evolved to settle interstate dis-
putes. 41 The court noted that the rationale of protecting one state
from subjection to another state's laws or courts42 applied only to cases
involving governmental entities complaining of pollution that was of
an interstate character,43 and not to cases involving private citizens
complaining of pollution of a local nature." The court's distinction
between the Committee v. Train case and many earlier cases" ihat
had applied federal common law to solve interstate disputes is sound;
however, the court failed to consider other areas of federal common
law development that might have been appropriate in the Committee
v. Train context. Although the court was correct when it stated that
the Supreme Court in Illinois had given the interstate nature of the
of a private cause of action in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d
Cir. 1947), against a violation of an act of Congress making it a crime to intercept
and divulge a telephone conversation.
37. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emjhasis added).
38. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-14; see Friendly, supra note 6, at 405-22.
39. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)
(contracts between employers and labor organizations affecting interstate "commerce);
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (patents and copyrights); Francis
v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (interstate carrier statutes); Huber
Baking Co. v. Stroehmanrn Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1958) (unfair
competition affecting interstate commerce).
40. See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
41. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
42. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
43. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,
514 F.2d 492, 520, 521, 532 (8th Cir. 1975); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt.),
aft'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973). But see United States ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. "556 (N.D. Ill. 1973), in which it was held
that Illinois, as well as the United States, has a right of action to abate water pollu-
tion even when no interstate effect.was alleged. Illinois was allowed to rely on federal
common law to abate pollution discharges from its own banks into Lake Michigan.
44. 539 F.2d at 1008-10.
45. See cases cited note 43 supra.
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dispute and parties as a reason for its decision, 46 it failed to note that
in that decision the Supreme Court also put great emphasis upon the
national interest in water pollution control in its determination that
there was a federal common law with respect to water pollution.47
An analysis of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 and the history behind those amendments might have
convinced the court that the pollution of Jones Falls Stream was a
proper situation for application of specialized federal common law to ful-
fill federal legislative intent or to fill federal statutory interstices.48
The goals of the '1972 amendments49 are even stronger evidence of
the national interest in pollution control than the water.pollution legis-
lation existing at the time of Illinois."" The court's concern in Com-
mittee v. Train that the pollution was not interstate might have been
nullified by investigation into what waters are now considered subject
to congressional control. The 1972 amendments apply to "navigable
waters," which are defined as "waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas."'" Legislative history discloses that Congress in-
tended "navigable waters" to "be given the broadest possible constitu-
tional interpretation, 52 and the Environmental Protection Agency has
stated that the Act extends to tributaries of navigable waters.5 With
this broad range of waters encompassed by the statute it may logically
be asserted that Congress intended to reach pollutant discharges in
the waters of Jones Falls Stream that eventually flow into the Chesa-
peake Bay;54 otherwise, the congressional goal of elimination of pol-
lution in navigable waters by 1985 would be jeopardized.
The court's distinction in Committee v. Train between citizen
plaintiffs and governmental entity plaintiffs5 is also weakened by an
analysis of the portion5" of the 1972 amendments that authorizes citi-
zens' suits to enforce certain provisions of the Act. This extension
of federal rights to individual citizens could have been relied upon by
46. 406 U.S. at 103-05.
47. Id. at 101-04. The Supreme Court felt that federal legislative attempts to
limit water pollution demonstrated the national interest in pollution control.
48. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. V 1975).
52. S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3776, 3822.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p) (2) (1976).
54. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion).
55. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975).
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the court as demonstrating a congressional intention that citizens be
allowed the same rights as governmental entities under federal pollu-
tion laws, whether they be statutory laws or decisional common laws.
The provision for citizen suits should be evidence of a national interest
in allowing citizens to enter the fight against pollution. The validity
of the distinction between the citizen plaintiff and the governmental
entity plaintiffs is further weakened by the Supreme Court's refusal
in Illinois to base its application of federal common law solely upon
the nature of the parties in the disputes.17
The court's holding that the 1972 amendments preempted any
federal common law right58 must also be considered largely in light
of the legislative intent. The court's reasoning that federal common
law could not prohibit something that had been specifically permitted
by Congress seems to be sound logically, but further investigation re-
veals some support for the continued viability of the federal common
law. First, it should be noted that 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) provides that
pollutant discharges allowed under a permit are not violation of the
statute,5 9 but nothing within that provision says that compliance with
the statute is compliance with the federal common law.60 As is char-
acteristic of environmental legislation, the 1972 amendments preserve
"any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law."61  This statutory clause preserves federal
common law rights as well as state common law rights.0 2  In Illinois
57. "[]t is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply federal
common law." 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
58. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975).
60. At least two commentators believe- that satisfaction of pollution control stand-
ards established by a legislature does not create a defense to a. common" law action
to abate a nuisance. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 505-07; Maloney, Judicial Protection
of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25 VND. L. REV.
145, 156-57 (1972). Hoffman cites, inter alia, the following cases as supportive of
his view: Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Eastern Shore Natural Gas Co.
v. Staufer Chem. Co., - Del. -, 298 A.2d 322 (1972); State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa
Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 297 So. 2d 571 (Fla.
1974); J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970); Lexington
v. Cox, 481 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1972). Maloney compared the effect of statutory pollu-
tion control standards to that of statutory standards in negligence cases, saying that
just as in negligence cases compliance with the statutory standard should not acquit
the defendant of any charges based upon an alleged violation of common law stand-
ards. Maloney cited the following cases for his position that compliance with statutory
standards is not conclusive on the question whether reasonable care has been exercised:
Mitchell v. Hotel Berry Co., 34 Ohio App. 259, 171 N.E. 39 (1929); Curtis v. Perry,
171 Wash. 542, 18 P.2d 840 (1933).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. V 1975).
62. 539 F.2d at 1011 (dissenting opinion). For support of this view see note
60 supra and cases cited therein.
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the Supreme Court said that the use of federal common law to abate
pollution of navigable waters is permissible even though the remedy
sought was not within the scope of remedies prescribed under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.63 In United States v. Ira S. Bus-
hey and Sons, Inc.,64 the court stated:
What is important about Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ...
is the declaration there that the numerous laws Congress has
enacted to prohibit or control pollution of interstate or navigable
waters do not establish in themselves the exclusive means by which
the federal policy concerning, and interest in, the quality of waters
under federal jurisdiction may be protected in the federal courts. 65
Committee v. Train is a significant limitation on the judicial ex-
pansion of specialized federal common law. Several commentators
have expressed concern that federal courts are increasingly asserting
federal common law in new'and unusual areas.66 The fear of expand-
ing federal common law arises because such decisions bind state
courts through the supremacy clause and allow judicial action in areas
where power had been delegated only to Congress.67
Committee v. Train is also significant because of its possible ad-
verse effect on pollution enforcement and the realization of the goals
set by the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. While
the decision involved intrastate parties that arguably should be subject
to state common law, the holding of the court seems to deny all private
citizens access to the federal common law respecting water pollution.
This denial may not be so harsh when the alleged nuisance is nearby
and within the same state, but when a private citizen of one state is
injured by a nuisance originating in another state, the denial of any
access to federal common law to the injured individual dna the conse-
quent subjection of that individual to the laws and courts of the state
where the nuisance originates appear harsh indeed. An injured in-
dividual's rights to a remedy should not be any different from the right
63. 406 U.S. at 103. It should be noted that the Illinois decision also said that
future federal laws might preempt the federal common law. Id. at 107. The 1972
amendments, however, specifically preserve common law rights. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(Supp. V 1975).
64. 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
65. Id. at 149.
66. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-11; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
HAIv. L: REv. 1512 (1969).
67. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 10-11. Monaghan expresses concern that the
federal courts are allowed to act in areas normally left only to Congress, but are
not subject to the political checks imposed on Congress. Id. at 11.
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of an injured state. Even if the courts and laws of the injured indi-
vidual's state were allowed to adjudicate the matter "under modem
principles of the scope of subject matter and in personam jurisdic-
tion,168 the right of the alleged polluter would be determined by the
laws and courts of another state. In either case, one citizen would
be subjected to the laws and courts of. a state where he had not per-
formed any act. Furthermore, this subjection could be particularly
ominous in the area of nuisance law, which normally involves balanc-
ing of interests.69
In addition to any problems that an injured individual might face
in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident, there is always the prob-
lem of enforcing extraterritorial injunctive decrees, especially when
there is suspicion of partiality of judgment. 70 All these problems
arising from an interstate pollution dispute suggest that the Committee
v. Train denial of a federal common law cause of action to allow pri-
vate citizens to abate pollution should be limited to its particular facts
of intrastate citizens and should not extend to private citizens of dif-
ferent staies.71
The court of appeals could have expanded the specialized fed-
eral common law to accommodate the private plaintiffs in Committee
v. Train and supported that decision with an interpretation of legis-
lative intent and a statement of national interest in water pollution
abatement. It seems that the court balanced the evil of invading fur-
ther the ideology of Erie and opposing specific statements of the
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 with the possible benefit
that allowing citizens suits under federal common law might have on
ending certain types of water pollution. Apparently, it concluded
that it was better to avoid the evils rather than pursue the uncertain
benefit.
BRUCE M. SIMPSON
68. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971). Mr. Justice
Harlan suggested that the courts of the injured party's state would have jurisdiction
and the laws of the injured party's state would apply in a suit by an injured party
against a polluter of another state.
69. Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Nuisance-State Ecological
Rights Arising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 Wis. L. Rav. 597, 608-09.
70. "Mhe efficacy of any relief granted too often depends on the cooperation
of a sister state's legal machinery in carrying out the injunction." Id. at 609 n.60.
71. The denial of access to the federal common law to private citizens also will
hinder the achievement of uniformity of laws in an area of express national interest
and concern.
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Labor Law-Superseniority for Union Stewards Held a Violation
of the National Labor Relations Act
Employee seniority has been recognized by Congress and the
courts as a legitimate part of the industrial structure,1 despite its well-
publicized abuses. 2 A variation of the practice, commonly labelled
superseniority, involves granting additional credits or top seniority to
selected employees. When used in an unarbitrary, nondiscriminatory
manner and as part of a legitimate employment arrangement, super-
seniority has been held to be a valid employment practice.s In NLRB v.
Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338 (Dairylea)4 the applica-
tion of superseniority to a selected union representative was found
to have unlawfully encouraged union membership and thus violated the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act).5 Theoretically, the analysis
and rationale of Dairylea could be applied to preclude any job-related
benefit granted to union representatives by an employer in the absence
of business justifications. Employers6 and labor organizations, 7 how-
ever, can minimize the impact of Dairylea with careful drafting of col-
lective bargaining provisions and a modicum of recordkeeping to loosen
the unlawful linkage between union membership and job benefits.
1. See, e.g., Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521,
526 (1949). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1970); 50 U.S.C. app. § 459 (1970).
Seniority is regularly defined as the length of service that determines the relative equi-
ties and claims to jobs and prerogatives related to employment. For a discussion of
seniority, see Poplin,*Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem,
23 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 177, 196-99 (1975).
2. For attacks on employee seniority under the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970), see Barton Brands Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th
Cir. 1976); Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951). For cases
arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.), see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
3. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
4. 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976). The case is popularly known as Dairylea,
after the charged employer that did not appeal the Board's decision in 219 N.L.R.B.
-, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970). 531 F.2d at.1166.
6. Section 2(2) of the Act defines an employer to include "any person acting
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
7. Section 2(5) of the Act defines labor organizations as follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, iii which employ-
ees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates .of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
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In December, 1972, a highly profitable milk delivery route became
vacant in the plant of Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. (the Employer).
Rosengrandt, a union steward,, and Daniels, an employee with twenty-
four more years of service with the Employer than Rosengrandt, both
applied for the job. The Employer was required by a collective bar-
gaining agreement" to assign the job to the applicant with the greatest
seniority. Since another provision of the contract designated the stew-
ard the "Senior Employee," the Employer awarded the job to Rosen-
grandt.
A charge was filed and a complaint issued by the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) against the Employer and Local 3389 al-
leging unlawful encouragement of union membership in violation of sec-
tions 8(a)(1), 10 8(a)(3), 11 8(b)(1)(A), 12 and 8(b)(2) 8 of the Act re-
sulting from the maintenance and enforcement of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The parties waived an evidentiary hearing and sub-
mitted the case on stipulations directly to the Board. The Board, how-
ever, refused to accept the stipulations and remanded the case for an evi-
dentiary hearing before an administrative law judge to determine the pur-
pose behind, operation of and justification for the superseniority clause.14
8. The contract provision in question was also contained in collective bargaining
agreements with Local 338 and seven other employers. The Employer and Local 338
had originally entered into a contract with this provision in 1937. The contract also
contained a valid union security clause. 531 F.2d at 1164-65.
The agreement provided that the union steward be selected by Local 338 from
the employees at the plant location and that "'t]he steward shall be considered the
Senibr employee in the craft in which he is employed."' Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1737 (1975). The parties conceded that this
clause gave a steward top seniority with respect to layoff and recall and such contrac-
tual benefits as assignment of overtime, selection of vacation period and assignment
of driver routes and other positions. 531 F.2d at 1164.
9. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. 531 F.2d at 1162.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section states that "[ilt shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of the Code] . .. ."
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). This section states in relevant part that
"[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- . . . (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. .. ."
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). This section states in part that "[it
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [section 157 of
the Code] . . "
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). This section states in relevant part that
"[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a) (3) . . "
14. "The purpose of the remand.. .was, inter alia, to accord Respondent Union
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Once again, the parties waived a hearing, stipulating that no evidence
was available regarding the intent of the framers of the provision and
resubmitted the case to the Board.
The Board en banc found that by maintaining and enforcing the
superseniority clause and awarding the route to the steward instead of
to the otherwise senior employee, the Employer had violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act and that Local 338 was guilty of vio-
lations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).15 It ordered both to re-
frain from enforcing such clauses in the future and to reimburse Dan-
iels for sustained losses.16 The Board determined that the clause gave
unions a wide range of on-the-job benefits that could only be achieved
by an employee who was a "good, enthusiastic unionist ' 117 and thus il-
legally tied job rights and benefits to union activities. Therefore, the
Board held that superseniority not limited on its face to layoff and re-
call was presumptively unlawful, with the party asserting its legality as-
suming the burden of proof.18
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order,
finding violations of only sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of
the Act.' 9 Recognizing the power of the Board as trier of fact to draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence before it, the court sustained
the conclusion that the disparate treatment accorded stewards and non-
stewards as to on-the-job benefits aside from layoff and recall resulted
in unlawful encouragement of union membership. Such activity fell
within the prohibition of section 8(a)(3) whose scope encompasses
not only actual discrimination that induces workers to join a union, but
also conduct that encourages employees to become enthusiastic union
members or merely to decide to support it, assist it or participate in
or any of the other parties a full opportunity to establish a proper justification for
the super seniority clauses here under attack." Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B.
-,-89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1739 n.9 (1975).
15. Id. at -, 89 LR.R.M. at 1740. See notes 10-13 supra for the relevant text
of these sections.
16. 219 N.L.R.B. at-, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739.
17. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
18. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1739. Member Fanning dissented and would-have
dismissed the complaint on the basis of Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Camp-
bell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949). He stated that the provision did encourage union stew-
ardship, but he equated that with encouraging a public service. He believed that the
general counsel had not met his burden of proof since the evidence in the case did
not show that stewards were selected on any basis other than ability. Dairylea Coop.,
Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 LR.R.M. 1737, 1741 (1975).
19. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1165
& n.3 (2d Cir. 1976).
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its activities. 2° Noting the failure of Local 338 to present legitimate and.
substantial business justifications for superseniority, 2' the Second Cir-
cuit rejected the union's abandoned claim that these provisions encour-
age the service of qualified persons and suggested that alternatives to
superseniority in the form of a union-paid salary or other non-job bene-
fits be used to recruit able stewards.22
The launching point for cases arising under the Act is section 7,
the heart of the Act, which recognizes the right of employees to "form,
join, or assist labor organizations, . . . [or] refrain from any or all
of such activities . ... "2 It is an unfair labor practice for an employer
or labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise
of their section 7 rights to engage or not to engage in concerted activi-
ties. 4
A provision contained in a collective bargaining agreement is not
sacrosanct simply because it has been included in the contract. If it
concerns a condition of employment, such as seniority, it is required
to conform to the provisions of the.Act. 5
In Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,26 the Supreme Court heard
three cases dealing with the issue of unlawful encouragement of union
activity. In the first instance, the union had caused an employer to
reduce an employee's seniority for delinquency in paying dues. In the
second, the union had suspended an employee for "bumping" a fellow
employee and taking a job without its clearance. The third case in-
volved an employer who granted retroactive wage increases and vacation
payments solely to members of the union. Finding violations of the
Act in all three cases, the Supreme Court recognized that "[ult is
common experience that the desire of employees to unionize is raised
or lowered by the advantages thought to be attained by such action.
Moreover, the Act does not require that the employees discriminated
against be the ones encouraged for purposes of violations of § 8(a)
(3)."'27 The Court further observed that no specific proof of unlawful
intent need be shown so long as the natural and foreseeable conse-
20. Id. at 1165; see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954).
21. 531 F.2d at 1166 (citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26,
34 (1967)).
22. 531 F.2d at 1166.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
24. Id. §§ 158(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
25. E.g., United Steelworkers Local 1070, 171 N.L.R.B. 945, 946 (1968).
26. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
27. Id. at 51.
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quences of discriminatory conduct serve to encourage or discourage
union membership.2
In Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB,2"
the Supreme Court limited Radio Officers' by rejecting the Board's con-
tention that union hiring halls were per 5e unlawful. Although the very
existence of hiring halls might encourage union membership, the Court
determined that the Act was intended to ban only specific encourage-
ment brought about by discrimination and not the encouragement of-
fered by a negotiated plan that was nondiscriminatory on its face.80
Thereafter, in cases applying Radio Officers' as modified by Local
357, it was held that the insistence of a union that an employer reduce
the seniority of an employee-union member because he had been de-
linquent in paying his dues unlawfully strengthened the union's control
of its members and encouraged nonmembers to join, in violation of sec-
tions 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).11 In other cases; the union's insistence that
the employer discharge all of its employees and hire new ones through the
union's hiring hall as a precondition to signing a contract 2 and the re-
fusal to refer a member33 were found to be violations of the Act be-
cause they involved the union's influence over employees and its power
to affect their livelihood. Such influence, in the absence of any union
contention that its actions were necessary to represent its members ef-
fectively violated the Act. 4
Local 357 indicated that not all encouragement of union member-
ship constitutes a violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).85 Fur-
thermore, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,"' the Supreme Court's
holding indicated that presumptive invalidity or unlawfulness under the
Act could be rebutted with evidence of a legitimate and substantial
28. Id. at 45; see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1944).
29. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
30. Id. at 675-76.
31. E.g., Seafarers Int'l Union, 202 N.L.R.B. 657, 659 n.13 (1973), enforced,
496 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135 (1973).
Local 357 did not sanction this use of hiring halls.
33. Local 1437, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 210 N.L.R.B. 359 (1974) (other em-
ployees' perception of the union's arbitrary exercise of power necessarily encouraged
their union membership).
34. Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 204 N.L.R.B. 681 (1973), remanded per curiam,
496 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 90 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1975) (mem-
bers' failure to pay a fine imposed for disrupting a hiring hall and internal election
did not justify removal from seniority list).
35. 365 U.S. at 675-76.
36. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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business justification in the absence of unlawful intent.87 In Great
Dane the Court held that the actions of an employer who had refused
to pay accrued vacation benefits to striking employees under a'termin-
ated collective bargaining agreement while paying them to replacement
workers, returning strikers and nonstrikers violated section 8(a)(3). 88
Great Dane is equally applicable to a situation that involves violations
of both sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). It merely restates the Board's
earlier policy of accepting union "interference" with the employment
relationship, if the union had a business or collective bargaining pur-
pose for all represented employees.8 9
On the authority of Great Dane, the Supreme Court recognized
the union's traditional function of serving the economic interests of the
bargaining unit as a whole and upheld a union fine levelled against a
member who had exceeded a piecework ceiling."' Similarly, in an-
other case, the Board found that the need for a union to perform its
tasks more effectively for the benefit of all permitted an employer to
compensate union members for time spent on union work.41
The Second Circuit's insistence that unions reward prospective
stewards with only non-job incentives leaves the door open for future
attacks on superseniority clauses that are in any manner job-related.
The seniority concept, 2 recognized by Congress,4  is a legitimate
union interest that ought not hastily be deemed discriminatory. Not
even clauses that offer stewards protection from layoff, however, are
immune from attack on the basis of Dairylea. But these clauses have
a justifiable use.4" As a term or condition of employment, seniority
37. Id. at 27. Prior to Great Dane, the Board had upheld a union's solicitation
of the discharge of an employee who had refused a night job in violation of the
contract. Houston Typographical Union No. 87, 145 N.LR.B. 1657 (1964). It also
upheld the fine of a union member who had not accepted a contractual subsistence
allowance. Millwrights' Local 1102, 144 N.L.RLB. 798 (1964).
38. 388 U.S. at 27.
39. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135, 137(1973) (Miller, Chairman, dissenting).
40. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 431-36 (1969).
41. Sunnen Prod., Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 826 (1971); see IBEW Local 592, 92
L.R.R.M. 1159 (1976) (union refused to refer member who had not passed union-
administered test); International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 68, 205 N.L.R.B. 132'(1973), vacated, 503 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1975) (union reduced seniority standing
of employee on extended leave of absence); Millwright Local 1080, 201 N.L.R.B. 882(1973) (union refused to refer self-employed member).
42. See note I supra.
43. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339-41 (1953); Aeronautical
Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 527 (1949).
44. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949);
accord, Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 (1973).
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is tailored to each shop and it is only reasonable to assume that varia-
tions in seniority practices will develop in individual plants.45 The
union, meanwhile, has a duty of fair representation of all unit employ-
ees. 4  It also has the obligation to see that the contract is preserved
as part of the continuous collective bargaining process.
47
In order to preserve its vitality, the union- needs continuity of its
officials within their jobs. Without the assurance that its elected repre-
sentatives will be present. to maintain the collective .bargaining agree-
ment as a living document and to see that grievances are promptly and
properly adjusted at their source,4 8 the union loses legitimacy in the
eyes of the employer and the support of employees who question the
validity of their representation. The Supreme Court recognized the
validity of this union interest in Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge
727 v. Campbell49 and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman5" and allowed spe-
cific superseniority for union chairmen and stewards despite a provision
of the Selective Service Act that mandated restoration of seniority for
returning veterans -of World War l1.51 While neither of these cases
arose under the Act, the Board has sanctioned seniority variations in
other cases, including "superseniority". for stewards as an exercise of
a union's discretion. 52
45. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. "330, 337-38 (1953).
46. Id. at 337; see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944).
See also IATSE Local 659, 197 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1972), enforced per curiam, 83
L.R.R.M. 2527 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, enfbrcemeht
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
47. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949).
48. See id. at 527.
49. 337 U.S. 521, 528 (1949); see text accompanying notes 1, 43 & 44 supra.
50. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
51. Id. at 342; Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. at
529 (1949). The Act provided:
SEc. 8....
(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such
training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary
position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate
[of satisfactory completion of his period of training and service], (2) is still
qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application
for reemployment within forty days after he is relieved from such training
and service-
(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such
employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like
seniority, status and pay unless the employer's circumstances have so changed
as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; ....
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8, 54 Stat. 890 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 459(b) (1970)).
52. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1503 (1962), enforcement
denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963). See generally Barton Brands
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Although Ford and Campbell involved limited exceptions to plant-
wide seniority rules for the limited purpose of protection against layoff
and are therefore distinguishable from the more general clauses seen
in Dairylea, their absence from the Second Circuit's consideration can
be read to put into question the concept of limited superseniority for
union stewards. Provision of employment is the foremost job-related
benefit. Protection against layoff and the right of first recall are essen-
tial to maintain the steward's representation of the bargaining unit.
The Second Circuit implied that non-job benefits and union-paid
salaries to attract qualified stewards constitute the only permissible al-
ternatives not violative of the Act.5 The suggestion that the union pay
its stewards a salary in lieu of contractual benefits may prove to be un-
realistic. Smaller locals are often financially pressed and the burden
of paying stewards could possibly bankrupt them. In larger employ-
ment situations, the sheer number of stewards and the cost of a union
salary for each of these workers could be prohibitive. On the other
hand, the employer, with greater resources and control over terms and
conditions of employment, receives benefits from the service of union
stewards. 5" It would be more in keeping with the purpose of the Act
to maintain industrial stability55 to allow employees and labor organiza-
tions to devise their own ways of rewarding stewards, since in theory,
at least, stewards aid both parties.56
Ltd., 213 N.LR.B. 640, 645 (1974) (Jenkins dissenting); Campbell Sixty Six Express,
Inc., 200 N.LR.B. 1126 (1972); Wanzer Dairy Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 782 (1965); Ar-
mored Car Chauffeurs & Guards Local 820, 145 N.L.R.B. 225 (1963); Florida Power
& Light Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 967 (1960); Armour & Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1959).
53. 531 F.2d at 1166.
54. These employees, commonly labelled grievance chairmen or shop stewards,
provide a service to the bargaining unit, as well as to the employer and to the up-
holding of national labor policies, by promoting industrial stability and certainty and
the speedy resolution of disputes that might otherwise cause work delays. Therefore,
for them, superseniority should not be denied. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge
727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 528-29 n.5 (1949).
55. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf.Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
56. In Dairylea, the collective bargaining agreement contained a lawful union-
security clause that required all employees, after a period of time, to become union
members. There still exists, however, the possibility in situations without such a clause
that there may be senior non-union employees who will suffer in comparison to "super-
senior" stewards. In those instances, the argument can be made that even the presence
of superseniority for union stewards limited to layoff and recall is violative of the
Act since it would discriminate against non-union employees.
This disingenuous argument is appealing, no doubt, but in balance, superseniority
would still prevail. The damage to the interests of employees who exercise their statu-
torily protected right to refrain from union membership is outweighed by the benefits
to the unit, the employer and the national eoonomy provided by collective bargaining
that were recognized initially by the framers of the National Labor Relations Act
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Employers and labor organizations should again note that Local
338 "was accorded ample opportunity to introduce evidence of its stew-
ard selection policies to rebut the Board's conclusion '57 of presump-
tive invalidity of the contract clause but waived opportunities for evi-
dentiary hearings. On appeal, it asserted its collective bargaining
agreement as the sole justification for the superseniority clause and pre-
sented no evidence of any other legitimate or substantial business rea-
son.58  Thus, the Second Circuit merely enforced an order based on
prima facie violations of the Act.59
In the face of the Board's persistent refusal to exercise its rule-
making powers, 60 the application of Dairylea and with it, the fate of
superseniority, will rest largely in the hands of the Board's general coun-
sel. He is given the statutory authority to decide whether to issue a com-
plaint following the filing of each charge with the Board.61 In unionized
industries, seniority is most likely to be a deeply ingrained practice, so
• that when employer and union representatives sit down to negotiate or
renegotiate an agreement, they should be mindful of the general coun-
sel's interpretation of superseniority in order to diminish the likelihood
of costly future proceedings. This vigilance in adjusting superseniority
clauses should insulate them from future attack by the Board.
Thus, the practical impact of Dairylea is greatest at the contract
negotiation level.62 The parties will seek to have seniority arrange-
ments conform to the bounds of the law, with the slightest possible dis-
ruption of established practices. In drafting a superseniority clause the
parties will have to stay within two basic strictures. First, a nexus be-
tween collective bargaining and the employee receiving the rewards
and the courts for 40 years thereafter. If the benefit afforded stewards is necessary
for the proper carrying out of their responsibilities as stewards, which in turn is neces-
sary in the application of the collective bargaining agreements, then this countervailing
consideration should prevail.
57. 531 F.2dat 1166.
58. See generally text accompanying note 25 supra.
59. 531 F.2d at 1167.
60. The Board has continuously refrained from exercising its rulemaking powers
under section 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970). See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970). This section provides that the general counsel
"shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation
of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160, and in respect of the prose-
cution of such complaints before the Board .... "
62. If the Supreme Court hears Dairylea, its standard of review may be limited
to whether or not the Board could reasonably have inferred that the superseniority
clause spurred workers to become good unionists and was thus a violation of the Act.
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should initially be established. While Campbell spoke of a "benefit
to the whole Union,"63 decisions under the Act emphasize that a labor
organization, as the representative of all employees, union and non-
union, must make its benefits available to every member of the bargain-
ing unit. 4  The employee favorably affected by additional seniority
must be in a position to aid the entire unit. Such employees include
primarily officials who see that grievances are promptly heard and ad-
justed, or those who have the duty to see that the collective bargaihing
agreement is upheld. These individuals provide services to both the
bargaining unit and the employer as well as promote national labor
policies. Therefore, superseniority for them should not be denied.00
To withstand attack, the benefits that are provided appropriate
officials must also be limited in scope. Top seniority for all benefits
connected to the job cannot be upheld in most instances since it at-
taches union membership to the terms and conditions of employment
in too forceful a manner."6 In the extraordinary instance where it can
be documented that superseniority for unlimited purposes is the only
means available to attract qualified personnel, and then, only after re-
peated failure with other inducements, the Board will probably give its
approval to the arrangement. 7  Despite the Second Circuit's oblique
reference to layoff and recall provisions, it must be noted that the gen-
eral counsel and Board share the position that such limited supersen-
iority for similar purposes is not contrary to the policies of the Act."'
Thirty years of precedent appear to support that proposition and it
would unfairly disrupt most industrial settings to rule now that this bene-
fit violates the Act."9
If charges are filed, the burden on employers and unions to justify
superseniority is not heavy. A minimum of notes and records need
63. 337 U.S. at 527 (emphasis added).
64. E.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954).
65. See Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737 (1975).
Union officials who do not administer the collective bargaining agreement and those
who take part in contract negotiations only at specified intervals will be harder to
justify as integral links to the unit. Id. at -, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1738.
66. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954).
67. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, _, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 (1975)
(dictum).
68. Compare id. with NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 338, 531
F.2d 1162, 1166 n.7 (1976). Both the general counsel and the Board appear to agree
that protection from layoff is justified in a unioa's need for continuity in order to
provide substantive representation to all unit employees.
69. Dairylea Coop, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. -, -, 89 L.R.R.M. 1737, 1738 n.6 (1975)
(citing the "relevance of the Court's reasoning" in Campbell).
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to be kept to provide the basis to document a Great Dane justification.
The Board has flexibly examined asserted union justifications in prior
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) cases and so long as the union's reasons for
a superseniority clause are not to avoid or circumvent -the impact of
another statute70 or are not based on suspect classifications such as al-
ienage,71 race 7 2 or union membership,7 3 they should suffice, if properly
documented.'
In Dairylea, the Second Circuit held that superseniority clauses for
union stewards that apply for unlimited purposes on the job fly in the
face of the policy of section 7 of the Act by tying employment benefits
to union activity and unlawfully encouraging union membership. The
decision involved, however, the unlikely prospect of a union that did
not assert any justification for its questioned superseniority clause. If
it had asserted that such a clause was necessary to enable it to represent
the bargaining unit better, the union would have stood a greater chance
of succeeding. The lack of justification for the contractual provision
allowed the Second Circuit not only to declare it presumptively unlaw-
ful, but also impliedly to threaten even the limited application of super-
seniority to any union representative. This threat, however, is dimin-
ished by the.court's failure to deal with prior cases that had sanctioned
a limited use of superseniority. This limitation, coupled with the rel-
ative ease with which the court's presumption can be rebutted, and
buttressed by the practicalities of the Act's enforcement, may mean that
Dairylea will provide little, if any, threat to traditional industrial prac-
tices.
HowARD MARK KASTRINSKY
70. Austin & Wolfe Refrig., Air Cond. & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135 (1973);
American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
71. NLRB v. Local 1581, ILA, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1040 (1974), enforcing 196 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1972).
72. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); NLRB v. Local 1367,
ILA, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
73. See Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Local 631, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 213 N.L.R.B. 600 (1974); Boiler-
makers Local 169, 209 N.L.R.B. 140 (1974); Local 167, Progressive Mine Workers,
173 N.L.R.B. 1237, enforced, 422 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Local 17, ILA, 173 N.L.R.B. 594, enforced per curiam, 434 F.2d 620 (9th
Cir. 1970); Local 383, Lathers, 176 N.L.R.B. 410 (1969).
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Military Law-Right to Counsel at a Summary Court Martial:
Middendorf v. Henry.
In a 1972 case, Argersinger v. Hamlin," the United States Su-
preme Court held "that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."2  The Army and Air Force considered this decision to be ap-
plicable to the military and began to provide counsel to all defendants
in summary courts-martial.3 The Judge Advocate General of the
Navy, however, disagreed with this position,4 and the Navy continued
the practice of denying appointed counsel to accused before summary
courts.' In Middendorf v. Henry6 a divided Supreme Court7 upheld
1. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For analysis of Argersinger and its background, see
Comment, Misdemeanants" Right to Counsel: A Retrospective View of Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 9 GoNz. I REV. 169 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Expanding Right to Ap-
pointed Counsel-Argersinger v. Hamlin, 37 ALB. L. REV. 383 (1973); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Right to Counsel-Rationale of Gideon v. Wainwright Extended to All
Criminal Prosecutions at Which Accused Is Deprived of His Liberty, 41 FOreHAM L.
Rnv. 722 (1973); Note, Criminal Law-Sixth Amendment-Right to Court-Appointed
Counsel for Indigents, 47 TurL. L. Ray. 446 (1973).
2. 407 U.S. at 37.
3. Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1974). Courts-martial fall into
three categories: general, special, and summary. Uniform Code of Military Justice art.
16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970). Article 20 of the Military Code states:
Subject to section 817 of this title [article 17], summary courts-martial havejurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter, except officers, cadets, avia-
tion cadets, and midshipmen, for any noncapital offense made punishable by
this chapter. No person with respect to whom summary courts-martial havejurisdiction may be brought to trial before a summary court-martial if he ob-jects thereto. If objection to trial by summary court-martial is made by an ac-
cused, trial may be ordered by special or general court-martial as may be ap-propriate. Summary courts-martial may, under such limitations as thd Presi-
dent may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter ex-
cept death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for
more than one month, hard labor without confinement for more than 45 days,
restriction to specified limits for more than two months, or forfeiture of more
than two-thirds of one month's pay.
Id. § 820. Article 27 makes no provision for appointed counsel for the accused before
a summary court. Id. § 827. Instead, it is the duty of the presiding officer to protect
the interests of the accused as well as those of the Government. U.S. DEP'T OF Da-
FaNSE, MANUAL FOR COURTs-MATrmi % 79a (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
MCM]. "The functions of a summary court-martial is to exercise justice promptly for
relatively minor offenses under a simple form of procedure." Id. Records of the pro-
ceeding and opportunity for appellate review are limited. See Uniform Code of Military
Justice arts. 54(b), 60, 65, 69, 10 U.S.C. §§ 854(b), 860, 865, 869 (1970); MCM 79e.
4. Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
5. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976); Betonie v. Sizemore,
496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
6. 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976), rev'g Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Navy's procedure,* stating that "neither the Sixth nor the Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution empower us to overtrn
the congressional determination that counsel is not required in sum-
mary courts-martial.""
Plaintiffs9 in Middendorf brought a class action suit' ° "seeking
habeas corpus (release from confinement), an injunction against future
confinement resulting from uncounseled summary courts-martial con-
victions, and an order vacating the convictions of those previously con-
victed."'1  The district court found for plaintiffs, 2 but the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals vacated this decision and remanded the case.13
Upon the petition of both parties, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari14 and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.15
The Supreme Court analyzed the issues in Middendorf in terms
of both the sixth and fifth amendments. As the standard for the appli-
cation of the sixth amendment's right to counsel,"' the Court looked
The title of the case changed when J. William Middendorf replaced John E. Warner as
Secretary of the Navy.
7. Id. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun joified Mr. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion. A separate dissent was
filed by Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Brennan joined Mr. Justice Marshall in
a lengthy dissent. Not taking part in the consideration or decision of the case was Mr.
Justice Stevens.
8. Id. at 1294.
9. Plaintiffs were members of either the Navy or the Marine Corps. Most had
been charged with unauthorized absence. Five men had been convicted at summary
courts-martial, including two who had intervened in the suit pursuant to FED. R. Crv.
P. 24(a)(2); three others had been ordered to stand trial. Henry v. Warner, 357 F.
Supp. 495, 497-98 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
10. Because of the Court's decision, the issues of whether FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (con-
cerning class actions) is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus and whether a district
court's injunction is enforceable outside of the court's district remain unanswered. 96
S. Ct. at 1285.
11. Id.
12. The district court ordered released all Navy and Marine Corps personnel who
had been or were to be tried by summary courts without counsel, enjoined the future
convention of such courts, and vacated plaintiffs' convictions: 357 F. Supp. at 499.
13. 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir." 1974). Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1973), held that absent military exigencies:
[C]ounsel must be appointed for the accused before a summary court-martial
only where the accused makes a request based on a timely and colorable claim
(1) that he has a defense, or (2) that there are mitigating circumstances, and
the assistance of counsel is necessary in order adequately to present the defense
or mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 365. See text accompanying notes 57-71 infra.
14. 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
15. 96 S. Ct. at 1281.
16.. The relevant portion of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to Argersinger v. Hamlin'17 and drew analogies between summary
courts-martial and certain civilian proceedings held not to require coun-
sel under the sixth amendment.' 8  Noting from these instances that a
proceeding that results in confinement is not automatically classified as
a criminal prosecution,' 9 the Court then emphasized "the fact that a
summary court-martial occurs in the military community, rather than
the civilian community." 20 .The majority looked at three factors: 21 the
type of offense generally adjudicated at summary court-martial, 22 the
limited consequences of the penalties assessed for these offenses, 28 and
the non-adversary nature of the summary court-martial. 24  A combina-
tion of these factors and "the distinctive nature of military life and disci-
pine"25 led to the Court's decision that the sixth amendment's require-
ment of counsel is inapplicable to summary courts-martial because such
courts are distinguished "from the civilian misdemeanor prosecution
upon which Argersinger focused. '26
17. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See text accompanying note 2 supra for the holding in
that case.
18. See 96 S. Ct. at 1287-89; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation
revocation proceeding not criminal proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(juvenile hearing that could result in confinement not criminal proceeding). Although
the sixth amendment did not apply in Gagnon, the Court did recognize that, in certain
cases, due process "will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent
probationers or parol6es." 411 U.S. at 790. Similarly, in Gault, the Court held that
due process requires counsel at a juvenile hearing that can assess confinement. 387 U.S.
at 34-42.
19. 96 S. Ct. at 1288-89.
20. Id. at 1289.
21. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented strongly concerning this analysis.
See 96 S. Ct. at 1297-1304.
22. The Court pointed out: "Much of the conduct proscribed by the military is
not 'criminal' conduct in the civilian sense of the word." 96 S. Ct. at 1289 (citing
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749-51 (1974)). Most of the plaintiffs in Middendorl
were charged with "unauthorized absence," in violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1970), "which has no common-law counterpart and
which carries little popular opprobrium." 96 S. Ct. at 1289. Furthermore, the Court
felt that conviction of such an offense "would likely have no consequences for the ac-
cused beyond the immediate punishment meted out by the military," whereas conviction
for certain misdemeanors in civilian courts could connote "bad character." Id.
23. The Court's regard of this factor was influenced by the limited scope of penal-
ties imposable" by summary courts. 96 S. Ct. at 1290. See note 3 supra for the text
of the relevant section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
24. The Court believed that the presiding officer's role-" 'thoroughly and impar-
tially [to] inquire into both sides of the matter and [to] insure that the interests of
both the Government and the accused are safeguarded' "--was further evidence of the
distinction between a summary court-martial and a criminal prosecution. 96 S. Ct. at
1290-91 (quoting MCM, supra note 3, at 79a). See MCM, supra note 3, at 79d for
a complete descriptitn of procedure at a summary court-martial.
25. 96 S. Ct. at 1291 n.19.
26. Id. at 1291.
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Moving to the requirements of the fifth amendment, the Court ob-
served that plaintiffs, who could suffer losses of liberty or property as
a result of summary court conviction, were entitled to that amendment's
guarantee of due process of law.2 7  The extent of this guarantee, how-
ever, is limited by the interests of the military regime to which plaintiffs
were subject.28  In determining the scope of military necessity that
would preclude the appointment of defense counsel at summary courts-
martial, the Court minimized the precedential value of the Court of
Military Appeals' contrary decision in United States v. Alderman 2  and
decided that the need for such counsel was not "so extraordinarily
weighty as to overcome"30 the Court's necessary deference 3' to "the
congressional determination. . that counsel should not be provided
in summary courts-martial. 32 The availability, at the accused's option,
of an alternative forum83 with counsel84 was the final major element
in the Court's decision, and the Court dismissed objections that the
choice is unconstitutional because the alternative (a general or special
court-martial) subjects the accused to the possibility of more severe
penalties.35
27. Id. The fifth amendment's due process provision is as follows: "No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... .
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 1291. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (pris-
oners' due process rights are subject to restrictions necessitated by the nature of the re-
gime to which they have been committed).
29. See 96 S. Ct. at 1291-92. United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46
C.M.R. 298 (1973), held that Argersinger is applicable to the military and requires
counsel at summary courts-martial. Judge Quinn wrote that Argersinger applied to mil-
itary courts just as it did to civilian courts. Id. at 300, C.M.R. at 300. Judge Duncan,
concurring in part, applied Argersinger to the military only after he found no convincing
evidence of military necessity that would preclude such application. Id. at 303, C.M.R.
at 303. In disagreement with both of these views, Chief Judge Darden dissented. Id.
at 307-08, C.M.R. at 307-08. Because only Judge Duncan dealt with the issue of mili-
tary necessity and Chief Judge Darden opposed his analysis, the majority in Middendorf
felt that the issue was not concluded. 96 S. Ct. at 1292.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1292.
31. The Court felt obliged to defer to Congress' determination because under the
Constitution, "The Congress shall have Power ... To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 1291. The Court found that provision of counsel at summary
courts would "turn a brief, informal hearing . . . into an attenuated proceeding which
consumes the resources of the military to a degree which Congress could properly have
felt to be beyond what is warranted ... ." Id. at 1292.
33. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). See note
3 supra for the text of this section.
34. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
35. 96 S. Ct. at 129'3-9 4. The Court analogized this choice to decisions faced by
defendants in civilian criminal courts. Id. See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts.
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In order to gain a complete understanding of Middendorf, it is
necessary to consider previous congressional and judicial treatment of
the -summary court-martial. Congress has twice refused to abolish the
summary court.88  Instead, in 1956, Congress provided that a defend-
ant could refuse trial before a summary court unless he had previously
rejected nonjudicial punishment.8 7  In 1968, on the second occasion,
a compromise between opponents and proponents of summary courts
broadened this right of refusal by eliminating the exception clause.88
At this time, before the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger,
civilian defendants subject to less than six months confinement did not
enjoy the right to appointed counsel.8 9 Thus, it is highly improbable
that Congress' decisions to preserve the summary court were based
upon a determination that the demands of military necessity bar the
appointment of defense counsel in summary courts-marial.40 Indeed,
none of the courts that considered the issue prior to Middendori found
any evidence of such a determinationA'
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Middendori, three other
cases had reached either a circuit court of appeals or the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals42 with the question of Argersinger's applicability to the
military justice system.48 In Betonie v. Sizemore,44 the Fifth Circuit
accepted Argersinger as establishing "the framework for Sixth Amend-
ment analysis of military proceedings."481 The Betonie court found the
Army and Air Force acceptance of Argersinger" "[p]articularly signifi-
icant. '47  Furthermore, the opinion rejected the Navy's attempts to dis-
tinguish military from civilian criminal justice, concluding that "both the
18-19, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-819 (1970) for penalties imposable by general and special
courts-martial.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 1292 n.21.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1303 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
40. Id..
41. See text accompanying notis 42-69 inlra.
42. The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals are final. Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
43. Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Warner, 490
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298
(1973). All of these cases arose out of the same basic fact pattern: enlisted members
of the Navy and Marine Corps appealed convictions imposed in summary courts-martial
at which the men were denied the assistance of appointed counsel.
44. 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 1007.
46. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
47. 496 F.2d at 1007.
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Fifth and Sixth Amendments require counsel in any court-martial pro-
ceeding in which incarceration is to be imposed as a punishment."4
The Navy's contention that the multiple functions of the summary court
officer fulfill the requirements of the right to counsel was also rejected
as "unconvincing," 49 for as the court noted, "The potential conflicts of
interest. . . are legion." 50
In United States v. Alderman,"' the Court of Military Appeals
reached a decision quite similar to the one in Betonie. Argersinger
was held applicable to the military by Judge Quinn"2 on the basis of
the court's decision in United States v. Tempia 8 and by Judge Duncan
because he found no evidence of military necessity to preclude such
application. 54  The voluntary -acceptance of Argersinger by the Army
and Air Force also impressed Judge Duncan. 55 Additionally, Judge
Quinn noted other extensions of the right to counsel by the military
tosituations not mentioned in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 6
In Daigle v. Warner"' the Ninth Circuit used an historical ap-
proach to determine that the sixth amendment, as applied in Arger-
singer, was inapplicable to summary courts-martial. 58  This approach
relied on the asserted intentions of the framers of the Bill of Rights."
The court noted that courts-martial are required to afford an accused
due process of law under the fifth amendment.60 Then the court
48. Id. at 1008. The court relied on Argersinger's rule that prohibits the imposi-
tion of potentially severe punishments unless the accused has the assistance of counsel.
Id.
49. Id.
•50. Id.
51. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
52. Id. at 299, C.M.R. at 299.
53. 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
54. 22 C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303 (Duncan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 300, C.M.R. at 300.
57. 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972). The
district court acknowledged the special attributes of nxilitary justice, but held that these
attributes "cannot justify denial of basic constitutional rights, when both these rights and
the needs of the military can be successfully accommodated. By applying Argersinger
to summary courts-martial, this court is not burdening the military with an inflexible
and impossible requirement." 348 F. Supp. at 1080.
58. 490 F.2d at 363-64.
59. The court accepted Colonel Wieners analysis. Id. at 364 (citing Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. RE-v. 1
(1958)). For another historical approach, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Con-
stitution The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. R-v. 293 (1957), which states that
the framers did intend the sixth amendment's right to counsel to apply to the military.
60. 490 F.2d at 364.
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looked to Gagnon v. Scarpelli6' and In re Gault0 2 as guides to deter-
mine the extent to which due process requires "counsel in situations
where confinement may be .imposed but the Sixth Amendment does
not apply."63  Finding the proceeding in Gagnon more analogous .to
the summary court than was the proceeding in Gault, the court held
that a modified due process right to counsel would be sufficient for
summary courts-martial.6 4 This limited due process right seems to be
a retreat from the courts' generally expanding notions of the right to
counsel.6 5 As in Alderman,66 however, the Ninth Circuit found "scant
support" for the Navy's argument that military necessity warrants the
denial of counsel to accused before summary courts. 7 Again, the
practice of the Army and Air Force was a factor in this decision. 8
Furthermore, the court felt that the Navy, by allowing private retained
counsel to appear in summary courts-martial, undermined any conten-
tion of possible harm to discipline that might result from the require-
ment of counsel. 9
Although the results of Betonie, Alderman, and Daigle reveal a
conflict,70 the common findings of the various courts are of great signif-
icance, especially in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Midden-
dorf, a case that reached that Court when the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
Daigle in a half-page opinion.7 1  None of the lower courts found evi-
dence of military necessity that would warrant the denial of the right
to appointed counsel in summary courts-martial.72  In Middendorf,
however, the Supreme Court relied upon military necessity, as deter-
mined by Congress, as an important element in its due process analy-
61. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Seenote 18supra.
62. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
63. 490 F.2d at 364.
64. Id. at 365-66. See note 13 supra.
65. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
66. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
67. 490 F.2d at 366. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
68. 490 F.2d at 366. See text accompanying notes 46-47 & 55 supra.
69. 490 F.2d at 366.
70. The Fifth Circuit and the Court of Military Appeals applied Argersinger to
all summary courts-martial. The Ninth Circuit's historical analysis found both Arger-
singer and the sixth amendment inapplicable to summary courts, but the court applied
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process to create a limited right to counsel in sum-
mary courts-martial. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
71. Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Midden-
dorf v. Henry, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
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sis. 78  In addition to being totally inconsistent with the earlier cases,
this reliance was based on congressional actions74 that gave "no indica-
tion that Congress ever made a clear determination that 'military neces-
sity' precludes applying the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to sum-
mary court-martial proceedings. '75  Furthermore, the Court's ac-
ceptance of the military necessity argument shows complete disregard
for the obvious meaning of the use of appointed defense counsel at
summary courts by the Army and Air Force. The acceptance like-
wise indicates an indifference to the implications that arise from the
Navy's policy of allowing the use of private retained counsel at sum-
mary courts. 76  This approach to military necessity may well indicate
the Court's willingness to accord "a grant of almost total deference to
any Act of Congress dealing with the military. '77
Part of the Court's sixth amendment analysis78 also suffers from
an evidentiary deficiency. In 'particular, the Court's belief-that a
summary court conviction of a minor offense "would likely have no
consequences for the accused beyond the. immediate punishment meted
out by the military" 7 9 -completely ignores the possible effects of the
escalator clauses contained in the Table of Maximum Punishments of
the Manual for Courts-Martial. 0 These provisions can detonate the
"[e]xplosive [q]uality"81 of a summary court conviction by empower-
ing a later court-martial to impose considerably greater penalties than
those ordinarily authorized.8 2 The Marshall dissent raised this point,8
but the majority ignored it.
After an attack on the "flimsy factual basis" of some of the ma-
jority's observations, the Marshall dissent challenged the applicability
of two of the factors considered by the majority in its discussion of the
sixth amendment issue.8 4 " Argersinger's holding based the right to
72. See text accompanying notes 46-48, 54, 67-69 supra.
73. See notes 31-32 and text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes.36-38 supra.
75. 96 S. Ct. at 1303 (Marshall & Brennan, JI., dissenting). See text accompany-
ing notes 36-40 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
77. 96 S. Ct. at 1304 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
78. See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
79. 96 S. Ct. at 1289.
80. MCM, supra note 3, at 1 127c, § B.
81. Feld, The Court-Martial Sentence: Fair or Foul?, 39 VA. L. REV. 319, 322
(1953).
82. See MCM, supra note 3, at 127c, § B.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 1299 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id.
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counsel on the possibility of confinement, without regard for the trivial
nature of the offense or the absence of consequences collateral to the
conviction.85  The majority's consideration of the latter two factors,8"
as the dissent points out, therefore conflicts with Argersinger.87
Also troublesome is the Court's implied contention that the non-
adversary nature of the summary court, as exemplified by the multiple
roles of the presiding officer, makes defense counsel unnecessary. 88
Powell v. Alabama89 rejected the notion that a judge can serve ef-
fectively as defense counsel, citing his inability to "investigate the facts,
advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary confer-
ences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional."9 0  It seems extremely un-
likely that the presiding officer at a summary court-martial, who is a
layman,9' could perform these tasks in such a way that the rights of
the accused would be adequately protected.
The practical effect of Middendorf is likely to be the preservation
of the summary court-martial. Prior to Middendorf, many military law-
yers expected the Alderman"2 decision to supply such strong evidence
of the general dissatisfaction with summary courts-martial that Con-
gress would abolish. the institution."3 Now, with Middendori upholding
the constitutionality of the summary court proceeding, abolition seems
unlikely. It is presumable, furthermore, that the Army and Air Force
will abandon their practice of providing defense counsel at summary
courts-martial. If this occurs, Middendorf will have denied a prospec-
tive right to some and eradicated a realized right of others.
The preservation of summary courts-martial is undesirable be-
cause the weaknesses of the proceeding are frequently accentuated by
the absence of defense counsel. For example, the limited record of
a summary court proceeding can effectively immunize an error of the
85. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
86. See notes 22-23 and text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
87. See 96 S. Ct. at 1299 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
88. See id. at 1290-91; note 24 supra.
89. 287 U.S. 45.(1932).
90. Id. at 61, quoted in part in 96 S. Ct. at 1299-1301 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
91. Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martia An Empirical Investigation,
18 Sr. Louis U.LJ. 319, 354 (1974).
92. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See text accompanying notes 51-56
supra.
93. See Lermack, supra note 91, at 374 n.183, 378.
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summary .court from review.9 4  "Counsel can seek to avoid the disad-
vantage of the sparse record by requesting a verbatim transcript or by
taking detailed notes of the proceeding. Where the record is complete,
obviously the reviewer can more effectively assess the potential errors
of the summary court."9 In like manner, defense counsel can more
effectively protect the accused's ability to prepare his defense in the
face of the pressing demands of time that often characterize summary
court proceedings. 96
The negative image engendered by the summary court-martial is
another disadvantage of the institution's continued existence.97  Sum-
mary proceedings "are likely to contribute to the atmosphere of
cynicism surrounding the entire legal process." 98  If Middendorf has
the expected effect of causing the Army and Air Force to discontinue
the appointment of defense counsel in summary courts-martial, the Su-
preme Court itself will have contributed to whatever additional loss of
faith in the law results.
The Court's heavy reliance on the distinct qualities of the sum-
mary court-martial's military environment9 9 minimizes the likelihood
that the civilian community will feel Middendorf's significance as a re-
treat from the principles established in Argersinger and its antece-
dents. 100 Nevertheless, this retreat may signal. a trend for the military.
By failing to rule on the Navy's practice of allowing private retained
counsel at summary courts-martial, the Court left open the possibility
of a suit- based on concepts of equal protection.' It is improbable
that the Court would accept such an argument without a change in the
direction taken in Middendorf.
It is unfortunate that the Court departed from the holding of
Argersinger to preserve the summary court-martial, in which "one finds
the coincidence of the military accused least able to defend himself be-
ing tried by the military court most unsuited to insure legal rights
94. Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HAMs. I. LrIS. 571, 586
(1971).
95. Case Comment, Right to Counsel at a Summary Court-Martial-Daigle v.
Warner, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 719, 727 (1973) (citing Fidell, supra note 94, at 592).
96. See Lermack, supra note 91, at 354-55.
97. See id. at 373, 378.
98. Id. at 373.
99. See text accompanying notes 20-26 & 28 supra.
100. See cases cited in note 65 supra.
101. Cf. 96 S. Ct. at 1302 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (because private
retained counsel is permitted, only defendants who cannot afford to pay will be denied
counsel).
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. . ,.o2 The rule that, absent a waiver, "no person may be impris-
oned. . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial"108 could
apply to the military without undue disruption of its functions. In
reaching a contrary conclusion, the Middendorf Court over-estimated
the needs of the military and under-estimated the needs of the individ-
ual.
MARK A. STERNLICHT
Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender Is Not a
Restraint on Alienation in North Carolina
During the last seven centuries of judicial history, courts have con-
strued restraints on alienation to be contrary to public policy and there-
fore void.1 The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed this tra-
dition by consistently holding that conditions that restrain the alienation
of legal2 and equitable3 estates are void. In Crockett v. First Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association,' however, the court altered its posi-
tion. In departing from the traditional restraints on alienation doctrine,
the court developed a new test and sustained the use of a due on sale
clause' as a valid restraint on alienation. 6 This result was reached de-
102. Note, Military Law--Courts-Martial-Recent Cases Defining the Right to
Counsel Before Summary Courts-Martial, 1975 B.Y.U.L. l~v. 285, 292-93.
103. 407 U.S. at 37.
1. The Statute of Quia Enptores, 18 Edw. 1, cc. 1-3, was enacted in 1290.
Under this statute the doctrine of subinfeudation was limited by prohibition of feudal
tenures in a fee simple estate. L. Sim.s & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTER-
Esrs § 15 (2d ed. 1956). This statute laid the basis for many of the common law
doctrines dealing with restraints on alienation.
2. Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919); Latimer v. Waddell,
119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896).
3. E.g., Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
4. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
5. Mortgages that contain a due on sale clause permit the lender to withhold
consent to possible transfers by the mortgagor. A mortgagor who seeks to alienate
his property without the lender's consent faces the possible exercise of the clause by
the lender. An exercise will force acceleration of the existing note and all principal
will be due on the note at the time of sale. The clause used in Crockett reads:
[Or if property herein conveyed is transferred without the written assent of
the Association, then in all or any of said events the full principal sum with
all unpaid interest thereon shall at the option of Association, its successors or
assigns, become at once due and payable without further notice and irrespective
of the date of maturity expressed in said note.
Id. at 622, 224 S.E.2d at 582.
6. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
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spite the fact that the sole reason for the lender's decision to enforce
the due on sale clause, and thus to accelerate the note, was to collect
a higher interest rate.
In April of 1975, plaintiffs, Mrs. Crockett and Mr. and Mrs. Proc-
tor, entered into a contract with defendant Association for the purchase
of three apartment buildings.. The agreement was conditioned on the
Proctors' ability to assume the outstanding balance of the indebtedness
on the buildings at the seven percent rate specified in the note. De-
fendant Association agreed to accept the assumption agreement pro-
vided that the Proctors consented to a new interest rate of nine and three-
quarters percent. If a transfer were made under any other circumstances,
the Association would accelerate the note. Suit was brought by plain-
tiffs to restrain enforcement of the clause and for money damages. In
superior court, summary judgment was granted for plaintiffs." The
supreme court reversed, holding that justifiable reasons exist for en-
forcing such clauses and that their overall effect on alienation is insignifi-
cant.9 These justifiable reasons are not limited to security impairment
but could include significant economic interests such as raising the
interest rate.'0
To evaluate the Crockett decision properly, it is necessary to ex-
amine prior case law dealing with the restraint on alienation doctrine
and its relationship with the due on sale clause. Courts have taken
three different approaches in analyzing restraints. The first two ap-
proaches deal with direct restraints on the alienability of property.
The majority doctrine of direct restraints, which is the traditional view,
holds all restraints invalid per se unless the restriction falls within cer-
tain recognized exceptions." Under the minority doctrine of direct re-
7. Crockett had assumed the note when she purchased the apartments from
Domar Corporation, the original debtor, in May of 1968.. The original interest rate
was seven percent. Id. at 635, 636, 224 S.E.2d at 590 (Lake, J., dissenting).
8. Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75 CVS 5941 (Super. Ct.
of Mecklenburg County, Sept. 24, 1975). The issue of damages was ordered to remain
upon the civil docket. 289 N.C. at 620-21, 224 S.E.2d at 581.
. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587. But see Justice Lake's dissent, in which
he stated that the due on sale clause is as fundamental a restraint as is the classic
promissory restraint. Id. at 644, 224 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Volkmer, The Application
of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA
L. REV. 747 (1973)).
10. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
11. See, e.g., Wachovia*Bank & Trust Co. v. John Thomasson Constr. Co., 275
N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969) (condition annexed to creation of charitable trust
an exception to restraints doctrine); Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916)
(condition preventing alienation of woman's separate equitable estate held a valid re-
straint). See also Note, Deeds of Trust-Restraints Against Alienation-Due-On
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straints, a restraint is valid and reasonable when its purpose outweighs
the actual hindrance on the property interest.12 Under the third view
only restrictions classified as indirect restraints on alienation are sus-
tained as valid.13  The latter two views differ noticeably from the ma-
jority direct restraint approach. Under the latter view, the court char-
acterizes the supposed restraint either as an invalid hindrance or as an
exception. This characterization is the extent of the analysis. The
minority direct restraint view and the indirect view use a balancing proc-
ess to determine whether justifiable purposes exist for the restriction.
Most courts in considering whether the due on sale clause is a restraint
on alienation have sustained the clause under either the minority doc-
trine of direct restraints or the indirect view."4
Out of this judicial balancing, several social and economic factors
have emerged as salient to the decision whether a due on sale clause
is a valid restriction. Most. factors cited by the courts have involved
security impairment 5 and the economic interests of the lender. These
interests include increased interest rates,16 reduced lending risk 17 and
increased lending caused by greater turnover of loan funds.18 In bal-
ancing the risk of security impairment against the economic interests
of the lender, courts have developed three divergent views concerning
the due on sale clause.' 9
Clause is -an Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation Absent a Showing of Protection
of Mortgagee's Legitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L.J. 331 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d
1 (1975); Gale v. York Center Community Coop., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960).
See generally Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on
Alienation, 57 MicH. L. Rav. 1173 (1959).
13. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, THE LAW OF Furua INTEREsrs § 1112 (2d ed. 1956).
An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish tome
purpose other than the restraint on alienability, but with the incidental result that
the instrument if valid would restrain practical alienability. Id.
14. See Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240. (1973).
15. E.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d
725 (1972); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
16. 'E.g., Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804
(Sup. Ct. 1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
17. E.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971),
cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1332 (1972); Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
18. This is the ultimate result of use of the due on sale clause. A greater num-
ber of loans can be made with adequate protection given by the due on sale clause.
See Note, supra note 11, at 345.
19. Most of the early case law that laid the foundation for the three views came
1977] DUE ON SALE CLAUSE
In one view, the impairment of security approach, mere allegation
by the lender that the covenants or conditions of the loan have been
violated is not enough to justify acceleration.2 ° "Acceleration can occur
only when the purpose of the clause has been circumvented or the lend-
er's security jeopardized." 21 The courts following this view feel that if
circumvention were not present and the clause were enforced, then the
equitable powers of the court would be invoked to impose an extreme
penalty on the debtor.2 2  This approach is the most restrictive of the
three.
A second view, the reasonable circumstances view, allows the lend-
er to enforce the due on sale clause when his action is reasonable un-
der the circumstances. Courts using this approach usually balance
the equitable factors involved.2 4  Economic interests of both the bor-
rower and the lender are also balanced under this view. An interesting
development in these cases is that the lender's desire to increase the
interest rate of a note is not an invalid reason per se.25 By recognizing
both the economic interest of the lender and the individual circum-
stances of the mortgagor, this approach leads to varied results.
The final view, the per se approach,20 gives the lender the greatest
amount of authority. Under this approach, the lender may enforce the
from the California Supreme Court. The first of these cases was Coast Bank v. Min-
derhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), which held that
the due on sale clause was a valid instrument if it served to protect justifiable inter-
ests (e.g., property upkeep, integrity and character of purchaser). In Cherry v. Home
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), the court held
that lenders had discretion in the use of their money and no obligation existed to
act reasonably. Later cases began to cut back on this precedent. In La Sala v. Amer-
ican Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971),
the court recognized that automatic enforcement of a due on.encumbrance clause was
unnecessary to protect security. Finally in Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n,
12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), the court severely lim-
ited Cherry, supra, by holding that automatic enforcement of a due on sale clause
will no longer be permitted. Legitimate interests must exist before a lender will be
able to exercise the clause.
20. E.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971),
cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972).
21. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See generally Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doc-
trine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747 (1973).
24. E.g., Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974).
25. E.g., People's Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257
N.E.2d 406. (1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
26. See, e.g., Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Controversy has centered around whether Coast Bank v. Minder-
hout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), should be placed in this
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clause for strictly economic reasons, for example: (1) lender can rid
his portfolio of low yield loans and make new agreements at higher
rates; (2) lender can escape arbitrary termination provisions.27  The
per se approach narrowly construes the due on sale clause in favor of
the lender.28
In Crockett, the North Carolina Supreme Court appears to have
rejected the majority direct restraint on alienation doctrine and moved
into a balancing process. Application of this balancing process in-
volved mixing several restraint on alienation views with the due on sale
approaches: One of the main criteria used was the Restatement of
Property definition of restraints.29 Under this definition restraints are
justified by measuring the amount of actual interference with alienation
and comparing this result with the objectives sought by enforcement
of the restraint. If the actual interference with alienability is insignif-
icant, the supposed restraint will be sustained. 0 This objective-versus-
restraint approach is similar to the analysis under both the minority
view of direct restraints and the indirect restraint view."' In using a
balancing approach, the court also incorporated the reasonable circum-
stances view of due on sale clauses used in other jurisdictions. 82 Un-
like the courts in these other jurisdictions, however, the North Carolina
court mentioned only a few of the many factors usually involved in due
on sale decisions.
One policy consideration mentioned by the court was the failure
of the lender to use prepayment penalties.3 By not using the prepay-
ment penalties, the lender allows the mortgagor to refinance with little
difficulty when interest rates drop. Allowing the lender the same abil-
category. Justice Lake in his dissent suggested that Coast Bank did follow the per
se approach. 289 N.C. at 638, 224 S.E.2d at 592. Volkmer, supra note 23, at 774-
75, suggests that Justice Traynor was trying to write Coast Bank under the reasonable
circumstances view.
27. See Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804, 808 (1970).
28. See, e.g., id. at 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
29. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 410, Comment a at 2429 (1944).
30. 289 N.C. at 628, 224 S.E.2d at 586.
31. See Bernhard, supra note 12. See generally L. SIMES & A. SMiTH, supra
note 13, at § 1112.
32. 289 N.C. at 628, 224 S.E.2d at 586.
33. Id. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 585. Prepayment penalties are used by many lend-
ers. If the mortgagor wants to pay the loan off before maturity date, he may have
to pay a certain percentage fee based on the outstanding loan amount or the original
debt. These fees usually run from one to two percent. See Comment, Usury Law
in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rnv. 761, 785 (1969). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
24-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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ity to adjust the rates seems equitable.34 The stress put on: this factor
by the Crockett court is consistent with precedent in other jurisdic-
tions.85
Another policy factor 3 mentioned by the court was the ability of
plaintiff to alienate her realty absolutely without fear of penalty or for-
feiture.87  Although the mortgagor has the ability to sell his equity, the
lender's decision to exercise the clause may often be as effective a "de-
terrent" as the issuance of an injunction barring the sale.3 8 With the
emergence of the interest rate as a component of real estate value,3 9
the decision by the lender to exercise the clause may either reduce the
proceeds of the sale or preclude it entirely.40 Low interest rates and
the ability to assume low interest loans are often major considerations
in buying residential real estate.
Another element of major importance in real estate transactions
is the relative experience of the parties involved. In Crockett, the
court attached considerable importance to the principle that courts will
not inquire into contractual obligations when parties are of equal com-
petence.4' Mrs. Crockett and Domar Corporation may have been on
"equal footing" with defendant since each had engaged in some com-
mercial property dealings before.42 But the situation may be quite dif-
ferent when a commercial lender is dealing with the typical residential
purchaser,43 who is extremely naive in real estate transactions. Wheth-
er Crockett will be limited to its facts or will be extended to include
34. 289 N.C. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
35. See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190
(1971), cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972). Enforcement of an accel-
eration clause was denied on the ground that large prepayment penalties were involved.
Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
36. 289 N.C. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
37. Several commentators, however, point out that the due on sale clause inhib-
its alienation. See, e.g., Bonanno, Due-on-Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Es-
tate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and
Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 267, 309 (1972); Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due
on Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscion-
ability, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1109 (1975).
38. See Note, supra note 37, at 1113.
39. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 309.
40. See Note, supra note 37, at 1113.
41. 289 N.C. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587. The court relied on Roberson v. Wil-
liams, 240 N.C. 696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954).
42. 289 N.C. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Roberson v. Williams, 240 N.C.
696, 83 S.E.2d 811 (1954)).
43. See Justice Lake's dissenting opinion, 289 N.C. at 642-43, 224 S.E.2d at 594-
95.
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all real estate purchasers is a problem that the court must face in the
future.
, Although impairment of security is usually the most important pol-
icy factor in due on sale cases, the Crockett court did not mention any
of the considerations that enter the balancing process to determine
whether a lender's security has been impaired. The lender's security
often improves upon assumption of an existing note by a new debtor
because the lender now has two sources from whom to collect. The
new debtor becomes the principal obligor and the initial mortgagor be-
comes a surety.44 Another consideration in determining whether se-
curity is impaired is actual physical waste or depreciation of the mort-
gaged premises.4" Perhaps the most controversial element of security
is the identity and personality of the borrower. Several courts have
recognized the lender's maintenance of control over the mortgagor's
identity and his financial responsibility as an acceptable business objec-
tive.40 Security impairment is of major importance to both the courts
and the lenders. The court in Crockett, however, failed to analyze the
existence of that factor properly.
Because it rejected the traditional view of direct restraints in
Crockett, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to balance the policy
reasons underlying the restraints on alienation doctrine against the need
to protect both the economic vitality of secured transactions and the
freedom to contract.47  Enormous policy considerations support each
of these important legal concepts. In using a balancing test to deter-
mine the validity of the restriction, the court touched on several ad-
ditional factors that support not only the due on sale clause, but the
whole real estate industry. The Crockett court described due on sale
clauses as conditions that promote alienability of property.48 Without'
the due on sale clause, a lender would be encouraged to explore alterna-
tives that could, significantly reduce consumer access to the housing
44. See First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E.
312 (1934)..
45. See, e.g., Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d
1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
46. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d
1 (1975); Peoples Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus.; Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d
406 (1970).
47. See Comment, Mortgage Consent to Sale Clause: A Reasonable Restraint
on Alienation?, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 513, 529 (1975). These principles were
appropriately called "Giants of the Law."
48. 289 N.C. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
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market.49 Higher risks, which could be alleviated by use of the due on
sale clause, would force interest rates upward and make mortgage evalua-
tion criteria much stricter. All of these factors point to a reduced supply
of mortgage money, which of course restricts alienability.
In his opinion, Justice Copeland noted several economic factors
that may be the real crux of Crockett. Sensible lenders use the due
on sale clause to minimize their risks.5 0 Use of the clause also permits
the lender to conform his loans to the current market rate. These
points can be explained by the economic history of the due on sale
clause. As one commentator suggested, the due on sale clause orig-
inally developed during times of stable interest rates as a device to
protect against bad credit risks.51 However, during the past few years,
home loan interest rates have become volatile. These increased rates
have put the savings lender in a different position:
The basic dilemma of the savings association business is an inability
to adjust earnings upward during periods of inflation accompanied
by rising interest rates .... 52
Clearly, if a borrower 'were able to pass on to. a vendee the
borrower's low interest rate without interference by the lender, all
mortgages would continue at that rate until their original maturity
date. The effect of this increased payoff time over the current
average actual payoff time of eight to ten years would be to freeze
a lender's income at unprofitable levels for twenty to thirty years.53
Lenders who do not rely on depositors for their funds, such as com-
mercial banks, real estate investment trusts and mortgage companies,
are not faced with the same dilemma. However, all lending institutions
rely to a great degree on the secondary mortgage market.
These economic considerations are especially important in North
Carolina. The two largest investors in the secondary market are the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Corporation (FHLBC). Each of these institutions'
uniform loan documents contain the due on sale clause. 4 Therefore,
49. See Comment, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California,
7 Loy. L.A. L REv. 306, 323 (1974).
50. 289 N.C. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 585. See also Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
51. Comment, Use of "Due on" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common
Sense Defense, 10 Tusk L.J. 590, 610 (1975).
52. Id. at 592. See also UNrrED STATES LUAGur OF SAVINGS & LOAN Ass'Ns,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON SAVINGS ASS'N NEEDS, 1970.
53. Comment, supra note 51, at 592.
54. Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 9,
Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
The uniform documents allow the lender to refuse consent to the transfer if the
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as a matter of economic policy, Crockett is good for North Carolina.
If the court had overturned the due on sale clause or construed it strict-
ly, the two largest investors in the mortgage industry might have hesi-
tated to buy North Carolina residential loans in the future. 5
In addition to the economic factors mentioned by the court, the
significant economic impact of the due on sale clause on both interest
rates and credit availability is also an important consideration. During
the last decade, this nation has witnessed a sharp rise in consumerism."
One area of attack by the "consumerists" has been the high interest rates
charged by lending institutions. If lenders were precluded from using
the due on sale clause, it would be necessary to charge a higher interest
rate initially as a possible hedge against the loan continuing for a longer
period of time than normal.57  One result of Crockett is that the due
on sale clause becomes a safety valve for both lender and borrower.
The lender's liquidity is improved and his loan portfolio is kept close
to the current rates, which in turn forces down the rate available to
consumers.5
Several alternatives to adjust rates do exist that the court could
have proposed for future use by North Carolina lenders. The first of
these is the variable interest rate mortgage. One writer suggests that us-
age of these loans will render the interest rate an insignificant factor
in the price of property. 59 Nevertheless, variable rates may not be the
answer for North Carolina. Another financing scheme that could be
used is the short term loan with a negotiable rate. However, short term
loans may be against the public interest since the borrower's monthly
payments are increased and he may have to refinance several times." °
As the shortcomings of the feasible alternatives indicate, the due
proposed purchaser and interest rate are not acceptable. Telephone interview with
Gus Gesell, President of the Home Savings and Loan Association in Chapel Hill,
North Carolina (Sept. 9, 1976).
55. See Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at
8, Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
56. See generally Symposium-Consumer Protection, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 447(1974).
57. See Comment, supra note 51, at 594.
58. See Bonnano, supra note 37, at 809.
59. Brief for North Carolina Savings & Loan League as Amicus Curiae at 8,
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580. The brief
states that Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-1, .6-3,
6.14 (1976), prohibit federal savings and loan companies from using variable interest
rate loans while allowing state savings and loan companies to use them. These regula-
tions would eliminate a large number of lenders in North Carolina.
60. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1970). See also Comment, Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n: "Due-on"
Clause Held as Restraint on Alienation, 7 U.W.L.A. L. Rav. 258, 265 (1975).
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on sale clause is the best economic alternative that the court could have
approved. Lenders prefer the clause as a protective device. Although
one writer has s~iggested that the personal credit of a person is irrele-
vant to the lender for security purposes,61 the lender is much more se-
cure with a financially responsible person in possession. This ability
to determine who will be in possession affords much better protection
to the lender than a later foreclosure on a bad risk he was forced to
accept. Another added protection provided by the due on sale clause
is the lender's ability to maintain his current loan portfolio at a higher
rate of interest. A more current portfolio increases len"ding and stimu-
lates economic activity. Of course these added protections are in turn
passed on to the borrower. Due on sale clauses allow borrowers to
receive a lower rate,62 longer terms on the mortgage contract 3 and
more readily available mortgage credit.64 Crockett was indeed an
economic victory for both the lenders and borrowers of North Carolina.
Crockett, although a success economicdlly, may have its short-
comings as a practical standard for the public to follow. "Much of the
language used in the opinion points to application of the reasonable
circumstances view of the due onsale clause. However, little discussion
of the factors that usually go into this balancing analysis was made. A
possible result of this inadequate discussion may be confusion in the
lending market. A lender who reads Crockett as adopting the per se
approach 5 may want to accelerate at any time to reach the current in-
terest rate obtainable in the market. Every possible transfer in North
Carolina would be subject to the unlimited scrutiny of the lender.
These transfers could occur not only by inter vivos conveyances, but
also by intestacy, testamentary devise, survivorship or even declaration
of trust.6  If the lender has an unrestrained power of consent to any
possible transfer, then a virtual life and death control over the property
exists. 67
On the other hand, a borrower who reads the decision as adopting
61. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 289-90.
62. See Comment, supra note 51, at 594.
63. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1973).
64. See Comment, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California,
7 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 306 (1974).
65. Mr. Justice Lake suggests this approach in his dissent. 289 N.C. at 638,
224 S.E.2d at 592.
66. See Bonanno, supra note 37, at 290.
67. See Comment,.Mortgages-a Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity
in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. Rav. 485, 501
& n.71 (1973).
19771 319
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the reasonable circumstances view has no effective guidelines to follow.
Will lenders be forced to divulge their trade secrets and give reasons
to support their conclusions of who is or is not a bad credit risk? The
definition of the creditworthy borrower-along with several other unre-
solved issues-will have to be answered in the future.0 8
Although a judicial landmark, Crockett will need future expansion.
Nevertheless Crockett has laid a good foundation for adoption of the
reasonable circumstances view in North Carolina.0 9 The task for the
courts is to build on this foundation and develop clear practical guide-
lines for all to follow. This task will be brought to the forefront soon,
for the reasonable circumstances view of the due on sale clause will
promote more litigation than either the per se approach or the impaired
security view.70
Despite its unclear analysis and limited discussion of important
factors, Crockett was a good result for North Carolina. Instead of in-
volving itself in the traditional approach of restraint on alienation and
merely dismissing the due on sale clause as a restraint, the court was
able to recognize the significant economic policies involved in the case.
Use of due on sale clauses encourages available mortgage credit, facili-
tates land ownership and, as a result, stimulates the alienation of prop-
erty. Each of these effects is a needed and desirable stimulant for
our economy. Although Crockett may well have damaged the tra-
ditional view of restraints on alienation, it did not destroy the doctrine.
The court's awareness of the economic credit society in which we live
and of the great effect lending institutions have on the public was the
true basis for Crockett. Future North Carolina cases involving sup-
posed restraints that do not carry these economic and public overtones
will probably be decided under the traditional view of restraints.
WILLIAM ROBERT CHERRY, JR.
68. Several other factors left unconsidered are as follows: (1) the guidelines
needed to measure the physical security impairment; (2) the borrowing class a certain
individual is in; (3) the important variables of the money market; (4) the evidence
needed to support a lender's decision regarding his loan portfolio; (5) whether the
portfolio decision and requested interest rate increase will be analyzed under an objec-
tive or subjective approach. The weight to be given to these factors will have to
be determined on a case-by-case basis. One court, however, has already suggested
that a case-by-case basis will lead to instability in land titles. See Baker v. Loves
Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
69. 289 N.C. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587. The court suggested that the circum-
stances of the case and the absence of other allegations supported the reasonable cir-
cumstances view.
70. See generally Note, supra note 11, at 336 & n.1.
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Professional Responsibility-North Carolina's View of the Lawyer
and the Perjurious Witness
A fundamental right of -an accused in our -adversary system of
criminal justice is the right to be represented by counsel' who will zeal-
ously advocate -his cause against the State.2 In fulfilling this duty of
zealous advocacy the lawyer, as an officer of the court, is required by
the ethical code of his profession always to function within the bounds
of the law.3 Against this background, and in the difficult context of
the trial of an indigent defendant represented by a court-appointed attor-
ney, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Robinson4 was forced
to grapple with one of the most difficult ethical problems faced by the
defense attorney: what must the lawyer do to fulfill his duties to client
and court when, before trial, his client informs him of his intention to
proffer perjured testimony and of his desire to call a witness who will
commit perjury? The supreme court's decision was -that the trial court's
"compromise" solution-denying counsers request to withdraw, but
giving him no responsibility for eliciting what he believed to be perjured.
testimony-denied defendant -a fair trial. 5  If this decision is neither
limited nor overruled,.the proper answer to an already perplexing ques-
tion for the attorney is even more doubtful -than before.
Defendant Jerome Robinson was found guilty in the Superior
Court of Mecklenburg County of felonious breaking -and entering and
of larceny. 6 Prior to the entry of a plea to the indictment, defendant's
court-appointed attorney, William Burns, -moved jointly with Robinson
that Burns be allowed to withdraw from the case and that substitute
counsel be appointed.1 In support of the motion, Burns informed the
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILrY, Canon 7 (1969); ABA STAND-
AmiS, THE DEFEN SE FUNCnON § 1.1(b) (Approved Draft, 1971) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STmNDA Ds].
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrY, Canon 7 (1969); ABA STAND-
ARS, supra note 2, at § 1.1(b).
4. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
5. Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
6. Id. at 57, 224 S.E.2d at 175. A previous trial for the same offenses ended
in a mistrial. Defendant Robinson was represented by William Bums, but there is no
mention in the record of conflict between the two over the use of possibly perjured testi-
mony. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 5, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220
S.E.2d 387 (1975).
7. The motion and ensuing remarks by the judge, defense counsel and defendant
on each occasion were made in the absence of either prospective or impaneled jurors.
290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
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court that a "substantial conflict '" had arisen because of defendant's
desire, and counsel's unwillingness, to offer at trial what counsel believed
would be perjured testimony by defendant and a defense witness.' On
three subsequent occasiofis during -the course of the trial, defendant,
either joined by counsel or on his own behalf, renewed the same motion.
On each occasion the motion was denied, the trial judge refusing to
shift the ethical burden to another attorney who, the judge assumed,
would also refuse to present false testimony. 10 Instead, Burns was left
to the alternative of remaining in charge of certain portions of the trial
without obligation to participate in eliciting the allegedly perjured testi-
mony. 1
In accordance with the court's plan, Bums remained seated at the
counsel table throughout the trial and, as counsel for defendant, cross-
examined the State's witnesses. 2 He called only one defense witness,
Carolyn Bertha,'" and after eliciting her responses to some preliminary
questions, requested that she tell her story to the jury.14 At the close of
Bertha's statement Burns remained silent and defendant took charge of
8. Id.
9. Id. Burns made the following statement to the court:
The defendant has indicated to me he wishes to take the witness stand in his
own behalf; which, in my opinion, is perjured testimony. He has indicated he
intends to call a witness to the witness stand and elicit testimony which would
be perjured testimony to that individual; and I feel that on the basis of that,
substantial conflict has arisen between the defendant and myself which would
prevent me from devoting my full effort to his representation in this matter;
and in addition to that, I don't feel that 1 should participate in the matter any
further because of the foregoing; and I do respectfully request that I be allowed
to withdraw as counsel for the defendant.
Id. Bums also based his belief that the testimony would be perjurious on previous state-
ments alleged to have been made to him by the witness and on his own independent
investigation of the case. Id. at 62, 224 S.E.2d at 177. Defendant denied having told
his lawyer that the witness' testimony would be false. Id. at 63, 224 S.E.2d at 178.
10. I d. at 59, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
11. Id. at 59-60, 224 S.E.2d at 176. In colloquy with defendant, the trial judge
described the extent of counsel's responsibility:
Mou can defend yourself of [sic] perjured testimony if you want to; but I'm
not going to ask a lawyer to; I'll let Mr. Bums sit by you and pick a jury,
examine the State's witnesses in your behalf; but when it comes to your de-
fense, if you're going to offer perjured testimony, I'm going to let Mr. Bums
sit there silently and ask you nothing. When you come on the witness stand,
you're on your own.
Id.
12. Id. at 60, 224 S.E.2d at 176.
13. Defendant chose not to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 62, 224 S.E.2d at 177.
14. Id.'at 63, 64, 224 S.E.2d at 178. The court gave the following instructions
about the examination" of the witness: "I'm going to allow you to call the witness, iden-
tify her by name and address, and you can tell her to say whatever she wants to say
about it and you won't have to ask her any questions about it." Id. at 63, 224 S.E.2d
at 178.
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the direct examination of the witness. 15 Counsel did not later argue
the witness' testimony in a closing statement to the jury. 6
Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the trial
judge denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
when he denied the motion to allow Burns. to withdraw and refused to
appoint substitute counsel.' 7  The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that there was no such denial.' The court reasoned that although an
indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution has the constitutional
right to effective assistance of competent counsel appointed by the
court to represent him,' 9 he .does not have the right to demand that
counsel, appointed and representing him within the bounds of the law,
be removed and replaced because of defendant's unfounded dissatisfac-
tion with his services. 20 The representation afforded defendant did not,
in the court's view, render his trial a "farce and a mockery of justice" ;21
therefore, the supreme court ruled that the trial judge did not- abuse
his discretion in finding that Burns' refusal to participate in a fraud on
the court was not a good cause for his replacement by another attorney. 22
The court went on to hold, however, that defendant did have the
right to elect to represent himself and to refuse the services of counsel
with whom he was clearly in irreconcilable conflict over the course to
be adopted in his defense.23 According to the supreme court the trial
court's adoption of a "middle course, ' 24 although intended to provide
needed assistance, served .rather to convey to the jury that there was
discord between defendant and his lawyer, and that counsel attached
little credibility to the testimony of the only defense witness. 25 The
resulting prejudice to defendant's case was therefore held to have denied
15. Id. at 64.
16. Brief for Appellee at 4, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220 S.E.2d 387
(1975).
17. 290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175. The court of appeals found no error. State
v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App. 65, 220 S.E.2d 387 (1975).
18. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); State v; Sneed, 284 N.C. 606,
201 S.E.2d 867 (1974).
20. See cases cited note 32 infra.
21. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974). See also cases
cited note 34 infra.
22. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180. See also note 34 infra.
23. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 272 N.C. 278,
158 S.E.2d 52 (1967); State v. Morgan, 272 N.C. 97, 157 S.E.2d 606 (1967); State v.
Elliott, 269 N.C. 683, 153 S.E.2d 330 (1967); State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139
S.E.2d 667 (1965).
24. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
25. Id.
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him the fair trial Tequired by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 6 Accordingly, a new trial was ordered. 7
Cases dealing with the issue of the indigent defendant's right to
counsel have uniformly held that such a defendant must accept the
lawyer appointed by the court to represent him unless he wishes to pro-
ceed in his own behalf 28 or can establish a substantial reason for substi-
tution of new counsel. The courts have also been consistent in holding
that "whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal
defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court."20
A bare allegation of "unfounded dissatisfaction"30 with a competent
assigned lawyer, who is "'proceeding according to his best judgment
and the usually accepted canons of criminal trial practice,' "31 will not
constitute good cause for his replacement.32 Rather, a defendant must
make a sufficient showing that under the particular cicumstances of
his case, his constitutional right to effective assistance will be substan-
tially impaired or denied by the court's refusal to grant his request for the
appointment of another lawyer.3 3
In North Carolina there is a heavy burden on defendant, for the
standard of proof is a stringent one: "[Tjhe general rule [is] that the
26. Id.
27. Id. At the new trial, defendant is to be represented by his current court-ap-
pointed lawyer or other competent counsel selected by the court. If such counsel is un-
satisfactory to defendant, he may elect to conduct his own defense without a lawyer.
Id.
28. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973); BrowA v. United
States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Campbell v. State, 231 Md. 21, 188 A.2d 282
(1963) (per curiam); State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 139 S.E.2d 667 (1965); State v.
Wilkinson, 12 Wash. App. 522, 530 P.2d 340 (1975). If defendant wishes to proceed
in his own behalf, unsatisfactory counsel cannot be forced on him. See cases cited note
23 supra. See also Note, Criminal Procedure-The Right to Proceed Pro Se: ludicial
Gymnastics with the Sixth Amendment, 54 N.C.L. Rnv. 705 (1976).
29. United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Tague,
An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
30. State v. Moore, 6 N.C. App. 596, 598, 170 S.E.2d 568, 570 (1969).
31. State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 270, 139 S.E.2d 667, 673-74 (1965) (quoting
Annot., 157 A.LR. 1225, 1226 (1945)).
32. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant unrea-
sonably believed that counsel was communicating confidences to the prosecutor); Brown
v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (counsel pessimistic about defendant's
chances for a favorable verdict); United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1945) (counsel advised defendant to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence
and refused to call a witness defendant wanted to testify); State v. Gibson, 14 N.C. App.
409, 188 S.E.2d 683 (1972) (defendant desired an attorney who would do more for
him); State v. Scott, 8 N.C. App. 281, 174 S.E.2d 80 (1970) (defendant dissatisfied with
counsel because unreasonable bond had been set); State v. Moore, 6 N.C. App. 596, 170
S.E.2d 568 (1969) (counsel had a negative attitude).
33. For a compilation of cases see Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1225 (1945).
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- incompetency (or one of its many synonyms) of counsel... is not a
Constitutional denial of [the] right to effective counsel unless the attor-
ney's representation is so lacking that the trial has become a farce and a
mockery of justice."34  Only in extreme circumstances is it likely that
such a deprivation will be found."
To understand properly the significance of the court's holding that
Robinson was ultimately denied a fair trial, some knowledge of the
professional debate about the duties and obligations of the lawyer
confronted with the perjurious witness, and of the sources to which he
may turn for guidance, is essential. The official standards governing
the conduct of the legal profession are contained in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility;36 it is in interpreting the admonitions and pro-
34. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974). See, e.g.,
Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959); Doss v. North Carolina, 252 F. Supp.
298 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Edgerton v. North Carolina, 230 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
Although North Carolina still follows the farce-mockery standard first established
in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), other
jurisdictions (including the Sixth Circuit, which first decided Diggs) have rejected it as
a standard for deciding whether an accused has been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel. Rather, effective counsel is "counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance." MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960).
Accord, Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); West v. Louisiana, 478
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 510 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See generally Beaney,
The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REv. 1150 (1963); Note,
Criminal Defendants Entitled to Reasonably Competent Assistance of Counsel, 12 AM.
CruM. L. REv. 193 (1974); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent De-
fendant, 78 HARv. L. RMv. 1434 (1965).
35. Duboise v. North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51, 53 (E.D.N.C. 1964). In Duboise
the court cited Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962), as an example of
such extreme circumstances. (Counsel was appointed on the day of defendant's trial,
made no investigation of the case, yet advised a guilty plea because defendant had pre-
viously made a coerced confession.)
36. The Code was promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1969 to re-
place the Canons of Professional Ethics that had been in effect since 1908. ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmm, Preface (1969).
The Code is divided into Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They
embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the
Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They
constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance
in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory
in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
Id. Preliminary Statement (footnote omitted). North Carolina adopted the Code (with
modifications) in 1974, pursuant to a resolution of the North Carolina State Bar, 283
N.C. 783 (1973).
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hibitions of the Code that members of the profession have divided.8 7
The "traditional" point of view (among whose exponents is Chief
Justice Warren Burger)18 is that although the lawyer in our adversary
system of justice owes a high duty of zealous advocacys9 and strict con-
fidentiality"0 to -his client, he is simultaneously an officer of the court
who must always conduct himself within the bounds of the law.41  Given
this duty, never, under any circumstances, may a lawyer knowingly
proffer perjured testimony and thereby participate in a fraud upon the
court." If the client reveals his intention to take the stand and to lie,48
37. In an attempt to give further practical guidance to those confronting ethical
problems in criminal trial practice, the American Bar Association has also adopted
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Ap-
proved Draft, 1971). When used in the Standards "the term 'unprofessional conduct'
denotes conduct which is or should be made subject to disciplinary sanctions. Where
other terms are used, the standard is intended as a guide to honorable professional con-
duct and performance." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 1.1(f).
38. Burger, Standards of Conduct For Prosecution And Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 11 (1966).
39. "The basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes- to the administration of justice
is to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate, with courage, devotion and to the
utmost of his learning and ability, and according to law." ABA STANDARDS, supra note
2, at § 1.1(b). See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 (1969).
40. A lawyer is prohibited from revealing a confidence or secret of his client and
from using a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsrBIL , DR 4-101 (B) (1)-(2) (1969).
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the dis-
closure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client.
id. DR 4-101(A). See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 3.1(a), and Commentary.
41. Burger, supra note 38, at 12. See note 39 supra; ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 (1969).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, although it cites none of the authorities, ap-
pears to agree with this proposition: the lawyer "is an officer of the court and owes
duties to it as well as to his client. In this there is no conflict of interest." State v.
Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976).
42. Burger, supra note 38, at 12. The Code provides that "[in his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not:
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Dis-
ciplinary Rule.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY, DR 7-102(A) (4), (7), (8) (1969).
The lawyer is subject to discipline for misconduct as provided in id. DR 1-102.
43. On the related issue of the lawyer's duty to reveal a fraud already perpetrated
upon the court by his client, see ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-
102(B) (1969); ABA COMM. ON ETHCS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Formal
Opinions, No. 341 (1975); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7, Commentary.
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and if counsel is unable to dissuade him or to withdraw44 from the case,
counsel "may not engage in direct examination... to facilitate known
perjury. He should confine himself to asking the witness to identify
himself and to make a statement." 45  Neither may the lawyer argue
the truth of a lying witness' testimony in his closing statement to the
jury.46 Rather, he must argue the case "on the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's testimony and the other evidence offered by the defense, exclu-
sive of the . . .perjured testimony."47
Critics of the traditional position are led by Dean Monroe Freed-
man, and it is his answer -to the "perjury question" that has been the
subject of heated reaction since first offered in 1966.48 Freedman
postulates that the attorney attempting to follow the ethical standards
of his profession and, at the same time, to live up to his special responsi-
bilities as partisan advocate in our adversary system finds himself in
an impossible "trilemma ' '4" when faced with the problem of perjured
testimony. 50 "That is, the lawyer is required to' know everything, to
keep it in confidence, and to reveal it to the court." 51 Although the
Code prohibitions that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured
44. The Code provides that a lawyer may seek to withdraw from a case if his client
insists that he "pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the
Disciplinary Rules," ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(C) (1) (c)
(1969), but offers no guidance as to what the lawyer should do if withdrawal is not
allowed.
Although Burger does not address the issue, others in substantial agreement with
his position believe that in seeking to withdraw, the attorney may not reveal any confi-
dences of his client (i.e., the reasons for withdrawal are privileged). ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 2, at § 7.7(c); Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense
Function: An Attorney's Vidwpoint, 5 AM. CRim. L.Q. 24 (1966); Gold, Split Loyalty:
An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L Rnv. 65 (1965).
45. Burger, supra note 38, at 13. Although the Code gives no guidance beyond
the prohibitions of DR 7-102(A) (4), (7) and (8), "the recommendations of the stand-
ard as to the steps to be taken by the lawyer when he must remain in the case after
learning of his client's intent to commit perjury are regarded as appropriately avoiding
violation of the Disciplinary Rules." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c), Com-
mentary.
Burger also believes that "[slince this informal procedure is not uncommon with
witnesses, there is no basis for saying that this tells the jury the witness is lying. A
judge may infer that such is the case but lay jurors will not." Burger, supra note 38,
at 13.
46. Bress, supra note 44, at 24; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c).
47. Bress, supra note 44, at 24.
48. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1469 (1966).
49. M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETcs IN AN ADvERSARY SYSTEM 28 (1975).
50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 28. "Mhe difficulties presented by those conflicting obligations are
particularly acute in the criminal defense area because of the presumption of innocence,
the burden upon the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right
to put the prosecution to its proof." Id.
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testimony," 52 "[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the law-
yer knows to be illegal or fraudulent,"53 or "[k]nowingly engage in
other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule""
seem fairly clear, the Code does not indicate how a lawyer is to go about
fulfilling his obligations when faced with a criminal defendant who
proposes to testify falsely.5
It is Freedman's view that once the attorney has pried and cajoled
all the relevant facts from a client, having assured the client that full
disclosure is necessary to a successful defense'6 and "will never result
in prejudice to the client by any word or action of the attorney,"5 7 the
attorney must honor his obligation of confidentiality. 58  If the client
proposes to perjure himself
the attorney's obligation... would be to advise the client that the
proposed testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fash-
ion in presenting the testimony and arguing the case to the jury
if the client makes the decision to go forward. Any other course
would be a betrayal of the assurances of confidentiality given by
the attorney in order to induce -the client to reveal everything
59
Freedman rejects the course of withdrawal as not viable, particularly
in the case of the indigent defendant, since in most jurisdictions a court-
appointed lawyer or public defender will not be allowed to withdraw
from a case unless he establishes an extraordinary reason for moving
for leave to withdraw."1 Freedman also rejects the Burger solution of
putting -the witness on the stand merely to tell his story, unaided by his
lawyer, and of ignoring his testimony in closing argument, as too highly
52. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImIUTY, DR 7-102(A) (4) (1969).
53. Id. DR 7-102(A) (7).
54. Id. DR 7-102(A) (8).
55. M. FREEDmAN, supra note 49, at 29.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 31.
60. Freedman views withdrawal as an avoidance of the ethical problem, since de-
fendant, if lie is not indigent, will retain another lawyer from whom he will withhold
any incriminating information or the fact of guilt. The new lawyer will be ignorant
of the proposed perjury and, therefore, will be unable to discourage the client from pre-
senting it. Id. at 33.
61. Id. Thus, the attorney must either lie to the judge about his reason for moving
to withdraw or else reveal that he has received knowledge of his client's guilt. The latter
alternative would violate the obligation of confidentiality, especially since in many juris-
dictions the same judge who allows the lawyer to withdraw will later hear the case and
sentence the defendant. Id. at 34.
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prejudicial to defendant's caseP2 because of adverse inferences a jury
will draw from such a -procedure.
In Robinson the North Carolina Supreme Court followed a clear
line of precedent in rejecting defendant's sixth amendment-based claim
that he was denied effective -assistance of counsel.63 The court itself,
apparently motivated by a feeling ithat the -trial afforded Robinson was
less than fair, raised the due process issue that provided the basis for
reversal of defendant's conviction. Unlike the lengthy analysis of the
already clear limitations on the indigent's right to counsel, the court's
disposition of the fair trial issue was not accompanied by an informed
discussion of the intense controversy over the proper role for the lawyer
who, in the course of representation, must deal with a potentially per-
jurious witness."4  In finding for defendant on due process grounds,
without proper regard for the complex ethical issue that the situation'in
Robinson presents, the court created a dilemma for the defense attorney
who would attempt to reconcile his duties to his client with those to
the code of his profession.
Not once in its opinion did the supreme court allude to or cite any
of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Amer-
ican Bar Association Standards. Yet the court's assertion that Burns
clearly had no duty to proffer perjured testimony 5 is consistent with
the prohibitions of the Code 6 and the Standards. 7  Despite this appar-
ent agreement with Code and Standards, the court rejected the procedure
adopted by the trial court for the examination of a perjurious witness 0
(substantially the same procedure adopted by the Standards) 9 on the
ground that such trial tactics inevitably prejudiced defendant's case
62. Id. at 37. One practical criticism Freedman offers is that a prosecutor might
object to a witness' narrative since it would deprive him of the opportunity to object
to inadmissible evidence before it is heard by the jury. A more serious criticism is that
jurors will draw prejudicial inferences from such conduct by an attorney who, they as-
sume, knows the truth about about the defendant's case. Id. Freedman adds:
There is, of course, only one inference that can be drawn if the defend-
ant's own attorney turns his or her back on the defendant at the most critical
point in the trial, and then, in closing argument, sums up the case with no ref-
erence to the fact that the defendant has given exculpatory testimony.
Id. Further, if a defendant is discouraged by this procedure from taking the stand in
his own behalf, as is his right, most would agree that his chances of conviction are in-
creased. Freedman, supra note 48, at 1475.
63. See text accompanying notes 29-32 for a discussion of the precedent.
64. 290 N.C. at 58, 224 S.E.2d at 175.
65. Id. at 59-60, 224 S.E.2d at 179.
66. See Code provisions quoted note 42 supra.
67. See ABA STANDARDs, supra note 2, at § 7.5(a), and Commentary.
68. See notes 11 & 14 supra.
69. See ABA STANDARDs, supra note 2, at § 7.7(c).
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in the eyes of the jury and thereby denied him a fair trial. 70 The court,
surprisingly, is in substantial agreement with Freedman's estimation of
the effect of limited participation by the lawyer;71 the court, however,
would surely not advocate Freedman's course of putting the lying wit-
ness on the stand, cross-examining in the conventional manner, and
arguing the truth of known false statements to the jury.72 Even Freed-
man would concede that the case for confidentiality and loyalty to the
client is not so strong if an alibi witness, as in Robinson, and not de-
fendant himself, takes the stand to lie; 3 nevertheless, the court still found
prejudice. Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that defendant's
only witness against strong evidence offered by the State was made to
appear incredible, and that defendant himself was deterred from testify-
ing in his own behalf by the procedure the trial court adopted. 4
The American Bar Association. Standards and many of the com-
mentators clearly take the position that it is a breach of the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality to the client to reveal the reason-perjury-for
wishing to withdraw from a case.75 The court, with no discussion, cited
Burns' actions in so doing as "commendable. ' 7  Neither did the court
address the corollary problem of possible prejudice to defendant when
the same judge who has been informed of his alleged desire to perjure
himself is also called upon to sentence defendant after conviction. 7
The Robinson decision is now one more factor to be weighed by
the attorney at the point in time when he is informed by a client of the
client's intention to commit perjury. If the client is indigent, the lawyer
knows it is unlikely a court will allow him to withdraw and appoint re-
placement counsel.78  Apparently, he cannot stay on the case and offer
70. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180; see note 62 supra.
71. See note 62 supra.
72. M. FREMMAN, supra note 49, at 31.
73. Id. at 32.
74. See note 11 supra.
75. See note 44 supra.
76. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
77. Before sentencing, the trial judge addressed the following remarks to defendant
Robinson:
Why didn't you take the advice of your attorney? You're as guilty as sin, and
there wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind in this courtroom, or on that jury.
They didn't take five minutes to find you guilty. You're the kind that makes
mockery of this system. Your attorney attempted to advise you as best he
could, that you were .guilty and that you should enter a plea of guilty ...;
but you wouldn't see it that way. Your guilt was as obvious as anybody I've
ever tried. Any other man in your situation would -say, "I'm caught," and "Be
merciful". . . . Do you want to say anything before I sentence you?
Defendant's Statement of Case on Appeal at 49-50, State v. Robinson, 28 N.C. App.
65, 220 S.E.2d 387 (1975).
78. 290 N.C. at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 179.
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the assistance the ethical norms allow since the court has by indirection
rejected the solution of the American Bar Association Standards. 9 The
lawyer familiar with the workings of the criminal justice system, who
feels some sympathy with the plight of a defendant faced with possible
imprisonment who wants and needs the guidance of a lawyer in present-
ing his defense, will be forced to take a hard look at his alternatives
before leaving defendant to the course of self-representation.
The seeming inability or reluctance of the court to confront the
hard ethical issues is apparently *a reflection of the larger problem of
the inadequacies and inconsistencies of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility itself. The new Code was long in the making and long awaited
by those lawyers who found the truisms of the Canons outdated and
sorely lacking in practical guidance in dealing with specific problems
of professional responsibility. Experience under the revised Code would
seem to indicate that many of the old problems have been rewritten
into its -provisions, and that the Code, too, suffers from a lack of clarity
and practical guidance.
Canon 7 prohibits the lawyer's knowing use of perjured testimony. 0
Canon 2 allows him to withdraw if continued representation of a client
would likely result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule."' Thereafter the
Code is sirangely silent on the subject of what the lawyer should do if
permission to withdraw is denied, as is more often than not the case
if the lawyer has been appointed to represent an indigent defendant.
The American Bar Association Standards supply the solution, which
purportedly avoids violation of the Disciplinary Rules.82 The Standards
are careful to point out that revelation of the reason for withdrawal
would constitute a breach of Disciplinary Rule 4-101, s3 yet the Stand-
ards advocate the course of allowing delendant to present his perjured
testimony unaided by his attorney. This solution has the practical ef-
fect of informing both judge and jury that the lawyer, because of knowl-
edge of his client's guilt, believes the testimony to be false."' The
North Carolina Supreme Court would seem to agree.85
79. Id. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
80. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A) (4) (1969). See
note 42 supra.
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) (1969).
See note 44 supra.
82. See note 45 supra.
83. See note 44 supra.
84. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 37.
85. 290 N.C. at 67, 224 S.E.2d at 180.
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Although a lawyer is subject to disciplinary action for violation of
the prohibitions of Canon 4, there is clear disagreement on how to read
the exceptions to the requirement of confidentiality.8 6 It would seem
to be an obligation of the authors of the Code that on such an important
question the language of the Rules be precise, so that a lawyer may
discern what he must do in order to comply. The Standards, too, are
inconsistent, at one point denouncing the idea of proffering perjured
testimony in the name of confidentiality as "universally repudiated by
ethical lawyers,"87 yet later admitting that there is disagreement among
experienced lawyers about how to proceed and preserve confidentiality.88
Those persons in a position to promulgate the Standards that are
to give ethical guidance to the profession clearly must go further in
defining what the limits of our adversary system are. Although we
sanction the "lie" of a "not legally guilty" plea by the accused who is
"guilty in faot ' 9 and do not foreclose to him the opportunity to make
his case to the jury even if he wishes to lie,90 we still must decide what
we wish the role of the lawyer in the system to be. Freedman seems to
believe that the criminal defendant, until he is tried and convicted, re-
mains in a -totally blameless state, entitled to the undivided loyalty and
full cooperation of his attorney in making his defense, even if the
86. Canon 4 provides that a lawyer may reveal:
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information nec-
essary to prevent the crime.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILrry, DR 4-101 (C) (2), (3) (1969).
Some would read the "may" language as permissive only, thus freeing the lawyer
to exercise his discretion to reveal or not reveal a client's intention to commit perjury.
The lawyer would be immune from discipline either way. See Callan, Professional Re.
sponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Ad.
versary System, 29 RuT. L_ REv. 332, 354 (1976). ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PRO.
FESSIONAL RESPONSIrILITY, Formal Opinions, No. 287 (1953) supports the proposition
that perjury is included within the definition of "crime."
Others read the DR 4-101(C)(3) exception along with ABA COMM. ON ETHICS
AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY, Formal Opinions, No. 314 (1965), which is cited
in a footnote to the Disciplinary Rule, to require the lawyer -to exercise his discretion
in certain situations and to reveal client confidences, despite the "may" language. See
Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HAv. L. REv. 622, 626-27 (1976).
87. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 142. For some interesting information on
what lawyers confronted with the perjury problem actually do, see Friedman, Profes-
sional Responsibility in D.C.: A Survey, 25 RES IPsA LoQ. 60 (1972); Reichstein, The
Criminal Law Practitioner's Dilemma: What Should the Lawyer Do When His Client
Intends to Testify Falsely?, 61 J. CiM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1970).
88. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at § 7.7, Commentary.
89. Freedman, supra note 48, at 1471.
90. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 276.
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defendant wishes to testify falsely -and to enlist the aid of his attorney
in so doing. In answer to Freedman, one commentator has aptly said:
[T]he very existence of the special rights accorded a defendant
whose liberties are at stake-appointed counsel, the fifth amend-
ment privilege, jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
others-militates against adding the right to compel counsel to
allow the client to perjure himself and even ethically require the
counsel to argue the client's false story to the jury.91
Although he owes his client the duty of zealous representation, the
lawyer's own values, his honesty and his integrity, are also at stake.
These values should not be sacrificed to the client who, by choosing to
pursue an illegal course of conduct, brings on his own prejudice.
If Freedman's solution elevates the duty of confidentiality to the
client at too great an expense to the lawyer, then a compromise such as
the trial court's, however flawed, that attempts to preserve the law-
yer's duty both to his client and to the court, is necessary. Unless the
holding in Robinson is somehow limited to the particular facts of the
case or overruled, the court would seem to have foreclosed the possibility
of such a compromise solution for the North Carolina attorney.
DEBORAI A. BRIAN
Securities Regulation-Challenging the Short Form Merger
Through Rule 10b-5 and the Corporate Purpose Doctrine
In the wake of the depressed securities markets of the 1970's, a
corporate phenomenon known as "going private" has become increas-
ingly prevalent.' "Going private" usually entails the buying out of pub-
lic minority shareholders of a corporation by a few majority share-
holders so as to take the corporation outside the scope of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and its attendant reporting requirements.2 The
danger inherent in this'mechanism, and one of the reasons it has drawn
increasingly close judicial scrutiny, is that in many cases it allows a few
91. Rotunda, supra note 86, at 627.
1. See Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 987 (1974).
2. See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE LJ. 903, 904 (1975).
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shareholders who took the corporation public during the stock boom
of the 1960's to force minority shareholders to sell their shares at a frac-
tion of the original purchase price.'
A number of devices serve as vehicles for "going private," one of
the most utilized of which is the short form merger.4 However, a re-
cent series of cases originating in New York5 has caused a re-evaluation
of the elements essential to a valid short form merger. In Green v.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals accep-
ted an expansive reading of rule lOb-5 7 and invalidated a short form
merger that complied in every respect with state law on the ground that
the majority shareholders did not come forward with any "justifiable
corporate purpose" for the merger other than the elimination of the
public minority shareholders. But a later New York Supreme Court
case, Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc.,8 in interpreting fiduciary obligations of majority
shareholders in a short form merger appeared to eviscerate the corpo-
rate purpose standard enunciated in Green by expressing receptivity to
any stated corporate purpose. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
then applied the same broad corporate purpose analysis when the same
merger came before it on charges of rule lOb-5 violations in Merrit v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby.' This note will suggest that a limited applica-
tion of the "corporate purpose doctrine," as applied through rule lOb-
5, would keep use of rule 10b-5 outside the regulation of fiduciary ob-
ligations to shareholders, 10 traditionally the prerogative of state law,
and would limit its operation to situations that more directly involve
3. See id. at 905.
4. The short form merger statute, which exists in approximately 38 states, allows
a parent corporation that owns some percentage of the stock in a subsidiary, usually
90%, to merge the two corporations afid buy out the public minority shares in the sub-
sidiary. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). For a list of the states that
now have short form merger statutes, see Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d
1283, 1299 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
5. Men-it v. Libby, MeNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976); Green
v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976)
(No. 75-1753); Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal
Food Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
6. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
8. - Misc. 2d -, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976). It should be
noted that the New York Supreme Court was limited to state fiduciary law since it
did not have available the federal remedies under rule lob-5.
9. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
,10. Green ,v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1304 (2d Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753)."
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securities fraud, rather than venturing into the vast domain of corporate
mismanagement.
The short form merger statute's fundamental objective is to allow
a merger to be effectuated without the supposedly needless costs of
proxy solicitations and shareholder meetings when the majority share-
holders are in accord and when the minority would be powerless to
block a merger anyway. 1 A dissenting minority, under most short
form merger statutes, must resort to an appraisal proceeding as its ex-
clusive remedy. 2 It may be argued that the exclusivity of an appraisal
remedy is the only realistic approach in modem times, especially in the
face of possibly obdurate and unreasonable minorities. The fallacy in
this reasoning is that the majority (in many cases the same persons who
took the corporation public initially) is given the power to choose when
that appraisal will occur. Therefore, when the price of the corpora-
tion's stock is at its nadir, the majority shareholders can decide to effect
a short form merger, thereby forcing a buy-out of the minority at a rel-
atively low price.13 Although other criticisms have also been launched
at the short form merger statutes,' 4 the short form merger does provide
a functional tool, when used fairly, to effectuate the will of the majority
in the least expensive and quickest manner possible.
It was in the context of a short form merger that the Second Cir-
cuit decided Green v. Sante Fe Industries, Inc., 5 a case that appeared
to have such far-reaching and devastating effects that Judge Moore, in
dissent, described it as nullifying "not only the corporate laws of Dela-
11. See Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, 24 Sw. L.J. 91 (1970). But
see Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv. 596 (1965):
The short merger has endured, and shows signs of flourishing, because it
offers the opportunity of merger without the needless expense of holding
meetings whose outcomes would be pre-determined. Such savings will be
significant, however, only where the corporation is of substantial size -and
where the question would have to be presented at a special meeting.
Id. at 602.
12. The exclusivity of the dissenting shareholders' remedy has been the subject
of much debate. For arguments in favor of exclusivity, see Vorenberg, Exclusiveness
of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964). Many
of the short form merger statutes are ambiguous on their face about the dissenting
shareholders' remedy, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 17-6712 (1974); some specify that they are
exclusive, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(B) (Purdon Supp. 1974); and at least
one provides that appraisal is not the exclusive remedy, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(b)
(1975). For a discussion of exclusivity, see Borden, supra note 1, at 1023.
13. E.g., Marshel v. A-W Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
14. These criticisms *include such topics as tax problems created for minority
shareholders whose shares are forcibly purchased. For an excellent discussion of the
criticisms, see Comment, supra note 11.
15. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
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ware with respect to short-form corporate mergers, but also, in effect,
comparable laws in an additional thirty-seven states.""' The facts can
be simply stated. In 1974 Santa Fe Natural Resources (Resources)
owned approximately ninety-five percent of the capital stock of Kirby
Lumber Company. Resources "embarked upon a plan to effect a short-
form merger pursuant to Section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law
. . ,,17 In furtherance of this plan Forest Products, Inc. was organ-
ized. Resources transferred its ninety-five percent interest in Kirby to
Forest Products in exchange for all of Forest Products' stock. The
bdard of Forest Products then adopted a resolution under which it would
merge with Kirby, with Kirby becoming the surviving corporation. The
merger became effective July 31, 1974. Plaintiffs, minority share-
holders in Kirby, sued to enjoin the merger as a "manipulative and de-
ceptive device in breach of Rule lOb-5. '11 8  The court of appeals re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.'"
The first major obstacle hurdled by the court of appeals was the
historically limited application of rule lOb-5 to only those transactions
in which there had been misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.20 The
court accomplished this task simply by utilizing sections (a) and (c) of
the rule, sections that had virtually been read out of the statute by courts
requiring misrepresentation or nondisclosure.2" These sections pro-
hibit "(a) . . . any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . .and
(c)... any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person .. ,"22 Fraud, as used
in these sections, is equated by the court -in Green with a breach of
fiduciary duty by the majority against the minority shareholders.28
Popkin v. Bishop,24 an earlier Second Circuit case in which the com-
plaint of the minority shareholders was dismissed because there was
no showing of nondisclosure or misrepresentation, was distinguished on
two grounds: (1) in Popkin a strong corporate purpose was shown,25
16. Id. at 1299 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 1288.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1294.
20. The cases are not entirely clear, but on their face appear to limit the appli-
cation of rule lOb-5 to non-disclosure situations. E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d
714 (2d Cir. 1972); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afj'd
per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. 533 F.2d at 1287.
22. 17 C.F.R. -§ 240.10b-5 (1976).
23. 531 F.2d at 1287.
24. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
25. 533 F.2d at 1291.
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and (2) approval of the minority shareholders was sought and given.26
The first distinction appears valid, although it should be noted that de-
fendants in Green were not required by state law to demonstrate a valid
corporate purpose and therefore had no reason to provide one. The
second distinction is almost totally without merit, especially in light of
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.,7 in which the Second Circuit held, just
prior to its decision in Green, that a long form merger under New
York law violated rule lOb-5, even though it had been submitted for
shareholder approval. 8  Also, submission for shareholder approval
would almost assuredly be a meaningless formality since in all cases
involving short form mergers, the majority already controls at least
ninety percent of the stock, thereby assuring passage of any motion for
merger.29
The finding of fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty, by the court in
Green focused on five major factors: (1) defendants had shown no
"justifiable corporate purpose"; (2) no prior notice of the merger was
given to minority shareholders; (3) the minority shareholders had no
opportunity to obtain injunctive relief; (4) the proposed price to
be paid for the minority shares was excessively low; and (5) the
shares of the minority were being purchased with corporate funds.8"
The first three factors were not required by state law and therefore
defendants were not on notice that they needed to comply with any
of these; the lack of justifiable corporate purpose, discussed below,3' was
heavily relied upon by the court nonetheless. The minority share-
holders have a remedy for the fourth factor, excessively low purchase
price, through the appraisal proceeding provided by state law. 2 The
fifth factor also does not withstand close scrutiny; from the standpoint
of the majority shareholders it would seem to make little difference, in an
economic sense, whether the shares were purchased with corporate
funds or with private shareholders' money. If the money is taken direct-
ly from corporate funds, the corporation will simply have less money once
the merger is effected and the majority shareholders become the sole
26. Id.
27. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 1282. For discussion-see Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead
or Alive?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 2, 14, col. 1.
29. Brodsky, supra note 28, at 14, col. 1.
30. 533 F.2d at 1290, 1292-93.
31. The doctrine is utilized extensively by the court. For a discussion, see text
accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
32. See Brodsky, supra note 28.
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owners; realistically the money ultimately comes from the majority's
pockets in either event.3 3
The predominant issue that prevailed in the aftermath of Green
centered around the theory of "justifiable corporate purpose. '34 The
theory appears to have its roots in the idea that "a scheme conceived
solely for the benefit of controlling stockholders without regard to the
welfare of the corporation or of the minority constitutes a breach of
the fiduciary obligation"; 35 thus, "the requirement that there be a show-
ing of legitimate corporate purpose."36 Obviously the doctrine was im-
plemented to provide for-an analysis of the motives behind the "going
private" transaction. 7 It has been praised by some as providing "an
equitable method of protecting the minority shareholder while at the same
time giving deference to the freedom of the corporation to go private for
valid business reasons. '38 But it can also be condemned as an imprecise
and vague standard with which those effecting important corporate
mergers must attempt to comply.
Commissioner Sommer of the SEC, who has argued for a strict
interpretation of the "justifiable business purpose" standard, has ex-
pressed the view that a corporation going public "makes a commitment
that, absent the most compelling business justification, management and
those in control will do nothing to interfere with the liquidity of the pub-
lic investment or the protection afforded the public by the federal se-
curities laws." 39  But another leading authority, Professor Vorenberg,
believes very little or no corporate purpose should be necessary in the
context of a short form merger."
Amid this controversy, the question still remained of how the Sec-
ond Circuit would interpret its own standard. Finally, in Merrit v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby,41 the federal court got its chance on a com-
plaint of securities fraud, but only after the minority shareholders had
33. See id.
34. See Brodsky, Going Private-Is It Over?, N.Y.L.J., March 3, 1976, at 1, col.
1, 2, col 1.
35. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal.Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d - -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
36. Id.
37. See Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRD-
HAM L. REV. 796, 806 (1976).
38. Id. at 816.
39. A. Sommer, "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, reprinted
in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010, at 84,698.
40. See Vorenberg, supra note 12, at 1192-93.
41. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
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been unsuccessful in an attempt to block the same merger in the New
York state courts.42 Nestle Alimentana (Nestle), a Swiss company,
had effected a short form merger between Universal Food Specialties
(UFS), a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle, and Libby, McNeill &
Libby (Libby), a Maine corporation. After purchasing Libby stock
for some fifteen years, Nestle and affiliates owned approximately sixty-
one percent by May 1975. UFS, which controlled the Libby shares
for Nestle, announced a cash tender offer for the remaining. Libby
shares at $8.125 per share, substantially higher than the prevailing mar-
ket price. In this offer, UFS stated its intention to merge with Nestle
if the former acquired at least ninety percent of the Libby stock. Just
prior to the expiration of the tender offer the minority shareholders of
Libby brought an abortive suit for monetary damages. Seven months
later they sought injunctive relief.4"
The New York Supreme Court in Tanzer was the first court to
confront the merger on a motion for preliminary injunction by the mi-
nority shareholders. 44  The Tanzer court's scope of inquiry was limited
to possible breaches of fiduciary obligations because the federal reme-
dies afforded by rule lOb-5 were unavailable.45 The court first distin-
guished Green on the ground that since that decision had been on a
motion to dismiss, the federal court was forced to assume the veracity
of the allegation of no valid corporate purpose, wThereas Tanzer invol-
ved an application for a preliminary injunction.46 Two additional fac-
tors that the supreme court relied upon to distinguish Green were that in
the present case (1) there was no under-valuation of the minority
shares, 47 and (2) the minority shareholders had been given notice of
the proposed Libby merger.4 8
42. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
43. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75.
44. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478. It should also be noted that another New
York state case, Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., - Misc. 2d -, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), which involvd a very similar issue, was decided just prior to the Tanzer
decision. In Schulwolf, business reasons were advanced for the merger and the minority
shareholders were not actually being frozen out, since they would receive preferred
stock in the resultant corporation; but the minority shareholders did not receive the
"residual equity" benefits to which common shareholders are normally entitled. Also,
Schulwolf involved a long form merger, which could have been voted down by the
public shareholders. Based on these factors, the court denied an injunction against
the merger.
45. - Misc. 2d at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
46. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
47. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
48. Id.
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The court then relied upon nine stated business purposes for the
merger to assuage its suspicions of fraud. These purposes can be gen-
erally grouped into two categories: (1) the merger of the two corpo-
rations would result in more efficiently operated businesses for both
while also solving possible problems of conflicts of interest; and (2)
the merger would result in savings on the cost of complying with the
securities laws.4 9  As one noted author has pointed out, the first group
of purposes could be accomplished without the elimination of the minor-
ity interest since they rely only upon the combination of the two cor-
porations.50 The second group of purposes, while depending upon the
elimination of the public minority interest, has not generally been ac-
cepted as a justifiable business purpose in and of itself.5 1  Despite
these criticisms of the stated purposes, it can at least be argued that
the corporate purpose doctrine is not so much concerned with justifi-
cations for elimination of the minority as with preventing a "naked grab
for power" 52 by placing some burden on the majority to justify their ac-
tions.
After failing to obtain, any relief in the state court, the minority
shareholders brought an action for preliminary injunction in federal dis-
trict court. Upon denial of the injunction, the case came before the
Second Circuit on appeal.58  The court of appeals distinguished
Green 4 in much the same manner as had the New York Supreme
Court.5 5 But the court had somewhat more difficulty coping with
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.5 6 Since that case was in the same pro-
cedural posture as Libby, the court had to distinguish it factually: in
contrast to Libby, Marshel involved a situation in which the same peo-
ple who had taken the corporation public during the bull market of the
1960's were attempting to utilize the state short form merger statute
to eliminate the minority at a low cost. This acquisition was being ac-
complished through the vehicle of a shell corporation and with the use
of corporate funds1 7
49. Brodsky, Going Private (III), N.Y.L.., April 7, 1976, at 1, col. 1, 2, col. 3.
50. Id. at 2, col. 3.
51. Id.
52. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food Spe-
cialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
53. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1313 (2d Cir. 1976).
54. Id. at 1312.
55. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
56. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1312 (2d Cir. 1976).
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The court relied upon a confidential report to the board of Nestle
by its president as a valid indication of the corporate purposes for the
merger. 8 Two of the purposes vere listed as follows:
(1) 70% of Libby's sales were in the United States, Canada and
Puerto Rico, and it had contacts with farmers which would be use-
ful in integrated selling to the underdeveloped countries. (2)
Libby had a healthy balance sheet and a cash flow slightly higher
than its future investment possibilities, and its stock was valued at
only a third of book value.59
Obviously these purposes are subject to the same criticisms as those dis-
cussed earlier in relation to the Tanzer decision."0 But the president's
memorandum to the board also spoke of the advantages to be gained
"'in the very fact of eliminating the minority stockholders.' "61 The
court concluded that the memorandum was obviously ambiguous, but
since it was not sufficient to indicate that plaintiffs would suffer "irrep-
arable injury," they should be left to their remedy at law."
Clear from analysis of the two decisions springing from the Libby
merger is that the courts will be highly receptive to any stated business
purpose in the face of an action by minority shareholders. The dissent
in Green, along with a great many other critics, attacked the use of
rule lOb-5 to control corporate fiduciary obligations. Judge Moore, dis-
senting in Green, pointed out that the majority "has extended to these
plaintiffs an independent, substantive right totally unrelated to the anti-
fraud scheme of the federal securities laws and in complete derogation
of a valid state rule regulating corporate activity."63 The condemnation
seems credible, especially in light of Cort v. Ash,6" a 1975 United States
Supreme Court opinion that "may portend the Supreme Court's in-
creased reluctance to entertain suits claiming a breach of state law fidu-
ciary obligations brought in the guise of a violation of federal law."65
One of the most valid criticisms of Green is leveled at the court's
utilization of rule lOb-5 to encroach upon an area traditionally left to
state legislatures-the regulation of fiduciary obligations of majority
shareholders.66 The drawing of the line between state and federal
58. Id. at 1312-13.
59. Id. at 1313.
60. See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
61. Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1313 (2d Cir. 1976).
62. Id.
63. 533 F.2d at 1307 (footnote omitted).
64. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
65. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, Going Private 50 (1976) (unpublished manu-
script in University of North Carolina Law School Library).
66. 533 F.2d at 1304 (dissenting opinion).
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control is inherently fraught with pitfalls in this area because many cor-
porations, almost by definition, are forced to engage in securities trans-
actions.6 7  Thus, any regulation of securities transactions inevitably
leads to some regulation of internal corporate affairs, a province tradi-
tionally left to state control. As a result it becomes necessary to ascer-
tain the point at which these internal corporate transactions fall outside
rule lOb-5's true purpose. When does a given transaction cease being
primarily a securities transaction and therefore become a matter for
state regulation?
One possible means of dealing with the problem, in the limited
context of a short form merger, would begin with three assumptions:
(1) rule lOb-5's primary concern is to enforce the credibility of the se-
curities markets; (2) once the securities element of a transaction be-
comes only tangential, so that the primary concern of the minority
shareholders is actually centered on corporate mismanagement, then
deference should be given to state law; and (3) the corporate purpose
doctrine, to have any true validity in a securities context, must be a more
restrictive test, one of compelling corporate justification. 8 The imple-
mentation would be as follows: a series of transactions and objective
criteria 0 would be identified that have a high degree of correlation
67. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 65, at 50-51.
68. In order for the corporate purpose doctrine to continue as a viable force,
it must be restrictive enough to prevent avoidance by intelligent pleading by any group
of majority shareholders.
69. Possible criteria would include: (1) percentage decline in market price of the
stock since the corporation first went public; (2) substantial identity of the parties who
took the corporation public initially with those who later attempt to take it private;
and (3) the amount of time elapsed since -the corporation first went public. Marshel
v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), provides a flagrant example
of the first criterion. In 1968-69, in a public offering, 300,000 shares of Concord
Fabrics stock were sold at $15 per share and 200,000 at $20 per share. In 1974, when
the market price had reached a low of $1 per share, the majority shareholders decided
to go private at $3 per share. The court blocked the merger. At the other end of
the spectrum is Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976), in which the price
offered in the attempt to go private was $8.125 per share, a price not substantially below
what the public shareholders had paid. In fact, plaintiff in the case had purchased his
stock in 1973 at $6.00 per share. The problem comes in delineating the point at which
the market price has declined to such a degree that any forced buy-out of the public
minority would be inherently suspicious. Ascertainment of this point would necessarily
involve both empirical study and a survey of shareholder and management attitudes. The
second criterion would serve as a strong indicator of stock manipulation. If the same
people who originally took a corporation public are now attempting forcibly to take
it private, the obvious inference would be that their intention all along was to take
advantage of possible market fluctuations. Again, Marshel provides an excellent ex-
ample; there, exactly the same people who. had taken the corporation public initially
were attempting to take it private. Regarding the third criterion, the shorter the time
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with the aim of rule lOb-5 as indicated above. Once a transaction came
within one of the proscribed situations, or met a threshold number of
objective criteria, the application of rule 10b-5 would be triggered with
an attendant requirement of a showing of compelling corporate purpose
by the majority shareholders. An archetypal example is the situation in
which a group of shareholders who took the corporation public in a bull
market are attempting to go private in a depressed market. 70  Thus,
once plaintiffs show defendant's actions to fit one of the established cat-
egories, such as the one just described, the majority shareholders would
be forced to come forward with a compelling corporate purpose for the
merger. The objective of this type of structure would be two-fold.
First, the implementation of rule lOb-5 would be limited to only those
corporate activities inextricably intertwined with securities transactions,
thus keeping its application outside the domain of state law. There-
fore, the minority shareholders would be forced to resort to state rem-
edies unless their allegations of fraud were primarily centered on a
securities claim. Secondly, the use of the more restrictive compelling
corporate purpose standard would give that doctrine viability.
The corporate purpose doctrine, as enunciated in Green, repre-
sents an attempt to balance the protection of minority interests with the
need of the majority to effectuate necessary transactions in furtherance
of the corporation's business. But then, in Libby, the Second Circuit
gave strong indications that the doctrine is little more than. a shell,
which can be avoided through proper pleading by any defendant. A
much more pragmatic use of the doctrine would be to restrict its appli-
cation, in the context of rule lOb-5, to only those situations strongly cor-
related with securities transactions. 71 If there is to be a federal remedy
period between the corporation's initially going public and an attempted freeze-out of
the public minority, the stronger the inference that the majority shareholders are simply
playing the market at the possible expense of the public miriority. Again in Marshel,
the majority shareholders were attempting to go private only six years after the corpo-
ration had gone public.
70. This practice is one that has'caused a great deal of the fervor in the "going
private" area. It appears to be one of many possible activities that would create dis-
trust among the public in an already disfavored securities market.
71. See Borden, supra note 1.
If the federal securities laws are to be pushed so far beyond their original pur-
pose as not only to enforce recognized standards of fiduciary obligations but
to creatd new ones in a hotly debated area without deference to state law or
empirical study or any balancing of the numerous competing social interests
involved, one may suppose that one day there will again be a recognition of
the "mischievous result" of judicial law-making based upon an alleged "trans-
cendental body of law outside of any particular State" which federal courts
1977]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for minority shareholders against a short form merger it should be for-
mulated by a legislative or an administrative body taking all the rele-
vant and unique considerations into account, 72 not by courts seeking
to apply rule 1Ob-5 to an area with which it was never intended to deal,
in a misguided effort to provide needed protection for minority share-
holders.
JOHNNY REID EDWARDS
Truth in Lending-Failure To Disclose a Right of Acceleration
Held Not a Violation
The Truth in Lending Act' and Federal Reserve Board Regula-
tion Z2 provide, inter alia, that a creditor shall disclose to its customers
any "default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of
late payments."'  Confronted with the issue whether a contractual
right to accelerate total indebtedness is such a charge when state law
requires a rebate of the unearned portion of the finance charge, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman
in their good judgment may discern and apply. We will then have in the
securities field our own Erie v. Tompkins.
Borden, supra note 1, at 1039 (footnotes omitted). This argument is relied upon
heavily by defendants in Green in their petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. V. Green,
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3222 (1976) (No. 75-1753).
72. It should be noted that the SEC has drafted proposed rules that would deal
specifically with the application of rule lOb-5 to the types of situations discussed herein.
If SEC rules are to be applied to these situations at all, it would certainly appear
that the better route would be through the Commission's proposed rules. Two of
these rules basically place disclosure requirements and substantive limitation on those
planning to carry out trdnsactions that would result in "going private." Proposed Rules
13e-3A & 13e-3B, Securities Act Release No. 5507 (Feb. 6, 1975), reprinted in [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RE. (CCH) 80,104, at 85,091-93.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamplet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The Truth in Lending Act is subchapter I of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1691 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 &
Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1976). Regulation Z was promulgated by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to the authority granted by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1604 (1970). The Board's authority is designed to insure the effectiveness of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (9) (1970); 12 C.FR. § 226.8(b)(4) (1976).
344 [Vol. 55
19771 RIGHT OF ACCELERATION 345
Ford, Inc.4 recently held that the right of acceleration is not a "charge"
and that disclosure of the acceleration right is not mandated by section
128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act5 and section 226.8(b)(4)
of Regulation Z.
The McCrackin-Sturman case arose out of a commonplace con-
sumer transaction-financing the purchase of a used automobile through
an installment loan contract.7  The .contract, executed on January 20,
1973 by plaintiffs William and Joan Johnson, was originated by Mc-
Crackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. and assigned to Ford Motor Credit Com-
pany.8 Paragraph 20 of the contract contained a "time is of the essence"
clause that specified the lender's right of acceleration upon borrow-
er's faultY A disclosure statement and a copy of the contract were
delivered to plaintiffs at the time of sale. The disclosure statement
provided information about certain terms of the contract, including
the amount of the charges assessable in the event of late payments".
4. 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
5. Section 128(a) (9) provides: "(a) In connection with each consumer credit
sale not under an open end credit plan, the creditor shall disclose each of the following
items which is applicable: . . . (9) The default, delinquency, or similar charges pay-
able in the event of late payments." 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (9) (1970).
6. Section 226.8(b)(4) provides: "(b) Disclosures in sale and nonsale credit.
In any transaction subject to this section, the following items, as applicable, shall be
disclosed: . .. (4) The amount, or method of computing the amount of any default,
delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.8(b) (4) (1976).
7. Not all extensions of credit are covered by the Truth in Lending laws. Ex-
empted transactions are set forth in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp.
1976).
8. Section 115 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act sets forth the following
provision concerning the liability of assignees:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subehapter, any civil"
action for a violation of this subehapter which may be brought against the
original creditor in any credit transaction may be maintained against any
subsequent assignee of the original creditor where the violation from which
the alleged liability arose is apparent on the face of the instrument assigned
unless the assignment is involuntary.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1614 (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
9. Paragraph 20 of the contract provided as follows:
20. DEFAULT
Time is of the essence of this contract. In the event Buyer defaults in any
payment, or fails to obtain or maintain the insurance required hereunder,
or fails to comply with any other provision hereof, or a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy, receivership or insolvency shall be instituted by or against Buyer or
his property, or Seller deems the Property in danger of misuse or confiscation,
Seller shall have the right to declare all amounts due or tb become due here-
under to be immediately due and payable. ...
527 F.2d at 261 (emphasis by the court).
10. The provision disclosing delinquency charges stated:
(13) Delinquency charges: Buyer may be required to pay a delinquency
charge of 2% of any installment in default for each month, or fraction
thereof in excess of 10 days, that such installment is in default, plus such
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and the method of computing the rebate of the unearned finance
charge unon prepayment of the loan," but the statement did not pro-
vide any information about the creditor's right to accelerate payment.
When plaintiffs defaulted in payment on the contract,12 Ford Motor
Credit exercised its rights under paragraph 20 of the contract and
repossessed the automobile.
Alleging that the disclosure statement that they received did not
meet the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
plaintiffs, in June 1973, sought statutory damages' 3 against Mc-
Crackin-Sturman Ford, Inc. and Ford Motor Credit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.14 The
expenses incurred -by the seller in effecting collection under the Contract
as may be allowed by law.
Id. at 261 n.4.
11. Paragraph 15 of the contract set forth the rebate provision:
(15) Prepayment rebate: Buyer may prepay his obligations under the
Contract in full at any time prior to maturity of the final installment there-
under, and if he does so, shall receive a rebate of the unearned portion of
the Finance Charge computed under the sum of the digits method subject
to retention by the Seller of a minimum finance charge of $10.00. No rebate
will be made if the amount is less than $1.00.
Id. at 261 n.5.
12. Plaintiffs failed to make any payments under the contract. Id. at 261.
13. Section 130 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act sets forth the damages
awardable for Truth in Lending violations. In pertinent part the section provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails
to comply with any requirement imposed under this part or part D or E
of this subchaptpr with respect to any person is liable to such person in
an amount equal to the sum of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the
failure;
(2) (A) i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of
any finance charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the
case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E
of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total amount of monthly pay-
ments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph
shall not be tess than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may
allow, except as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall
be applicable and the total recovery in such action shall not be more
than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
creditor; and(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
14. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 153, 156 (W.D. Pa.
1974). In the district court all parties had moved for summary judgment. The mo-
tions by McCrackin-Sturman Ford and Ford Motor Credit were denied; the motion
by plaintiffs was granted against McCrackin-Sturman Ford alone. Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment against Ford Motor Credit, however, was denied without preju-
dice. Id. The court noted that in the event that plaintiffs were unable to collect
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court held that a right of acceleration was a "default, delinquency,
or similar charge" within the purview of section 128(a)(9) of the
Truth in Lending Act and section 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z.15
In failing to disclose the right of acceleration, the court reasoned that
defendant had not made precisely -the "type of disclosure that the
Truth-in-Lending Act was intended to require."1  Allegations of
other violations of the Act were not considered in the summary judg-
ment order.
On appeal of the summary judgment order against McCrackin-Stur-
man,' 7 the Third Circuit reversed, holding that when state law re-
quires that the creditor rebate the unearned portion of the finance
charge,' 8 the right of acceleration is not a "default, delinquency, or
similar charge."' 9  Rather the court characterized the right as a con-
tractual remedy,20 and thus determined disclosure was not required by
section 128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act and section 226.8
(b)(4) of Regulation Z.21  The court emphasized that it was not
confronted with the issue whether a right of acceleration need be dis-
closed when there is no requirement that the creditor rebate the un-
earned portion of the finance charge.22
The Third Circuit rejected the district court's determination that
a "charge" was simply an "obligation."2  Characterizing its own def-
inition of the word as the meaning utilized by the consumer credit
industry, the Third Circuit defined "charge" as a specific pecuniary
sum assessed in addition to the regular payments. 24  Since Penn-
from McCrackin-Sturman, they would need to produce additional evidence to hold Ford
Motor credit liable. Id. See note 8 supra for statutory provisions on the liability
of assignees. Only the ruling against McCrackin-Sturman Ford was certified as an
appealable final judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 527 F.2d at 262.
15. 381 F. Supp. at 156.
16. Id.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever all the time balance is liquidated prior to maturity by pre-
payment, refinancing or termination by surrender or repossession and re-sale
of the motor vehicle, the holder of the installment sale contract shall rebate
to the buyer immediately the unearned portion of the finance charge. Rebate
may be made in cash or credited to the amount due on the obligation of
the buyer.:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965).
19. 527 F.2d at 265.
20. Id. at 267.
21. Id. at 266-67.
22. Id. at 260 n.3.
23. Id. at 265.
24. Id. at 266.
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sylvania law, which the court held was fully incorporated into the
contract,25 requires a rebate of any unearned finance charge upon ac-
celeration,2" the court reasoned that no pecuniary sum in addition to
the existing contractual obligation was being assessed.27  Thus, there
was no requirement that the right of acceleration be disclosed as a "de-
fault, delinquency, or similar charge." In reaching this conclusion
the Third Circuit relied heavily on a Federal Reserve Board staff opin-
ion letter,2 issued subsequent to the district court decision, that
also concluded that a right of acceleration was not disclosable as a
charge when there was a requirement that unearned interest be re-
bated.29 The court rejected the contention that it should not con-
sider Pennsylvania's statutory rebate provisions and that, by merely set-
ting forth in the contract a right to accelerate total indebtedness, de-
fendants had violated the disclosure requirements. 30  The court also
rejected the argument that the "meaningful disclosure" standard of
the Truth in Lending laws required a right of acceleration to be dis-
closed."'
The legislative intent and text of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act32 provide a backdrop against -which the McCrackin-Sturman de-
cision may be viewed. Enacted in 1968, the Act was developed to
provide the consumer with meaningful information in order that he
might intelligently "shop around" for credit sources.3  Intended ef-
fects of the legislation included enhancement of economic stabiliza-
tion and strengthening of competition among the various financial in-
stitutions. 4 Consumers litigating under the Truth in Lending laws
"25. Id.; see text following note 69 infra.
26. PA. STAT. Am. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965), set forth in note 18 supra.
27. 527 F.2d at 266.
28. 5 CoNs. CP.D. GuiDE (CCH) f 31,173 (1974), quoted in 527 F.2d at 267
n.22.
29. 527 F.2d at 267.
30. Id. at 268.
31. Id. at 269.
32. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1691 (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
33. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); 12
C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2) (1976) (FRB statement of purpose of Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act); [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962 (legislative history of Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act-House Report and Conference Report). See generally
Boyd, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act-A Consumer Perspective, 45
NOTRE DAME LAw. 171 (1970).
-34. -15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). This section also states that the purpose of the
legislation was to assure a-meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
could compare the various credit terms available and thereby avoid the uninformed
use of credit. Id. Currently within the purview of the legislation are credit billing
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have generally found the provisions construed liberally in order to
foster the remedial purposes of the legislation."5
Prior to the McCrackin-Sturman district court decision, the issue
whether a creditor must disclose a right to accelerate had confronted
the courts only in the class action of Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc.36 In that case defendant had failed to disclose his right to accel-
erate the entire balance of the contract. Although the theory of re-
covery stated in the complaint was defective, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois found on its own initia-
tive a violation of the requirement of section 226.8(b)(4) of Regu-
lation Z that requires a lender to disclose "charges payable in the
event of late payments. 's7  The court reflected on the informative
purposes of the consumer credit statutes and held that it was clear
that an acceleration of indebtedness provision should be disclosed as
a "default, delinquency, or similar charge" within the meaning of sec-
ti6ns 128(a)(9) of the Truth in Lending Act and 226.8(b)(4) of Regu-
lation Z.38 Relying on Black's Law Dictionary, the court adopted
"obligation" and "claim" as synonyms for "charge. '39  The court
also concluded that "charge" had been judicially defined as "a
pecuniary burden or expense."'40 These definitions, later accepted
by the district court in McCrackin-Sturman, were the gravamen of the
holding in Garza that a right of acceleration was a disclosable
"charge.-"41
Subsequent to the McCrackin-Sturman district court decision with
its treatment of Garza as authoritative on the acceleration disclosure
issue,42 but prior to the Third Circuit's decision in the case, numerous
opportunities to consider the matter further were presented at the-dis-
trict court level. The first encounter with the issue was 'by a special
master for the United States District Court for the Northern District
practices, credit card transactions and consumer leases. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West
Cam. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 11976).
35. See, e.g., Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th
Cir. 1973); Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Ore. 1975); John-
son v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. 11L 1974). But see Jones
v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402, 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
36. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. III. 1972).
37. Id. at 959.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 153, 156 (W.D. Pa.
1974).
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of Georgia. In Pollack v. Avco Financial Services, Inc.,43 and Barks-
dale v. Peoples Financial Corp.4 the same special master followed
Garza and the district court McCrackin-Sturman opinion in concluding
that a right of acceleration was a charge that required disclosure.
Barksdale is representative of this reasoning in which the master, after
noting the absence of any special meaning or legislative definition for
the word "charge," reported "[a]s a matter of law that a right of ac-
celeration is a 'charge' that must be disclosed pursuant to Regulation
Z § 226.8 (b) (4)."'4
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia further
considered disclosure of acceleration clauses in the case of McDaniel
v. Fulton National Bank .4  In McDaniel the court adopted the find-
ings of the special master47 and developed a line of reasoning different
from that of the earlier cases. Making observations about the general
nature of "charges" as evidenced by sections 226.4(a) and 226.8(c)
or Regulation Z,48 the master had determined that the term "charges"
referred to specific pecuniary sums that could be assessed against the
customer in addition to the existing contractual obligations. 49  He con-
cluded "that the right of the creditor, upon default of the debtor, to
43. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) If 98,766 (1974).
44. Id. 98,738.
45. Id. at 88,341. Although a report by the same master in Hall v. Sheraton
Galleries, id. 1 98,737, was issued prior to the district court McCrackn-Sturmnan deci-
sion, the report cited Garza and concluded that a provision for collection of attorneys'
fees and acceleration of indebtedness in the event of default was disclosable as a charge
that may be imposed against the borrowing of money. Id. at 88,336.
46. 395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
47. Id. at 423. The master's findings are reported in McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l
Bank, 5 CONS. GCRD. GUIDE (CCH) I 98,683, at 88,263 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
48. Language in § 226.4(a) of Regulation Z is representative of that from which
these observations were drawn. Charges required by this section to be included in
the determination of finance charges are of the following types:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a
discount or other system of additional charges.
(2) Service, transaction, activity or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, points, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an appraisal, investigation, or credit~report.
(5) Charge or premiums for credit life, accident, health, or loss of in-
come insurance, written in connection with any credit transaction ....(6) Charges or premiums for insurance, written in connection with any
credit transaction, against loss of or damage to property or against liability
arising out of the ownership or use of property ....(7) Premium or other charge for any other guarantee or insurance pro-
tecting the creditor against the customer's default gr other credit loss.
(8) Any charge imposed by a creditor upon another creditor for pur-
chasing or accepting an obligation of a customer if the customer is required
to pay any part of that charge in cash, as an addition to the obligation,
or as a deduction from the proceeds of the obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1976).
49. 5 CoNs. CRED. Gum f 98,683, at 88,263.
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accelerate the unpaid balance, cannot reasonably be considered a
'charge' (expense or cost) in any context inasmuch as acceleration, in
and of itself, does not increase the amount of the debt by one penny."5
Coupling the master's findings with its interpretation that Georgia law
prohibited the collection of any unearned interest,5 the district court
determined that there was no need to disclose an acceleration provision
as a "default, delinquency, or similar charge" since no additional tangible
sum could be assessed.5 2  Garza and the McCrackin-Sturman district
court opinion were not considered valid precedent in McDaniel because
the court read those cases as not involving a prohibition on the collection
of unearned interest such as that which the court interpreted Georgia
law to require.5
In Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc.,54 which also arose in the
Northern District of Georgia, Chief Judge Edenfield pointed out that
the court in McDaniel was in error in its interpretation of the Georgia
law regarding collection of unearned interest.55 The Georgia law,
stated in Vernie Jones, was that an acceleration of total indebtedness
clause was unenforceable only if it rendered the contract usurious."
When it considered the disclosure ramifications of a potentially en-
forceable acceleration clause, the Vernie Jones court concluded that,
if a note "made no provision for rebate of unearned interest upon ac-
celeration, the diminution of the period over which the finance charge
would be spread"'57 would constitute a default charge to the consumer.
In requiring disclosure of clauses that on their face provided for an
acceleration of total indebtedness, the Vernie Jones court grounded
its decision on a determination that congressional intent required that
the consumer be made aware of all "charges" that might be assessed
against him.5 8  Whether -the consumer would prevail in any subse-
quent litigation attacking the validity of the charge was not the focus
-of the inquiry. A supplemental opinion in McDaniel v. Fulton Na-
tional Bank acknowledged the correct interpretation of Georgia law
in the Vernie Jones case.5 9
50. Id. at 88,264.
51. 395 F. Supp. at 423.
52. Id. at 426.
53. Id. at 423.
54. 395 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
55. Id. at 907.
56. Id. at 907-08.
57. Id. at 907.
58. Id. at 908-09.
59. See 395 F. Supp. at 425. The supplemental opinion reversed the court's prior
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Other district courts have utilized policy arguments in the decis-
ion to require disclosure of acceleration clauses. Meyers v. Clearview
Dodge Sales, Inc.60 required disclosure of a right of acceleration even
though Louisiana law had provisions for a rebate of unearned. interest.
The court reasoned that disclosure of the right of acceleration fur-
thered important goals of the Truth in Lending laws."1 Citing Garza
v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc.,6 2 Meyers viewed a "charge" as .any pe-
cuniary burden or obligation.68 Woods v. Beneficial Finance Co.,"
noting Meyers with approval, referred to a meaningful disclosure
standard under the spirit of the Truth in Lending laws. 6  Woods did,
however, acknowledge that fine semantic distinctions were necessary
to equate "acceleration" with "charge. 66
Since it has been held axiomatic to judicial review that an admin-
istrative agency's interpretations of its own regulations are entitled to
great deference by the courts,67 it is hardly open to question that the
Third Circuit properly relied on the Federal Reserve Board staff opin-
ion letter that clearly interpreted "default, delinquency, or similar
charges" not to include a right of acceleration when there is a'require-
position and required a disclosure of the right to accelerate total indebtedness. Id.
at 428. The opinion now reasoned that the congressional intent behind constimer
credit legislation required disclosure of all charges that the lender asserts that he has
a right to collect. Id. As in Vernie Jones, whether or not .the state courts could
be utilized to collect the charge was not a determinative issue. Id.
Prior to the supplemental opinion in McDaniel, the district court in Barksdale
v. Peoples Fin., 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975), in reliance on the initial McDan-
iel opinion, overruled the special master's recommendation that the right of acceleration
be disclosed as a "charge." Id. at 114. The court, following the incorrect conclusion
in McDaniel that acceleration of total indebtedness clauses were per se unenforceable
in Georgia, held that since no additional sums could possibly be assessed against the
borrower there was no "charge" to disclose. Id. at 114.
60. 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La. 1974).
61. Id. at 726-27.
62. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Il. 1972), cited in 384 F. Supp. at 726-27.
63. 384 F. Supp. at 726-27.
64. 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975).
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. In light of these distinctions, Woods held prospectively that it was neces-
sary that rights of acceleration be disclosed. Id. One district court case that did
not require disclosure of the right to accelerate was Jones v. East Hills Ford Sales,
Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1975). This case was decided by another judge
of the same district court that had required disclosure in McCrackin-Sturnan. The
Jones court, as did the Third Circuit in its disposition of McCrackin-Sturman, 527
F.2d at 267, afforded great weight to the Federal Reserve Board staff opinion letter
(cited in note 28 supra), which made it clear that it was not necessary to disclose
a right of acceleration as a charge when a rebate of unearned interest was required.
398 F. Supp. at 404. Interestingly, the Jones court did not refer to the Pennsylvania
statutory rebate requirements. The court concluded that the rebate policy of the cred-
itor involved sufficiently. obviated the claim that the customer was being charged. Id.
67.. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 265 (Sth
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ment that unearned interest be rebated." Acceptance of this Fed-
eral Reserve Board position also necessarily required departure
from the determination of Garza and its progeny that a charge is
simply an "obligation" or "burden" rather than a specific additional
pecuniary sum. 69 The surprising part of the McCrackin-Sturman
opinion is its decision to incorporate the Pennsylvania rebate provision
into the loan contract. To incorporate the Pennsylvania statute, the
Third Circuit relied on the famous language of Von Hoffman v. City
of Quincy: "It is also settled that the laws which subsist at the time
and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be per-
formed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly re-
ferred to or incorporated in its terms. ' 70  Reflecting on this quotation,
Professor Corbin has reasoned that the general terminology of such
a statement precluded it from being accepted as. correct. 71  He ac-
knowledged that the operation of a contract could only be determined
with due reference to all applicable statutes but emphatically stated
that the statutes were not incorporated into the contract.7 2
At first blush it seems that with proper reference to the historical
interpretation and purpose of consumer credit laws, the Third Circuit
should have disregarded Von Hoffman and concluded that the accel-
eration clause should have been disclosed since on its face it created
a charge, albeit an unenforceable one under Pennsylvania law.. The
court would have been supported in such a decision by the prior de-
termination in Vernie Jones that a rebate provision should not be read
into a silent acceleration clause. 73 A pro-disclosure opinion would
also have been consistent with the general philosophy of consumer
credit legislation.74 Ironically, it was the consumer oriented Penn-
Cir. 1971); see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bone v. Hibernia Bank,
493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
68. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) If 31,173 (1974), quoted in 527 F.2d at 267 n.22.
69. See, e.g., Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726-
27 (E.D. La. 1974); Pollack v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GuIE (CCH)
1 98,766 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (special master's report). For a discussion of the term
"charge," see Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) V 98,568 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 11 98,683
(N.D. Ga. 1974) (special master's report). See also 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
. 4230 (1970) (definition of delinquency charge).
70. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,.550 (1886).
71. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 551, at 197 (1960).
72. Id.
73. 395 F. Supp. 904, 909 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
74. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
See generally Boyd, supra note 33, at 174.
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sylvania statute that allowed the Third Circuit to deviate from the
"meaningful disclosure" standard that had often mandated disclosures
in prior Truth in Lending cases.75
Under Georgia law, as interpreted in Vernie Jones, acceleration of
total indebtedness clauses are not per se unenforceable. 7 That court
refused to read a rebate requirement into a silent clause because there
was no certainty that a rebate would be required. A rebate of unearned
interest was called for only if acceleration rendered the note usurious. 77
The Pennsylvania statute involved in McCrackin-Sturman is an un-
equivocal rebate requirement. 78 If the Third Circuit had interpreted the
contractual right to accelerate total indebtedness as a disclosable
"charge," the court would have been in the awkward position of requiring
Pennsylvania lenders to disclose to their customers that the lender was
asserting a right to a "charge" that a state statute made it impossible
lawfully to collect. Thus, in the specific factual context of McCrackin-
Sturman, the decision not to require disclosure of the acceleration clause
was the practical resolution of the issue. However, the incorporation
of the Pennslyvania statute into the contract does raise a broad collateral
problem concerning the extent to which state law provisions may per-
meate a Truth in Lending case.79
Although there is nothing really profound in the conclusion that
an acceleration clause does not constitute a "default, delinquency, or
similar charge" when there is a provision for rebate of any unearned
interest, there is a certain gravity to a decision that disclosure of such
a clause will not be required under the Truth in Lending laws. In
its decision not to grasp "meaningful disclosure" as the sustaining phi-
losophy of what would have been a technically weak position, the
Third Circuit appropriately indicated that the standard of meaningful
disclosure should not override the specific provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z. But since the opinion inevitably sur-
faces with an anti-consumer gloss, it is likely that Johnson v. McCrac-
kin-Sturman Ford, Inc. will be viewed as a deviation from the direction
that the courts have determined that consumer credit litigation must take.,
75. See, e.g., Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Ore. 1975);
Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
76. 395 F. Supp. at 909.
77. Id. at 910.
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965). See note 18 supra for the
provisions of the statute.
79. See McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 395 F. Supp. 422, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
354 [Vol. 55
1977] RIGHT OF ACCELERATION 355
After a thorough consideration of the Third Circuit's opinion in Mc-
Crackin-Sturman, a district court recently concluded:
[Elven if we accept the argument that acceleration of the defaulted
loan does not impose a charge under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b) (4),
the customer should be informed of the right of acceleration and
its consequences under the requirement that there be a meaning-
ful disclosure of the terms and conditions of the credit transaction
80
Thus, even though it is a well reasoned opinion, Johnson v. McCrackin-
Sturman Ford, Inc. does not seem destined for the authoritative treat-
ment it deserves.
THoMs C. WATKINS
80. Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 733, 781 (W.D. La. 1976) (supple-
mental opinion).

